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Università degli Studi di Genova
Dipartimento di Informatica, Bioingegneria,
Robotica ed Ingegneria dei Sistemi
Ph.D. Thesis in Computer Science and Systems Engineering
Computer Science Curriculum
Security Analysis




Dottorato di Ricerca in Informatica ed Ingegneria dei Sistemi
Indirizzo Informatica
Dipartimento di Informatica, Bioingegneria, Robotica ed Ingegneria dei Sistemi
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Abstract
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is being increasingly adopted by on- line ser-
vices in order to achieve an adequate level of security. MFA is based on security
protocols, called MFA protocols, that integrate the use of credentials with additional
identity proofs, called authentication factors (based on knowledge, possession or in-
herence). The authentication factors are provided through specific objects, called
authenticators (e.g., hardware token). To date, MFA has been widely adopted in the
most diverse security-critical application scenarios (e.g., online banking, eHealth).
Various solutions have been proposed, leveraging MFA protocols which employ dif-
ferent kinds of authenticators and providing different user experience. When con-
sidering various MFA protocols, few questions may arise. How do MFA protocols
differ in terms of (i) level of protection, (ii) compliance w.r.t. current regulations and
(iii) complexity for the user?
To answer the question concerning the level of protection, traditional verification
techniques for security protocols require a formal specification of the protocol under
analysis. However, as a matter of fact, several service providers employ ad-hoc MFA
protocols and do not disclose their internals. In addition, classical attacker models,
such as the Dolev-Yao adversary, hardly apply. Hence, new protocol modeling tech-
niques and new attacker models should be investigated.
Concerning regulations, public and private authorities have introduced directives and
guidelines for the design of MFA protocols (e.g., recommendations for online pay-
ment services from the European Banking Authority, and the guidelines from NIST
about the digital identity management through MFA). In principle, these initiatives
aim to guide the design of more secure and usable MFA protocols, but there is no
evidence that the existing MFA protocols actually comply with the aforementioned
regulations. Thus, a novel methodology is needed to provide such an evidence.
The ease-of-use is a relevant aspect to be considered in the analysis of an MFA pro-
tocol. Indeed, the use of multiple authenticators in the execution of an MFA protocol
can negatively affect user experience, which can have an impact on its security as
well. However, none of the research works managed to measure the usability of a
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conspicuous number of MFA protocols design. Hence, a methodology for evaluating
the ease-of-use of an MFA protocol should be identified.
In this work, we propose a framework to analyze MFA protocols, which does not
rely on the implementation details, being able to assess the (i) level of protection,
(ii) compliance w.r.t. current regulations and (iii) complexity for the user.
To this aim, we define a specification language which is compatible with the typi-
cal (amount of) information publicly released by service providers on the employed
MFA protocols. For what concerns the security analysis, we propose an evaluation
of MFA protocols in terms of resistance against a set of attacker models, tailored for
the specific case of MFA protocols. For what concerns the regulatory aspects and
best practices, we include the possibility to evaluate a protocol in terms of compli-
ance with a customizable set of requirements and best practices. Furthermore, for
what concerns the ease-of-use of an MFA protocol, we propose a new metric, called
complexity, for evaluating a protocol in terms of efforts that an user is required to
perform during its execution.
The aforementioned framework has been then implemented in a working tool, Mu-
FASA, allowing (even non-expert) users to model an MFA protocol and to automat-
ically analyze it.
Finally, the presented framework has been applied on some selected use cases. First,
it has been employed in the early stages of the design of a novel MFA protocol, inte-
grated into the Citizens’ Clinical Record platform developed in the Trentino region
(Italy). Then, it has been used for performing a latitudinary study on online banking
services, allowing us to model and analyze more than 150 MFA protocols employed
by banks all over the world.
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Digital Identity A digital identity (as defined in [NIS17]) is as a set of attributes that uniquely
describe a user in a specific context (e.g., a payment service).
Authentication The authentication is a process aimed at verifying users’ identity, thus constitut-
ing a prerequisite to allowing access to resources (as defined in [NIS17]). The verification
of a user’s digital identity is performed through a so-called authentication protocol.
Authentication Protocol An authentication protocol, as defined in [NIS17], is a sequence of ac-
tions that allow the digital authentication of a user by verifying the possession and control
of specific categories of credentials called authentication factors (by NIST in [NIS17]) or
authentication elements (by EBA in [Eur13a, Eur13b, Eur15, Eur17]).
Authentication Factor According to both NIST and EBA, an authentication factor (or authen-
tication element) can be of three different types: (i) something the user knows (knowledge
factors); (ii) something the user possesses (ownership factors); or (iii) something the user
is (inherence factors). When an authentication protocol leverages more than one authenti-
cation factor, it is referred to as MFA protocol.
Authenticator An authenticator, as defined in [NIS17], is an object attesting one or more au-
thentication factors. An authenticator is “something the user possesses and controls (typi-
cally a cryptographic module or password) that is used to authenticate the user’s identity”.
An authenticator can attest more than one authentication factor in which case it is referred
to as multi-factor authenticator.
Authenticator Output The authenticator output is a value that every authenticator can generate
on demand ([NIS17]). The ability to generate valid authenticator outputs proves that the
user possesses and controls the authenticator (and thus the corresponding authentication
factors). Nevertheless, the relationship between an authenticator and its output depends on
the nature of the authenticator itself. In the case of a knowledge factor, for instance, an
authenticator and the corresponding output are the same entity (e.g., the password or the
secret code itself).
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Authentication Code According to EBA, an authentication code is a unique code generated by
a cryptography-based authenticator and dynamically linked to a specific remote payment
transaction (as presented in [Eur17]). We consider the authentication code as a specific
authenticator output.
Dynamic Linking With Dynamic Linking, we indicate a set of security measures to be adopted
by bank s.t. (i) the user is made aware of the details of the operation she is going to
authorize; (ii) the authentication code generated is specific details of the operation; (iii) the
authentication code accepted by the payment service provider corresponds to the original
details of the operation chosen by the user; (iv) any change to the details of the operation
results in the invalidation of the authentication code generated.
Endpoint The endpoint, as defined in [NIS17], is the platform or device, i.e., a web browser or
a mobile phone, from which the user starts the MFA protocol.
Verifier A verifier is “an entity that verifies the user’s identity by verifying the user’s possession
and control of the authenticators” [NIS17]. The type of verifier depends on the nature of
the corresponding authenticator. In the case of a memorized secret (e.g., a password), for
instance, the verifier has “only” to check if the provided secret is correct. In the case of
an OTP device, instead, the verifier has to generate an expected OTP and compare it with
the received one in order to validate it. In this work, the verifier coincides with the service
provider server.
Enrollment The Enrollment (defined in [NIS17]) is the phase in which the user is registered
to the service. It encompasses a preliminary process of user identification, called identity
proofing. Through this process, a service provider collects, validates and verifies informa-
tion about an individual.
Binding The binding (according to [NIS17]) is the procedure through which the identity proofs
(i.e., the authenticators and the authentication factor they attest) are linked to the user
identity. This procedure is also called delivery of credentials, authentication devices and
software by EBA in [Eur15, Eur17]). In this work, we further detail the binding phase
in three steps: request, delivery and activation. During the request step, the user informs
the bank that she wants to activate a certain AF. The second step concerns the delivery
of authenticators to the user. The activation step aims to guarantee that AFs are properly
delivered. Binding can be executed by a human operator or remotely, e.g., over the Internet
or via registered mail, potentially leveraging an MFA protocol employing previously bound
authenticators. Note that additional binding operations can be performed in a separate
occasion, i.e., whenever a user wants to associate a new authenticator to her identity.
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Exemptions The exemptions are defined in [Eur15, Eur17] as a set of situations, identified a
slow-risk operations, in which MFA may not be employed. In the online banking context,
these situations can be: (i) checking the account balance, (ii) paying a trusted beneficiary,
(iii) executing a recurring transaction and (iv) executing a bank transfer between user’s
own accounts.
MFA implementation With MFA implementation, we refer to the design choices taken by an





1.1 Context and Motivations
In recent years, the usage of online services has considerably increased. Nowadays, user can
manage their banking accounts, control their personal health records or access to local admin-
istrations services just by connecting to a web platform. The availability of the most diverse
services have grown, allowing people to perform online what they were required to execute in
person. However, although online services provide evident benefits to both service provider
themselves and customers, they introduce new security and privacy issues. Data leakages or data
thefts are a growing concern, as they can harm users in different ways. Therefore, protecting
sensitive data has become of paramount importance.
A fundamental security measure for the protection of online resources is the employment of reli-
able (digital) authentication mechanisms, i.e., procedures that verify the digital identity of users
and check their legitimacy. In this context, users have to exhibit an identity proof that can only be
provided by the users themselves, thus deterring attackers from breaching their online resources.
The most common identity proof consists of user credentials, i.e., username and password. How-
ever, due to the naive behavior of users (e.g., employing the same guessable passwords on several
online services) and the increasing strength of malicious agents that currently operate over the
internet, they are often considered insufficient to achieve an adequate level of security and their
use exposes users to several threats.
To tackle this problem, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is being increasingly adopted by on-
line services. MFA is based on security protocols, called MFA protocols, that integrate the use of
credentials with additional identity proofs, called authentication factors [NIS17]. Authentication
factors are based on either knowledge, possession or inherence. During the execution of an MFA
protocol, authentication factors are provided through specific objects, called authenticators (see
[NIS17]). Therefore, an MFA is designed to force a malicious user to adopt various techniques
8
Figure 1.1: One among the MFA protocols adopted by Nordea - Nordea1.
Figure 1.2: Another one among the MFA protocols adopted by Nordea - Nordea2.
for compromising the authenticators and authenticating instead of the user.
To date, MFA has been widely adopted in the most diverse application scenarios. The majority of
online banking services, eHealth platforms and identity providers implements MFA, proposing
extremely various solutions. Indeed, for authenticating to online services, users are commonly
offered multiple choices of MFA protocols employing different kind of authenticators and pro-
viding different user experience. To better highlight this situation, we propose the following
motivating example.
Motivating Example. Let us consider the online banking services of Nordea1, a major, inter-
national bank based in Sweden. Its customers can opt, among others, for two MFA protocols
for authenticating, leveraging a physical device2 and a mobile application3. We schematically
depict them in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
In the first MFA protocol (Nordea1, from now on) the user is in possession of a device to authen-
ticate. Initially, she connects to the website of the bank and she logs in with her credentials - a
memorized secret, attesting a knowledge factor (1). Then (2) she is prompted with a challenge,





(together with the card and the pin code that unlocks it) - a multi-factor authenticator, attesting
both an ownership and a knowledge factor. Finally, the device returns an answer code (4) that
the user copies in her browser (5).
The second protocol (Nordea2, from now on) is slightly different. Again, the process starts
with the user authenticating to the website (1), hence providing a memorized secret. However,
in this case the remote service sends a notification (2) to a mobile application running on the
user’s smartphone (an Out-of-band authenticator). The application displays the authentication
request (3) to the user that, to confirm, touches the fingerprint reader of the phone, providing and
inherence factor (4). The protocol terminates (5) with the mobile app sending a confirmation
code to the bank server.
When considering these two MFA protocols, few questions arise. In particular, do the two pro-
tocols differ in terms of (i) level of protection, (ii) compliance w.r.t. current regulations and (iii)
complexity for the user?
For what concerns the level of protection, a traditional approach is the formal verification of
the security protocols. There is a rich literature on security protocols that have been either for-
mally validated or proved flawed through this kind of techniques (e.g., [Low96, APS14, BV11,
BM11, CGDW09])). These verification techniques require a formal specification of the pro-
tocol under analysis. Some authors followed this approach also for the MFA protocols (as
[ACZ13, DeF11, Hag07, JCL+17, JJIL16]. However, this can be done only for an MFA pro-
tocol when its implementation or design are given. In many real cases, this is unlikely to happen.
As a matter of fact, several service providers employ ad-hoc MFA protocols and do not disclose
their internals. Therefore, modeling their MFA protocols with traditional techniques is often
unfeasible. As a further consequence, even classical attacker models, such as the Dolev-Yao
[DY81] adversary, hardly apply. Hence, new protocol modeling techniques and new attacker
models should be investigated.
In parallel with the aforementioned initiatives on MFA protocol analysis, public and private
authorities (belonging to various application scenarios) have introduced regulations, directives
and guidelines for the design of MFA protocols. For instance, the European Banking Authority
(EBA) acknowledged the importance of MFA in the online banking context and, starting from
2013, issued directives and recommendations for online payment services [Eur13a, Eur13b]. The
most recent directive is [Eur15] and further related regulatory standards have been also published
(e.g., [Eur17]). Similarly, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [NIS17]
and Payment Card Industry (PCI) [PCI17] have proposed a set of guidelines concerning the
digital identity management through MFA. Analogous initiatives are also carried out by private
companies, which have started releasing their own guidelines [Cen16, Gem15, Pin09]. In princi-
ple, these initiatives aim to guide the design of more secure and usable MFA protocols. However,
there is no evidence that the existing MFA protocols actually comply with the aforementioned
regulations and best practices. Thus, a novel methodology is needed to provide such an evidence.
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The ease-of-use is another relevant aspect to be considered in the analysis of an MFA protocol.
As shown in [CDFN13, KPCS15, WDRJ10], the use of multiple authenticators in the execution
of an MFA protocol can negatively affect user experience, which can have an impact on its
security. However, the majority of research works on the topic (as [DDC18, WDCJ09, Alt16])
usually consists in usability tests performed on the field, involving small groups of people and
surveying their perception on the usage of given sets of MFA protocols. Given the number
of existing MFA protocols and the objective difficulty in presenting to subjects a large set of
protocols to test, none of the authors managed to measure the usability of a conspicuous number
of MFA protocols design. Hence, a methodology for evaluating the ease-of-use of an MFA
protocol should be identified.
In this work, we propose a framework to analyze MFA protocols relying on neither implementa-
tion details nor behavioral specifications. To this aim, we define a specification language which is
compatible with the typical (amount of) information that is publicly released by service providers
on the employed MFA protocols. In practice, we model a protocol in terms of the operations that
a user is required to perform during an authentication session, i.e., in a setting that is the same of
our motivating example. In particular, our language focuses on the concept of authenticator as
the basic building block of any MFA protocol. The semantics of our language is given in Security
Protocol Specification (SPS) language [AMV15].
For what concerns the security analysis, we propose an evaluation of MFA protocols in terms
of resistance against a set of attacker models. These attackers have been tailored for the specific
case of MFA protocols, being modeled following dedicated literature (as [JFR17, Ayy17, LM11])
and NIST definitions [NIS17]. For what concerns the regulatory aspects and best practices, we
include the possibility to evaluate a protocol in terms of compliance with a customizable set
of requirements and best practices. For presenting this feature, we extracted and encoded a
set of requirements (deriving from EBA regulations) and a set of best practices (derived from
[NIS17, PCI16a] and others) and use them for evaluating a protocol. Furthermore, for what
concerns the ease-of-use of an MFA protocol, we propose a new metric, called complexity, for
evaluating a protocol in terms of efforts that a user is required to perform during its execution.
The aforementioned framework has been then implemented in a working tool, MuFASA. By
showing a user-friendly interface, MuFASA allows (even non-expert) users to model an MFA
protocol and to automatically analyze it, giving a report presenting the performed evaluations
and the obtained results.
Finally, the presented framework has been applied on some selected use cases. First, it has
been employed in the early stages of a new MFA protocol design. Then, it has been used for
performing a latitudinary study on online banking services, allowing us to model and analyze
more than 150 MFA protocols employed by banks all over the world.
11
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis cover both the specification and the analysis of an MFA protocol.
More in detail, the contributions are the following.
1. The definition a new specification language for modeling MFA protocols and their pre-
liminary phases (Chapter 3). Such language allows for specifying the main features of an
MFA protocol design, abstracting the details of actual protocol implementations. More-
over, it is quite simple to employ, since the specification is based on client-side actions and
communications that can be easily identified even by non-expert users. The semantics of
our language relies on SPS: a modeling language that is specifically designed to represent
security protocol with a proper abstraction level.
2. The definition of a framework for the analysis of an MFA protocol (Chapter 4). The frame-
work features a set of threat models for the specific context of MFA. Moreover, it allows
for evaluating a protocol in terms of compliance with a set of requirements and best prac-
tices that can be customized on the application scenario. Furthermore, it leverages a newly
defined metric, called complexity, for evaluating the ease-of-use of a protocol basing on
objective measurements.
3. The implementation of the presented framework in a working prototype, the MuFASA
(Multi-Factor Authentication Specification and Analysis) tool, allowing for specifying and
automatically analyzing MFA protocols (Chapter 5). Leveraging such tool, an extensive
application of the proposed methodology has been performed, obtaining encouraging ex-
perimental results on the analysis of MFA protocols employed by different banks around
the world (Chapter 6).
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 - Background
In this chapter, we introduce the reader to the basic notions and definitions on which this
thesis work is based. To this aim, the first section presents the definition of Digital Identity.
Secondly, we present the basic notions regarding Authentication protocols and our basic
assumptions. Furthermore, a section concerning MFA is presented. In particular, this sec-
tion presents the definitions of key concepts related to MFA proposed both by NIST and an
relevant institution in the online banking scenario: the European Banking Authority. The
given definitions are compared and merged in a set of notions that will be used throughout
this thesis.
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Chapter 3 - Specification
In this chapter we introduce the reader to our language for specifying MFA protocols. First,
we discuss the key features of our language and the motivations behind its development.
Then, we present the language itself, defining both its syntax and semantics, in terms
of translation to SPS [AMV15], a variant of Alice & Bob language. For each part of the
translation, an example involving the Nordea1 protocol is provided. Furthermore, a section
related to the compliance of our language with NIST definitions is presented. Finally, the
language for specifying the preliminary phases of an MFA protocol is defined.
Chapter 4 - Analysis Framework
In this chapter, we present our analysis framework. In particular, we firstly define the set of
attacker models (and their application conditions) that can be considered for the protocol
analysis. Furthermore, we describe the possibility of including evaluation criteria related
to best practices and security requirements deriving from the scenario in which the protocol
will be executed. Finally, we introduce the complexity, a metric for evaluating the efforts
required by users for executing the protocol.
Chapter 5 - Framework Implementation
In this chapter, we present MuFASA, a tool implementing the our specification language
and the analysis framework. At first, we introduce the user to the features and the goals
of the protocol. Then, we present the tool architecture and the implementation details.
Finally a demonstration of the execution flow is given.
Chapter 6 - Results
In this chapter, we present the experimental results that we obtained by applying our
methodology on different use cases. At first, we discuss how our methodology has been
adopted during the design of a new MFA protocol for eHealth services. Then, we present a
latitudinary study on a dataset of banks that implement various MFA protocols for protect-
ing their online services. Finally, we discuss potential threats to validity of our findings.
Chapter 7 - Related Work
In this chapter, we present the related work. In particular, we compare our work to existing
publications, in different aspects of protocol analysis.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions
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In this preliminary chapter we introduce the reader to the basic concepts and definitions on which
this work is based.
2.1 Digital Identity
The main topic of this thesis is the so-called authentication. With the term authentication,
[Low97] indicates the process through which “one agent should become sure of the identity
of the other”. However, this definition implicitly relies on another one, i.e. the definition of
(digital) identity.
Intuitively, the digital identity can be considered as the “online representation” of a user. A
precise and unique definition is still on debate: indeed, depending on the context, the user may be
represented through different ways (e.g., with an email, a username, a software, etc.). However,
by taking the definition given by NIST it in [NIS17], the digital identity can be generically
defined as ”the unique representation of a subject engaged in an online transaction”.
Further refinements to this generic definition derive from the specific context in which a user
acts. This fact is also remarked in [NIS17], in which NIST states that “a digital identity is always
unique in the context of a digital service, but does not necessarily need to uniquely identify the
subject in all contexts”. In other words, the digital identity of a user could be based on her
attributes, features or just an email, depending on the specific needs of the application scenario.
Nevertheless, regardless of the application scenario, the creation of a digital identity must be
consequent to a process called identity proofing. This process consists in establishing that a user
is who she claims to be. Once the process has been successfully completed, the user’s identity
for the specific context (or service) can be established.
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An authentication process between the user and the server will hence aim at letting the server
identify the user by recognizing her digital identity. To this aim, it is necessary to establish a
set of elements, called identity proofs, on which to perform the identification. These identity
proofs are associated to the specific digital identity and can be of various nature (depending on
the context). The most classic example of identity proof is a set of credentials (i.e., username
and password). By providing the required identity proofs, the user can convince the server of her
identity, hence being authenticated.
2.2 Authentication Protocols
As the number of personal and sensitive data that is managed by online services grows, defining
mechanisms for transmitting and access data in a secure way is of increasing importance. Secu-
rity protocols are exchanges of messages between two or more agents that try to achieve one (or
more) security goal(s), running in potentially hostile environments. Among the possible security
goals, including the establishment of a shared key or performing a confidential transmission of a
datum, the goal of authenticating one agent to another is the one of our interest.
Achieving the authentication means that, at the end of the protocol, one agent should become
sure of the identity of the other. Trivially, an Authentication protocol is a security protocol that
is designed to assure an agent as to the identity of the other agent with whom is running the
protocol is called.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Authentication protocols (security protocols in general) usually rely on some form of crypto-
graphic operations to achieve their security goals.
In particular, cryptographic operations can be used to guarantee the confidentiality of a message,
to certify the identity of the sender, to prevent repudiation, etc.
In this work, we will consider authentication protocols relying on both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography.
Symmetric Key Symmetric encryption is a type of encryption where only one secret key is
used to both encrypt and decrypt a message. In other words, anyone who possesses the
key can encrypt a message that is confidential to others that possess the same key. On the
other hand, anyone who possesses the key can decrypt and read any message that has been
encrypted with the same key.
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Asymmetric Key The Asymmetric encryption is based on a pair of keys: a public key and a
private key. While the first is made publicly available, the second must be kept secret and
must be properly protected by its owner. These two keys are one the dual of the other. This
kind of encryption is commonly used for two operations:
Public key encryption. In this case, the public key is used to encrypt the message, while
private key is used to decrypt. In this case, the encrypted message can be decrypted only
by theowner of the private key.
Digital Signature. In this case, the message is signed with the private key. Anyone can
read the message, leveraging the public key, implicitly authenticating the identity of the
sender.
As usual in the protocol analysis, we assume perfect cryptography. This means that attackers can
encrypt or decrypt messages only if they possess the correct key.
2.2.2 Channel Properties
In this work, following what presented in [Pro08] we consider channels as communication medi-
ums through which a participant A can transfer data to another participant B. In particular, we
assume that each channel be of several kinds, depending on the security properties it guarantees:
Confidential We assume a channel to be confidential if A can be sure that any message sent over
this channel can only be read by B. In other words, any intruder cannot learn the contents
sent on this channel. Confidential channels do not protect the message transmission against
intercepting messages and replacing them with different ones, spoofing (the intruder may
introduce messages on the channel in the name of other parties), disruption (the message
does not arrive at the intended receiver), replay or re-ordering (messages may not arrive at
the recipient in the order they were sent).
Authentic We assume a channel to be authentic if B can rely that any datum he receives via this
channel indeed comes from A. Moreover, we assume that this kind of channels guarantees
the integrity of the transmitted message. Furthermore, in all channel models, for channels
that are at least authentic, B can be sure that the message was meant for him. The authentic
channel does not protect message transmission against eavesdropping, disruption, replay
or re-ordering.
Secure A channel is defined secure if it is both confidential and authentic.
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2.3 Multi-Factor Authentication
In literature, it has been very difficult to obtain a precise definition of MFA. Indeed, we observed
a lack of a common and consistent terminology in the field: several unofficial definitions, based
on different key features and requirements, have been written depending on the context (or the
environment) in which MFA is implemented. Among the others, we have identified two main
authoritative bodies, namely the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [NIS17]
and the European Banking Authority [Eur13a, Eur13b, Eur15, Eur17]. These authorities target
different aspects of MFA, i.e., the application of MFA for digital authentication management and
for online payment services, respectively. In the following sections, we present the key concepts
characterizing the two sources. Finally, we present the common terminology that will be used
throughout the thesis, obtained after revising and aligning the concepts identified by the two
sources.
2.3.1 Regulatory Definitions - EBA
In order to overcome the lack of guidelines and definitions, lawmakers and institutions started
to publish a few documents to steer the design of this new kind of authentication. However,
lawmakers belonging to different application scenarios provided different interpretations and
specifications. On top of that, these “early” documents did not provide sufficient information to
obtain a homogeneous landscape in the protocols design.
Among different application scenarios, online banking is one of the first ones in which the im-
portance of having stronger authentication mechanisms (if compared to “normal” ones) has been
acknowledged. Starting from 2013, several documents [Eur13a, Eur13b] and directives [Eur15]
have been published, progressively refining and enriching the key definitions characterizing the
MFA until 2017, when various regulatory standards (e.g., [Eur17]) have been released. There-
fore, given this progressive evolution and precision of these definitions, we decided to take them
as a reference in our work.
In the following sections, the definitions provided by EBA in [Eur13a, Eur13b, Eur15, Eur17]
are presented, grouped according to their scope: authentication, identity proofs and preliminary
phases.
2.3.1.1 Authentication
The MFA is defined by EBA in [Eur13a], with the name of “Strong Customer Authentication”.
In this context, the Strong Customer Authentication has been firstly defined in [Eur13a] as: “a
procedure based on the use of two or more of the following elements – categorised as knowledge,
ownership and inherence: i) something only the user knows, e.g., static password, code, personal
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identification number; ii) something only the user possesses, e.g., token, smart card, mobile
phone; iii) something the user is, e.g., biometric characteristic, such as a fingerprint. In addition,
the selected elements must be mutually independent, i.e. the breach of one does not compromise
the other(s)”.
2.3.1.2 Identity proofs
It is worth noting that the definition of Strong Customer Authentication is based on the concept
of authentication elements. These elements can be of three types (knowledge, ownership and
inherence) and must be used to verify the user’s identity.
In [Eur15] and [Eur17], EBA introduced the concept of authentication code. According to EBA,
the authentication code must be the result of the execution of the Strong Customer Authentica-
tion. This code must be only accepted once by the service provider and must be resistant against
the risk of being forged in its entirety or by disclosure of any of the elements upon which the
code was generated.
On the top of that, EBA defines the concept of dynamic linking. The dynamic linking is supposed
to bind the Strong Customer Authentication to a specific operation. To this aim, the following
measures must be implemented
• the user is made aware of the amount of the payment transaction and of the payee;
• the authentication code generated is specific to the amount of the payment transaction and
the payee agreed to by the payer when initiating the transaction;
• the authentication code accepted by the payment service provider corresponds to the orig-
inal specific amount of the payment transaction and to the identity of the payee agreed to
by the payer;
• any change to the amount or the payee results in the invalidation of the authentication code
generated.
2.3.1.3 Preliminary phases
Besides the requirements listed so far, EBA defines further specifications regarding the prelim-
inary phases, i.e., those procedures that have to be completed for allowing a user to execute an
MFA protocol. In particular, [Eur13a] includes some basic requirements for the registration of
the user to the online service and the establishment of the authentication elements. These phases,
called enrollment and provisioning by EBA, are crucial for the security of the Strong Customer
Authentication. Indeed, if the authentication elements are compromised during the preliminary
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phases by a malicious agent, he can easily authenticate instead of the user. About these two
phases, [Eur13a] says: “PSPs should ensure that customer enrolment for and the initial provision
of the authentication tools required to use the internet payment service and/or the delivery of
payment related software to customers is carried out in a secure manner”.
This definition is refined in [Eur17], in the paragraph “delivery of credentials, authentication
devices and software”.
2.3.2 General Purpose Definitions - NIST
In parallel with regulatory aspects belonging to specific use cases, other institutions have started
to publish guidelines and documentations on MFA that can be adopted in various application
scenarios.
Among those, NIST has recently published a document concerning the management of a Digital
Identity [NIS17]. Given both the relevance of the institution and the completeness of the pub-
lished guidelines, we decided to take [NIS17] as a reference for our work. In the following, a
subset of the definitions presented in [NIS17], grouped according to their scope, are reported.
2.3.2.1 Authentication
The definition of authentication provided by NIST is based on the concept of user’s digital iden-
tity, which is defined as “a set of attributes that uniquely describe a user in a specific context”.
According to [NIS17], the verification of a user’s digital identity is performed through a so-called
authentication protocol, that allows for the digital authentication of the user.
An authentication protocol is “a sequence of actions that allow the digital authentication of a user
by verifying the possession and control of specific categories of credentials called authentication
factors”.
2.3.2.2 Identity proofs
According to NIST, an authentication factor can be of three different types: (i) something the
user knows (knowledge factors); (ii) something the user possesses (ownership factors); or (iii)
something the user is (inherence factors). When an authentication protocol leverages more than
one authentication factor, it is referred to as MFA protocol.
In addition to the Authentication Factors, the NIST defines the concept of authenticator. An
authenticator is “something the user possesses and controls (typically a cryptographic module
or password) that is used to authenticate the user’s identity”. An authenticator is an object that
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Table 2.1: Used Definitions.
Definition NIST EBA
Digital Identity Ë Ë (User identity)
Authentication Ë Ë
Authentication Protocol Ë Ë
Authentication Factor Ë Ë (Authentication Element)
Authenticator Ë é
Authenticator Output Ë é
Authentication Code é Ë
Dynamic Linking é Ë
Endpoint Ë é
Verifier Ë é
Enrollment Ë Ë (Registration to the service)
Binding Ë Ë (Delivery of credentials, authentication devices and software)
Exemptions é Ë
MFA Implementation – –
attests one or more authentication factors. Every authenticator can generate an output value on
demand, called authenticator output. The ability to generate valid authenticator outputs proves
that the user possesses and controls the authenticator (and thus the corresponding authentication
factors). In [NIS17], multiple types of authenticators are defined, along with their key features
and references to real-world examples.
For what concerns the platform from which the authentication is started by the user, the NIST
refers to it as the endpoint.
2.3.2.3 Preliminary phases
NIST identifies two preliminary phases for the proper execution of the MFA: enrollment and
binding.
The enrollment, i.e., the registration phase, encompasses a preliminary process of user identifi-
cation, called identity proofing. Through this process, a service provider collects, validates and
verifies information about an individual. Once this process is performed, the service provider is
able to recognize the identity of the individual with an adequate level of assurance.
The so-called binding phase, instead, refers to the establishment of an association between a
specific authenticator and a subscriber’s account, enabling the authenticator to be used — pos-
sibly in conjunction with other authenticators — to authenticate for that account. The binding
procedure can be executed both during or after the enrollment phase.
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2.3.3 Employed Definitions
The glossary of this thesis contains a common terminology that will be used throughout this
work. Such terminology has been obtained after revising and aligning the concepts identified by




In this chapter we present our methodology for the specification of MFA protocols and prelimi-
nary phases.
The following section presents an overview of the approach. Then, the language for modeling
MFA protocols is detailed, in terms of both syntax and semantics. Moreover, compliance of the
presented language w.r.t. NIST definitions (listed in [NIS17]) is evaluated. Finally, the language
for the specification of preliminary phases is proposed.
3.1 Overview
We developed a specification language using the authenticators as building blocks for specifying
a protocol: SLaMP - Specification Language for Multi-Factor Authentication Protocols.
Several reasons support our design choice. First of all, authenticators are the key objects in
an MFA protocol execution, since they attest the authentication factors that allow the user for
being authenticated. Furthermore, a finite set of authenticator types, that can be used in MFA
protocols, is defined by NIST in [NIS17]: this means that common design patterns, features and
security considerations can be found in MFA protocols using the same authenticators. Finally,
various distinguishing features of authenticators can be easily described (even by non-expert
users) even without having details on actual protocol implementations. Hence, in SLaMP, we
consider an MFA protocol as a sequence of authenticators, where each authenticator subsumes a
set of communications, interactions with other entities and security assumptions that characterize
the protocol.
The SLaMP language subsumes a set of operations and communications that are performed
during the protocol execution. The semantic of SLaMP is given in the Security Protocol Spec-
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ification language[AMV15] (SPS, from now on), a variant of the Alice & Bob language with
the addition of few information regarding the messages schemas, the transmitted data and the
communication channels.
In order to assess the proposed language, the compliance of SLaMP with respect to NIST classi-
fication is performed.
Finally, for what concern the specification of preliminary phases, we decided to introduce a
finite set of symbols indicating the different ways to perform an identity proofing and binding
procedure. Indeed, following what presented in [NIS17] and observing real-world solutions, we
realized that few patterns in the executions of such procedures can be identified. Therefore, a
few symbols indicating these patterns are employed.
3.2 SLaMP protocol specification
In this section, SLaMP is presented. The idea is to model each MFA protocol in terms of the
authenticators it involves.
Therefore, we specify an MFA protocol P as a finite sequence of authenticators (A1; . . . ;An),
using “;” to separate the elements of the sequence.
In our framework, an authenticator is uniquely characterized by four main features, i.e., its (i)
type, (ii) I/O channels, (iii) data and (iv) the authentication factors it attests. The general defini-
tion of an authenticator is
δFγ τ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′ (3.1)
where δ,δ′ are data items (discussed in Section 3.2.3), γ,γ ′ are channels (discussed in Section
3.2.2), τ is an authenticator type (discussed in Section 3.2.1) and F is the set of authentication
factors that the authenticator attests. In addition, an authenticator type may be optionally labeled
with ? 1 to indicate that, for each operation, it requires the review and confirmation of the user
(discussed in Section 3.2.4).
We define Ω as the set of all authenticators that can be specified in SLaMP.
In Table 3.1, a brief summary of the notation employed in our modeling language is reported.
In the following sections, we detail how the various aspects characterizing an authenticator are
modeled.
1We use () to denote optional terms.
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Table 3.1: Notation for specifying authenticators in SLaMP.
Authenticator type Data items Data channels
¤ Memorized secret ε No input Fh Manual copy
! Look-up secret opid Operation identifier Fi Inter-process communication
P Hardware authenticator otp One-time password Fo Optical code scan
Software authenticator Fm Mobile telephony network
Authentication factors Additional notations and restrictions
K Knowledge Factor Out-of-band hardware authenticator
O Ownership Factor Æ Out-of-band software authenticator
I Inherence Factor τ ? User confirmation required
3.2.1 Authenticator Types
The type of an authenticator is defined by its physical and behavioral features. We distinguish
among three categories of authenticators, i.e., secrets, hardware and software. Below we describe
them in details.
3.2.1.1 Secrets
A secret is the simplest form of authenticator. Basically, it consists of some information, e.g., a
secret number, that the user exhibits at a certain point of the protocol. We distinguish between
memorized secrets (¤) and look-up secrets (!). The main difference between these two types
is that a memorized secret represents a pure knowledge factor, e.g., a secret pin number, while
a look-up secret is stored on some physical support such as a device or a piece of paper. For
instance, look-up secrets include matrices where each cell contains an access code.
3.2.1.2 Hardware
Hardware authenticators (P ) are devices that carry out some computation, e.g., cryptographic
operations. Hardware authenticators can either work in isolation (i.e., only interacting with the
user) or connect to some other device (e.g., through a USB cable). Nevertheless, they consist of
dedicated hardware and they cannot carry out any task other than that specified by their embedded
program.
The AFs of a hardware authenticator can vary significantly. For instance, a card reader may also
require a secret pin, i.e., it attests both an ownership (the smart card) and a knowledge (the pin)
factor. Notice that the pin of the card reader is not considered a memorized secret (see above)
if it cannot be used as a stand-alone authenticator, e.g., when its purpose is only to protect the
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hardware from unauthorized users. We denote with P[F] a hardware authenticator that attests
the AFs F ⊆ {O, K, I}. For instance, (the type of) the card reader mentioned above is P[O,K].
3.2.1.3 Software
Software authenticators ( ) are the counterpart of hardware authenticators. Their distinguishing
feature is that they consist of programs that run on some general-purpose computing platform,
e.g., a tablet or a smartphone. As for the hardware authenticators, also software authenticators
can attest different AFs. Hence, we apply the same notation introduced above. For instance,
[O] stands for (the type of) a software authenticator that attests an ownership factor.
Example 1. Both Nordea1 and Nordea2 start with the user entering her credentials. This corre-
sponds to a memorized secret ¤. Instead, the two protocols differ on the second authenticator.
In the first case, there is a hardware authenticator that is owned by the user and is activated by
a pin that she only knows. In our language this corresponds to P[O,K]. In the second proto-
col, the second authenticator is a software running on the smartphone of the user that the user
activates through her fingerprint. In symbols this amounts to [O,I].
3.2.2 Data Channels
MFA protocols often rely on more than one communication channel. There are several types of
channels that are commonly adopted and we list them below.
h Human beings are part of the MFA protocols. Their role is often to provide the authenti-
cators with the proper input and collect their output. For this reason we model them as
communication channels.
o Sometimes an authenticator acquires its input through some optical scan interface, e.g., a bar
code or QR code reader.
n The network is the primary communication channel for most internet protocols. The network
channel includes all IP-based communications independently from the link medium (e.g,
WiFi or 4G).
i Sometimes two processes directly communicate through some inter-process channel. For in-
stance, this is very common on the modern smartphones where two apps can directly share
a piece of data.
m The mobile telephony network is also commonly adopted to send authentication codes through
an SMS of a phone call.
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Example 2. Let us consider again the two MFA protocols presented in Section 1.1. In the first
protocol every piece of information is transmitted by the user, i.e., user, password, challenge,
pin and answer. Thus, all these operations occur on the h channel. In the second protocol, the
user only inserts her credentials. All the other communications pass through the network (n
channel).
3.2.3 Data Items
Data items represent the information that an authenticator receives and generates. Although the
internal structure of the communications may be obscure, e.g., because messages are encrypted,
the content of a data item is commonly well-understood. For instance, a hardware authenticator
may return a number to be submitted on a website in order to authorize an operation. Such
a number can be generated through various algorithms (e.g., via RNG or hashing). From our
perspective, all these numbers have the same features, i.e., they are unforgeable, unrepeatable
evidences that only the authenticator can generate. As a matter of fact, a user cannot perceive
any observable difference between them. Therefore, we distinguish between data items only
depending on their role in the protocol. In particular, here we consider three possible data items
that one can infer from the behavior of the authenticator.
ε We use ε to denote that the authenticator receives/sends no data or when the transmitted data
play no role in the authentication protocol.
opid An operation identifier is a piece of information that univocally defines the ongoing op-
eration. It may be of different formats (e.g., a QR-code, an alphanumeric string) and it can
be interpreted only by authenticators.
otp A one-time password is a code generated with some (assumed cryptographically perfect)
algorithm that only the authorized parties can compute and verify. The internal structure of
the otp depends on the inputs received by the authenticator that generates it. For instance,
it can be the next number returned by a secure random number generator, a hash or the
signature of an opid.
Example 3. Both Nordea1 and Nordea2 terminate with the bank server receiving a response
code. In the first case it amounts to the challenge answer. In the second case it is the confirmation
code generated after the notification. In both cases we assume that the authenticators receive an
identification code, i.e., opid, and return an encrypted confirmation code, i.e., otp.
3.2.4 Further Notation and Restrictions
The specification given in (3.1) provides a general definition of an authenticator. Moreover, we
apply few restrictions to the structure of well-formed authenticators.
27
We already mentioned that a distinguishing feature of (software and hardware) authenticators
is whether they inform the user about the ongoing operation. In general, these authenticators
prompt the user with a message with the operation to be authorized, e.g., “transfer 100$ to
account 1234”. Then the user has to confirm the operation. This fact denotes the generation
of an output (an otp in our setting) that is uniquely associated to a specific operation. Such an
association is also called dynamic linking [Eur15, Eur17]. The definition of dynamic linking
given there also states that the user must be aware of the ongoing operation and she has to
explicitly agree on it. We use the label ? to denote an authenticator type that informs the user and
asks for her authorization as discussed above, e.g., P?[O]. When using such label, we assume
that the user is able to properly check the received information and that she stops the protocol
execution when such information does not match with the operation she wants to authorize.
Reasonably, in order to display the operation details, the authenticator must receive an input, i.e.,
γ 6= ε. Well-formed authenticators must respect this requirement.
The Secret authenticator type consists of pure data objects, e.g., passwords or other information
that can be stored on some support. As such, they do not have a proper input/output interaction
(we assume that the user copies the information on some endpoint such as a web browser). For
this reason ¤ and! are not annotated with channels and data items.
Furthermore, we introduce two abbreviations that will simplify the discussion about the out-of-
band authenticators (see Section 3.4 below). In particular we define , P [O] and Æ , [O].
Moreover, to apply these abbreviations two conditions must be satisfied:
• ( ) γ = m∨ γ ′ = m; i.e., input or output are transmitted through mobile channels and,
• (Æ ) γ = n∨ γ ′ = n, i.e., input or output are transmitted through network channels.
Example 4. We combine the observations of Examples 1, 2 and 3 to provide the specification for
Nordea1 and Nordea2. The first protocol (Nordea1) corresponds to the following specification.
¤; opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp (3.2)
For Nordea2, we replace [O,I] with the abbreviation introduced above, i.e., Æ[I]. Moreover,
we notice that the authenticator informs the user about the ongoing operation (?). Thus, the
resulting specification for the second protocol is as follows.
¤; opidFn Æ?[I] Fn otp (3.3)
Finally, we define two utility functions, i.e., RunsOn and End point.
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RunsOn : A→ {Desktop,Mobile,Hardware,⊥} binds each authenticator to the platform where
it runs. Intuitively, RunsOn(a) = d means that the authenticator a is executed on a platform
of type d. For instance RunsOn(opidFn Æ?[I] Fn otp) = Mobile. We use ⊥ when a certain
authenticator is not executed, e.g., RunsOn(¤) =⊥.
Instead, Endpoint : P→ {Browser,App} returns the user endpoint of a given protocol. For in-
stance, Endpoint(¤; opidFn Æ?[I] Fn otp ) = Browser.
3.3 Semantics of SLaMP
In this section we present the semantics of SLaMP (presented in Section 3.2). We define the
semantics in terms of its translation into a well-known state-of-the-art specification, namely SPS
[AMV15]. Notice that this serves also as a basis for the implementation of a translator from our
language for MFA protocol into the SPS specification.
3.3.1 Roles
In our specification, we assume that the participants to the MFA protocol executions, i.e., the
Roles of the protocol, belong to a finite set. This set is composed as follows.
Endpoint (E) The Endpoint entity represents the browser or the application from which the
protocol is started. One may consider it as a mere medium for transmitting data to the
Server. In our modeling, instead, we use a specific role for this entity. This allows for better
specifying the possible interactions and communications with the User, the Authenticators
and the Server.
Depending from where the protocol is started, the endpoint could be of two types. In
the case that a protocol is started from a desktop computer, we assume the Endpoint to
be a browser installed on such computer. On the contrary, if a protocol is started from a
mobile device, we assume that the endpoint is a native mobile application running on the
smartphone of the user.
Authenticators (A1,. . ., An) In our modeling, each authenticator employed in the protocol ex-
ecution has a role on its own. This allows us to model all the possible communications
of various types of authenticators (leveraging IPC, network, etc.) and specific interactions
with the user.
It is worth noting that memorized and look-up secrets have not a role by themselves in the
protocol. Being either memorized or calculated by the User, these two kinds of secret are
modeled as a secret knowledge that is shared between the User and the Server.
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User (U) In our modeling, the user has a specific role in the protocol execution. She is required
to perform actions and interact with the endpoint and with the authenticators. In our mod-
eling, we assume that she is the only one that can start the protocol execution. Moreover,
we assume that she performs every action in a proper way, i.e., not making mistakes and
not leaking any secret, authentication factor or authenticator output.
Server (S) The Server belongs to the online service on which the user wants to authenticate. We
assume that any “client” (e.g., the Endpoint and every Authenticator) can authenticate the
Server leveraging public certificates.
Telephony Server (T) For communicating through the mobile telephony network, the Server
relies on an external Telephony Server or module. This server only communicates to the
clients through the mobile telephony network and communicates with the Server for re-
ceiving instructions and transfer the data that has been sent by the authenticators.
3.3.2 Channels
Each role transmits and receives data through various communication channels. These channels
can be of various kind, ranging from network-based channels (e.g., HTTPS connection) to “fic-
tive” channels (e.g., the interactions between the authenticator and the user). In our modeling
language, we consider two channels for every connection between two roles, depending on the
“direction” of the data transmission. We generically indicate with A to B the communication
channel through which the role A sends data to the role B, where to indicates the direction of the
data transmission. Below we briefly introduce the channels appearing in our specifications as
well as their technical features.
E to S, S to E These two channels model the communication between the Endpoint and the
Server. Such communication can occur over a unilateral TLS channel, relying on a public
certificate. Therefore, we assume E to S to be confidential only, while S to E is assumed
to guarantee confidentiality and authenticity (E can authenticate S through its certificate).
S to A, A to S These two channels model the communication between the Server and an Au-
thenticator. These channels are activated during the binding procedure, in which the shared
secrets (including those for establishing a secure connection) are distributed in a controlled
environment. For instance, A may share a symmetric key with S that has been generated
during the process. For this reason, we assume that these channels are authentic and con-
fidential.
U to A, U to A These two fictive channels model the interactions between the User and an Au-
thenticator. We assume that the user keeps the authenticator carefully, being the only one
who can use it. Additionally, we assume that, by default, every authenticator is employed
in a “protected” environment, i.e., with no malicious agents eavesdropping data.
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U to E, E to U These two fictive channels model the interactions between the User and the End-
point. These communications take place through the screen and the keyboard of the device
on which the protocol is executed. By default, we assume than any input of the user is
confidential w.r.t. the Endpoint. On the other hand, we assume that the communication
from E to U is both confidential and authentic (i.e., the Endpoint has a strict interaction
with only one user).
E to A, A to E These two channels model a communication between the Endpoint and the Au-
thenticator, e.g., leveraging an USB interface. In our modeling, we assume that such com-
munications are performed leveraging specific USB drivers or inter-process-communication
primitives that have been implemented in a proper way. In other words, we assume (by
default) that these channels are protected from illegal accesses, being both confidential and
authentic.
A to T, T to A This couple of channels represents the transmission of data between an Authen-
ticator to the Telephony Server via the telephony network. In the past, there have been
concerns on the security properties of the telephony network [MKTM16, MBSS13]. Nev-
ertheless, here we assume it to be both confidential and authentic. The main reason is that
attackers that can effectively compromise this two properties on the telephony network,
although possible, are out of scope of this work.
T to S, S to T These two channels model the communications between the server and the Tele-
phony Server. We assume that these communications are performed over a secure connec-
tion, guaranteeing confidentiality and mutual authentication (e.g., a VPN).
It is worth noting that a Data Channel specified in SLaMP (see Section 3.2.2) may refer to one
or more of the presented communication channels. For instance, if an authenticator receives an
input through the optical channel, S to E and E to A are involved, since the Server must send the
input to the Endpoint in order for the authenticator to read it. On the contrary, if an authenticator
sends the otp through the network, this maps to the only A to S channel.
3.3.3 SPS specification
We have defined the semantics of our language in terms of Security Protocol Specification lan-
guage [AMV15] (SPS, from now on), a variant of existing Alice-and-Bob languages. Indeed,
SPS specifies various additional features with respect to these languages (e.g., communication
channels), covering all the aspects that we consider in our framework.
The syntax of SPS is reported in EBNF form in Listing 3.1. An SPS specification relies on six
sections.
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SPS ::= Types : (TYPE IDENTs; )∗
Mappings : (FUNC : TYPEs → TYPE; )∗
Formats : (FUNC(TYPEs); )∗
Knowledge : (ROLE : MSGs;)∗[ where ROLE 6= ROLE ( & ROLE 6= ROLE )∗]
Actions : (ROLE CHANNEL ROLE : MSG | ROLE : TYPE VAR)∗
Goals : (ROLE authenticates ROLE ON MSG | MSG secret of ROLEs )∗
MSG ::= CONST | VAR | FUNC(MSGs)
IDENT ::= CONST | VAR | FUNC
ROLE ::= CONST | VAR
TYPE ::= Agent | Number | PublicKey | PrivateKey | SymmetricKey | Bool | Msg
CHANNEL ::= [ • ]→ [ • ]
Listing 3.1: EBNF of SPS specification.
In the Types section, all constants and variables are declared, using a set of pre-defined types.
Among these types, the type Agent is used to identify Roles, i.e., the participants to the pro-
tocol; the Number type is used to indicate a generic fresh number/value; other types define
various kinds of keys, boolean values and the generic Msg type, subsuming all types. The IDEN-
TIFIER of each specified type can be a constant (CONST), a function (FUNC) or a variable (VAR);
CONST and FUNC are alphanumeric strings starting with a lower-case letter, while VAR is an
alphanumeric string starting with an upper-case letter.
In the Mappings section, it is possible to specify a special kind of function symbols that can
be used to describe pre-existing setup of long-term keys. In this section, it is hence possible to
define shared keys for agents and public key infrastructures.
In the Formats section, one can specify function symbols that basically represents a concate-
nation of information. Formats are used to abstractly represent how the concrete implementation
structures the clear-text part of a message, allowing to generate (in the SPS translation to formal
models) implementations with real-world formats such as TLS.
In the Knowledge section, it is possible to specify the initial knowledge of each of the protocol
roles. For instance, it is possible to declare the knowledge of shared secrets or other principals.
The Actions section contains both the creation of new fresh values and the messages that are
exchanged between the roles. In the first case, the action contains the role creating the variable
along with the type and the name of the variable itself. In the latter, the single line includes a
the two roles involved in the communication, the employed Channel and the transmitted data
(Msg). In particular, the type CHANNEL allows for specifying authentic, confidential, and secure
channels as •→,→• and •→ •, respectively. Instead, the transmitted data can be constituted of
constants, variables and functions. Among these functions, a set of fixed cryptographic function
symbols (included in SPS by default) can be indicated. These functions are asymmetric and sym-
metric encryption (crypt and scrypt), digital signatures (sign), hash and keyed-hash functions
(hash and mac), and modular exponentiation (exp) and multiplication (mult). It is worth noting
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1 Types :




6 shk : Agent , Agent -> SymmetricKey ;
7
8 Formats :




13 A: A, B, shk(A,B), g;
14 B: B, A, shk(A,B), g;
15
16 Actions :
17 A: Number X
18 A -> B : scrypt(shk(A,B), f1(A,B,exp(g,X)))
19 B: Number Y
20 B -> A : scrypt(shk(A,B), f1(B,A,exp(g,Y)))
21 A: Number Payload
22 A -> B : scrypt(exp(exp(g,Y),X), f2(Payload))
23
24 Goals :
25 Payload secret of A,B
Listing 3.2: Example of protocol specification in SPS.
that, as a consequence of the specified actions, some implicit operations may take place. For
instance, when receiving an encrypted message, an agent would implicitly decrypt it and keep
it in its knowledge, if it is in possession of the proper key. Moreover, after receiving a known
variable, an agent would implicitly check its value and stop further actions if the received value
is not the one expected.
Finally, the Goals section includes the goals the protocol aims to achieve, i.e., secrecy and
authentication goals.
An example of SPS specification of a protocol is reported in Listing 3.2. In the specified protocol,
two agents A and B use a symmetric key shk(A, B) to establish a fresh Diffie-Hellman key and
securely exchange a Payload message. The Types section (lines 1-3) includes the specification of
the two agents (A,B) and the constant value g. The Mappings section contains the structure of the
shared key (lines 5-6). The Formats section includes the specification of two message formats,
for transmitting the half-key from an agent to the other (line 9) and the payload (line 10). The
Knowledge section contains the specification of the initial knowledge of both the agents, sharing
the (secret) symmetric key and a g value (lines 13 ad 14, respectively). The Actions section
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contains the messages exchanged by the agents and their internal operations. A creates the secret
exponent X for the Diffie-Hellman exchange (line 17). Then, it computes the half-key exp(g,
X), inserts it into format f1, encrypts the message with the shared key shk(A, B) and sends
it to B leveraging a standard insecure channel (line 18). Since the encryption key is shared, B
is able to decrypt the message and obtain the content in f1. B does the same actions as A: it
creates the secret exponent Y (line 19), it computes the half-key exp(g, X), it inserts it into
format f1, encrypts the message with the shared key shk(A, B) and sends it to A leveraging the
channel in the opposite direction (line 20). At this point, A generates a generic Payload (line 21).
Finally, A inserts the Payload into format f2, encrypts the message with the “composed” key,
exp(exp(g,Y),X), and sends it to B (line 21). B is able to decrypt the message, combining the
known variables and obtaining the Payload.
Given an SPS specification σ, we say that it is valid, in symbols ` σ if none of its goals are
violated. Otherwise, we say that σ is invalid (6` σ).
3.3.4 Translation into SPS
In this section, we define the SPS semantics of SLaMP. The semantics is given in terms of the
function Sem : SLaMP→ SPS.
The definition of the Sem function requires us to introduce a number of utility functions. Each
utility function is responsible for building a fragment of the final specification. All the fragments
are then composed together by Sem. In the following sections we describe these functions, then,
in Section 3.3.4.7, we provide the definition of Sem.
3.3.4.1 Actions Function
We start by defining the function Actions, that is responsible for building the list of SPS ac-
tions out of an SLaMP specification. In symbols, Actions(P) = Actions(A1; . . . ;An) = PRE ·
Actions1(A1) · . . . ·Actionsn(An), where (i) PRE is a fixed list of SPS actions (given in Listings
3.3), and (ii) the function Actionsk(Ak) is defined in Section 3.3.4.1.1. The symbol · denotes the
concatenation between two lists.
U: Msg Operation
U →• E: Operation
E →• S: Operation
Listing 3.3: Actions of
PRE.
Intuitively, PRE models the list of actions that must be executed
at the start of every protocol. Indeed, in our modeling, an MFA
protocol starts when the User decides to perform an Operation
on the Server. Such operation is firstly created as a fresh value, as
specified in the first line of Listing 3.3. Then, the Operation is
inserted by the User on her Endpoint (from which we assume she
starts the protocol execution) - see line 2. Such operation request is then forwarded from the End-
point to the Server (line 3). At this point, the operations and interactions with the authenticators
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will start.
3.3.4.1.1 Actions(A1; . . . ;An) The translation of the authenticators to actions is modeled with
the function Actions, defined as
Actions(A1; . . . ;An) = PRE ·Actions1(A1) · . . . ·Actionsn(An)
without risk of misunderstanding, we use Actionsk to denote the application of function Actions
on the k-th authenticator.
Again, Actionsk amounts to the concatenation of the results of three functions, i.e., Actionsink ,
Actionsmidk and Actions
out
k , that we define below. In symbols, Actionsk(δ Fγ τ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) =
Actionsink (δFγ τ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) ·Actionsmidk (δFγ τ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) ·Actionsoutk (δFγ τ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′).
Definition of Actionsink . This function returns the list of actions corresponding to the input of a
given authenticator. The extensional definition of Actionsink is given in Table 3.2. in the following,
further details on possible values of Actionsink are given.
Actionsink (opidFhτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) where O ∈ F . Indicates a list of actions allowing the Server
(S) to transmit opid to the Authenticator (Ak) relying on the manual copy of the user.
Obviously, the manual input of the user is consequent to a set of communications and
operations that take place before that particular action. It is worth noting that, in this
work, we assume that an opid is based on two elements. Firstly, we assume that an opid
contains a reference to the Operation that the User has communicated to the Server. Sec-
ondly, we assume that it is associated to fresh value, for preventing potential replay attacks.
Therefore, the first operation of the list indicates that the Server generates a fresh, unique
identifier (UniqueID) of the Operation.
The opid, expressed as a format containing the combination of Operation and UniqueID,
is then sent from the Server to the Endpoint. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, we assume
that the opid is created for (and can be read by) the specific authenticator. This fact is
modeled by using a symmetric encryption function (scrypt - one of the base functions
of SPS) for encrypting the opid with a specific decoding key dK(S,Ak), which is shared
between the Authenticator and the Server. At this point, the User takes opid from the
Endpoint (this action is modeled as a transmission of the encrypted opid from E to U) and
she inserts it into the Authenticator.
35
Table 3.2: Extensional definition of Actionsink .
Input Output
opidFhτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O ∈ F
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E •→ • U: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
U •→ • Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFhτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O 6∈ F
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E •→ • U: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
U →• Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFoτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O ∈ F
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E •→ • Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFoτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O 6∈ F
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E →• Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFnτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFiτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O ∈ F
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E •→ • Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFiτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O 6∈ F
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E →• Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFmτ(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′
S : Number UniqueID
S •→ • T: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
T •→ • Ak: scrypt(dK(S,Ak), opid(Operation,UniqueID))
otpFhτ[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O ∈ F
S •→ • E: hash(seed(S,Ak))
E •→ • U: hash(seed(S,Ak))
U •→ • Ak: hash(seed(S,Ak))
otpFhτ[F] Fγ ′ δ′
where O 6∈ F
S •→ • E: hash(seed(S,Ak))
E •→ • U: hash(seed(S,Ak))
U →• Ak: hash(seed(S,Ak))
otpFmτ[F] Fγ ′ δ′
S •→ • T: hash(seed(S,Ak))
T •→ • Ak: hash(seed(S,Ak))
otpFmτ?[F] Fγ ′ δ′
S: Number UniqueID
S •→ • T: crypt(pK(Ak),scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,UniqueID)))
T •→ • Ak: crypt(pK(Ak),scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,UniqueID)))
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Actionsink (opidFhτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) where O 6∈ F . This case refers to the possibility that an authen-
ticator, receiving an input via a human, does not attest an Ownership factor (e.g., gets
stolen). The list of actions remains the same w.r.t. the case with the ownership factor,
except for the last one, in which the channel between the User and the Authenticator loses
the authenticity property.
Actionsink (opidFoτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) where O ∈ F . This is the case in which the Authenticator re-
quires to scan a barcode/QR code in order read the input provided by the Server. It is
worth noting that the scanning operation is usually performed on a display, hence - in
this case - opid is a sort of a barcode/QR code to be shown on the Endpoint. The list
of operations starts with the Server generating a unique identifier (UniqueID) related to
the specific Operation. Consequently, the Server implicitly generates the opid containing
Operation and UniqueID. As for the previous case, the opid must be read only by the
specific Authenticator with the proper decoding key. Hence, the Server sends the opid,
encrypted with dK(S,Ak) (a decoding key shared with the authenticator) to the Endpoint.
The Authenticator has to scan the opid from the display of the endpoint. This action is
modeled as a transmission of opid from the Endpoint to the Authenticator, that implicitly
decrypts it, leveraging the symmetric key dK(S,Ak).
Actionsink (opidFoτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) where O 6∈ F . In this case, we refer to an authenticator that
does not attest an Ownership factor and receives an input by scanning a code from the
Enpoint. The list of actions remains the same w.r.t. the case in which O ∈ F , with the ex-
ception of the last one, in which the channel between the Endpoint and the Authenticator
loses the authenticity property.
Actionsink (opidFnτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′). This case models the transmission of the opid from the Server
to the Authenticator leveraging a the network. For this input of Actionsink , the resulting
list of actions is constituted by an internal operation and a data transmission. At first,
the Server creates the UniqueID. Then, the Server sends the opid (encrypted with the
decoding key dK(S,Ak)) to the Authenticator.
Actionsink (opidFiτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) where O ∈ F . This is the case in which the Authenticator is di-
rectly connected to the endpoint, either leveraging an USB interface (if it is an hardware
device) or a direct communication between the software application and the endpoint. The
corresponding list of actions starts with an internal operation, through which the Server
generates a UniqueID related to the chosen operation. The opid is then sent from the
Server to the Endpoint, encrypted with the decoding key dK(S,Ak). At this point, the
Endpoint transmits the obtained opid to the connected Authenticator.
Actionsink (opidFiτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′) where O 6∈ F . In this case, we refer to an authenticator which
is connected to the endpoint, receives an input via USB or IPC and, does not attest an
Ownership factor. The list of actions remains the same w.r.t. the “standard” case, with the
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exception of the last one, in which the channel between the Endpoint and the Authenticator
loses the authenticity property.
Actionsink (opidFmτ
(?)[F] Fγ ′ δ′). In this case, the Server contacts the Authenticator through the
telephony network, leveraging the Telephony Server. It is assumed that the Service Provider
has enough information to establish a communication with the correct authenticator, i.e.,
the one associated to the user’s identity (in the case of an Out-of-Band Hardware authenti-
cator, we assume that the Server knows the phone number associated to the user’s account).
The first operation is internal: the Server generates an UniqueID associated to the opera-
tion chosen by the user. Then, the Server contacts the Telephony Server, that could reach
authenticators through the mobile telephony network. The Server transmits the opid to
the Telephony Server, encrypted with the decoding key which has been shared with the
Authenticator (dK(S,Ak)). The Telephony Server finally sends the opid to the correct
Authenticator, through the telephony network.
Actionsink (otpFhτ[F] Fγ ′ δ
′) where O ∈ F . In this case, the Server transmits an otp to the End-
point, requiring the user to copy it and put it on the Authenticator. The Server firstly
generates an otp, not depending from an opid. The structure of this otp may be of the
most various types. However, an otp - by its nature - has to be a fresh value of limited va-
lidity over time. Therefore, we model it as a value which has been generated depending on
a seed that has been previously shared between the Server and the Authenticator. Hence,
the first action of the list, represent the Server sending the otp to the Endpoint. The otp
is generated using the hash function (as suggested by [NIS17] for the generic single-factor
authenticator), taking seed(S,Ak) as an input (as mentioned in Section 3.3.4.5, we assume
that the seed has been correctly distributed from the Server to the specific Authenticator
k). Then, the User reads the otp from the Endpoint. This is modeled with a transmission
from E to U. Finally, the User inserts the otp on the Authenticator (transmission from U
to Ak).
Actionsink (otpFhτ[F] Fγ ′ δ
′) where O 6∈ F . This case refers to an authenticator, receiving an otp
by manual insertion, that does not attest an Ownership factor. The list of actions remains
the same w.r.t. the “standard” case, with the exception of the last one, in which the channel
between the Endpoint and the Authenticator loses the authenticity property.
Actionsink (otpFmτ[F] Fγ ′ δ
′). In this case, the Server sends an otp to the Authenticator leverag-
ing the Telephony Server. As for the previous case, the Server generates an otp through a
hash function, taking the shared seed as an input. Then, it sends it to the Telephony Server
(first action of the list). Finally, the Telephony Server send the otp to the Authenticator.
Actionsink (otpFmτ
?[F] Fγ ′ δ′). In this case, the Server for transmits an otp to the Authenticator
leveraging the Telephony Server. However, since the Authenticator displays the ongoing
information, this means that the opid has also to be transmitted. In this particular case, the
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Table 3.3: Extensional definition of Actionsmidk .
Input Output
δFγ τ [{K}∪F] Fγ ′ δ′ U •→ • Ak: fK(U,Ak)
δFγ τ [{I}∪F]Fγ ′ δ′ U •→ • Ak: fI(U,Ak)
δFγ τ [{K, I}∪F]Fγ ′ δ′
U •→ • Ak: fK(U,Ak)
U •→ • Ak: fI(U,Ak)
δFγ τ
?[O]Fγ ′ δ′ Ak •→ • U: Operation
δFγ τ
?[{K}∪F]Fγ ′ δ′
U •→ • Ak: fK(U,Ak)
Ak •→ • U: Operation
δFγ τ
?[{I}∪F]Fγ ′ δ′
U •→ • Ak: fI(U,Ak)
Ak •→ • U: Operation
δFγ τ
?[{K, I}∪F]Fγ ′ δ′
U •→ • Ak: fK(U,Ak)
U •→ • Ak: fI(U,Ak)
Ak •→ • U: Operation
¤
U →• E: mem(S,U,k)
E →• S: mem(S,U,k)
!
S : Number Coords
S •→ • E: Coords
E •→ • U: Coords
U •→ • Ak: Coords
Ak •→ • U: exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)
U →• E: exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)
E →• S: exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)
otherwise /0
Server generates an otp that contains an opid (that can only be decoded with the proper
dK key). Then, it creates an otp, signing it with the public key of the Authenticator k, and
sends such a message to the Telephony Server. The Telephony Server finally transmits the
otp to the Authenticator, leveraging the mobile telephony network. The Authenticator can
implicitly decode the message and get the information regarding the Operation that has to
be displayed to the user.
Definition of Actionsmidk (τ[F]). This function returns the list of actions deriving from the type
and the set of attested authentication factors of a given authenticator. The extensional definition
of this function is presented in Table 3.3. In the following paragraph, further details of possible
values of the functions are presented.
Actionsmidk (τ [{K}∪F]). In the case that an authenticator testifies an additional Knowledge fac-
tor, an additional action must be considered. This action models the interaction of the User
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(U) with the Authenticator (Ak), providing the knowledge factor (fK(U,Ak)) in order to
unlock the functionality of the Authenticator. If the received knowledge factor is correct,
the rest of the actions (appended after this one by the function Actions) will be executed.
Actionsmidk (τ [{I}∪F]). As for the previous case, when an Authenticator testifies an additional
Inherence factor, an additional action has to be considered: the interaction of the User (U)
with the Authenticator (Ak), providing the inherence factor (fI(U,Ak)) in order to unlock
the functionality of the Authenticator.
Actionsmidk (τ [{K, I}∪F]). When an Authenticator testifies additional Knowledge and Inherence
factors, two actions modeling the interaction of the User (U) with the Authenticator (Ak),
providing both the knowledge and the inherence factors (fK(U,Ak), fI(U,Ak)) must be
included.
Actionsmidk (τ
?[O]). A single-factor Authenticator, displaying information regarding the ongoing
operation, implicitly requires an additional action. The action specifies a communication
from the Authenticator (Ak) to the User (U), which models the fact the User is shown the
critical information regarding the operation that she is about to authorize. At this point,
since the variable Operation has been initially created by the User, an implicit check such
variable is performed. If the value of Operation is the one expected, i.e., it belongs to
the knowledge of the user, the rest of the actions are executed. Instead, if the operation
displayed to the user does not match with what she is expecting, the protocol should stop:
by continuing the protocol execution, indeed, another (potentially malicious) operation
may be authorized.
Actionsmidk (τ
?[{K}∪F]). In the case that an Authenticator, attesting an additional Knowledge
factor, displays information regarding the ongoing operation, two actions are required.
These two actions model a) the transmission from the User to the Authenticator of the
knowledge factor and b) the fact that the Authenticator displays to the User the information
about the operation. In this case, two implicit checks on fK and Operation are executed
by the Authenticator and the User, respectively.
Actionsmidk (τ
?[{I}∪F]). As for the previous case, if an Authenticator, attesting an additional
Inherence factor, displays information regarding the ongoing operation, two actions are
required. Trivially, these two actions model a) the transmission from the User to the Au-
thenticator of the inherence factor and b) the fact that the Authenticator displays to the User
the information about the operation. The values of fI and Operation must be checked in
order to proceed with the correct execution of the protocol.
Actionsmidk (τ
?[{K, I}∪F]). In the case that an Authenticator, attesting additional Knowledge and
Inherence factors, displays information regarding the ongoing operation, two actions are
required. Trivially, these three actions model a) the transmission from the User to the
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Authenticator of both the knowledge and inherence factors and b) the fact that the Au-
thenticator displays to the User the information about the operation. Also in this case, the
values of the variables have to be properly checked.
Actionsmidk (¤). When considering ¤, a particular list of actions must be included in the speci-
fication. Indeed, since ¤ is modeled as a shared knowledge, the list would start with the
User inserting the k− th memorized secret on the Endpoint. The Endpoint will forward
the memorized secret to the Server. If the received memorized secret is correct, the actions
following this list will be executed.
Actionsmidk (!). In the case of!, a particular list of actions must be included. The Authenticator
is modeled as a device having a set of pre-shared values (lus). The list of actions starts
with the Server generating a set of coordinates for retrieving the correct secret (modeled as
a fresh variable Coordinates). The Coordinates are sent to the Endpoint. At this point,
the User reads the coordinates from the Endpoint (transmission from E to U) and “puts”
them on the Authenticator (transmission from U to Ak). Leveraging the lus mapping and
the coordinates, a value is returned, obtained as a math calculus. Here we model it with the
function exp. The User inserts the obtained secret to the Endpoint. The Endpoint sends it
to the Server, leveraging an HTTPS channel. If the received secret is correct, the actions
following this list will be executed.
Definition of Actionsoutk . This function generates the list of actions representing the operations,
interactions and transmissions that allow the Authenticator (A) to transmit the generated output
to the Server (S). The extensional definition of this function is presented in Table 3.4. In the
following, we give further detail for every possible input of Actionsoutk .
Actionsoutk (τ [F] Fh otp) where O ∈ F . In this case, the Authenticator communicates the otp to
the Server leveraging some human actions. The list of actions starts with the Authenticator
(Ak) generating an otp without receiving any input. As previously mentioned, we consider
this kind of otp to be generated by a hash function, which takes seed(S,Ak) (i.e., a seed
that has been previously shared between the Server and the Authenticator k) as input. The
generated otp is read by the User (in the first action). Then, the otp is copied by the user
on the Endpoint. Finally, the Endpoint sends it to the Server for verification. If the value
of the received otp is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will be
executed.
Actionsoutk (τ [F] Fh otp) where O 6∈ F . This case refers an authenticator generating (without
any opid as input) an otp to be manually copied that does not attest an Ownership factor.
Except for the first action, in which the channel between the Authenticator and the User is
not confidential, the set of actions is identical w.r.t. the case in which O ∈ F .
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Table 3.4: Extensional definition of Actionsoutk .
Input Output
τ [F] Fh otp
where O ∈ F
Ak •→ • U: hash(seed(S,Ak))
U →• E: hash(seed(S,Ak))
E →• S: hash(seed(S,Ak))
τ [F] Fh otp
where O 6∈ F
Ak •→ U: hash(seed(S,Ak))
U →• E: hash(seed(S,Ak))
E →• S: hash(seed(S,Ak))
τ [F] Fn otp Ak •→ • S: hash(seed(S,Ak))
τ [F] Fi otp
where O ∈ F
Ak •→ • E: hash(seed(S,Ak))
E →• S: hash(seed(S,Ak))
τ [F] Fi otp
where O 6∈ F
Ak •→ E: hash(seed(S,Ak))
E →• S: hash(seed(S,Ak))
τ [F] Fm otp
Ak •→ • T: hash(seed(S,Ak))
T •→ • S: pair(Ak,hash(seed(S,Ak)))
opidFγ τ (?)[F] Fh otp
where O ∈ F
Ak •→ • U: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
U →• E: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFγ τ (?)[F] Fh otp
where O 6∈ F
Ak •→ U: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
U →• E: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFγ τ (?)[F] Fn otp Ak •→ • S: crypt(inv(pK(Ak))),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFγ τ (?)[F] Fi otp
where O ∈ F
Ak •→ • E: crypt(inv(pK(Ak))),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFγ τ (?)[F] Fi otp
where O 6∈ F
Ak •→ E: crypt(inv(pK(Ak))),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
opidFγ τ (?)[F] Fm otp
Ak •→ • T: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
T •→ • S: pair(Ak,crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)))
otpFγ τ [F] Fm otp
Ak •→ • T: hash(seed(S,Ak))
T •→ • S: pair(Ak,hash(seed(S,Ak)))
otpFγ τ [F] Fn otp Ak •→ • S: hash(seed(S,Ak))
otpFγ τ?[F] Fm otp
Ak •→ • T: crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
T •→ • S: pair(Ak,crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)))
Actionsoutk (τ [F] Fn otp). In this case, the Authenticator directly communicates with the Server.
The Authenticator generates the otp with the hash function, leveraging seed(S,Ak), and
sends it to the Server for verification. It is assumed that the communication takes place
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after a previous establishment of a session between the Authenticator and the Server. If the
value of the received otp is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will
be executed.
Actionsoutk (τ [F] Fi otp) where O ∈ F . In this case, the Authenticator sends the otp to the Server,
passing through the Endpoint by using IPC. The list starts with the Authenticator (Ak) gen-
erating the otp (with the hash function) and sending it to the Endpoint (E). At this point,
the Endpoint transmits the otp to the Server. If the the verification of the received otpT is
positive, the actions following this list will be executed.
Actionsoutk (τ [F] Fi otp) where O 6∈ F . This case refers to an authenticator that generates (with-
out any opid as input) an otp, transmits it via IPC or USB interface while not attesting an
Ownership factor. Except for the first action, in which the channel between the Authenti-
cator and the Endpoint is not confidential, the set of actions is identical w.r.t. the case in
which O ∈ F .
Actionsoutk (τ [F] Fm otp). In this case, the Authenticator sends the otp through the telephony
network for reaching the Server verification. To this aim, the Authenticator (Ak) generates
the otp and sends it to the Telephony Server. The Telephony Server transmits the received
otp to the Server, together with the identity of the sender. To do so, it leverages the
format pair that, by definition, allows to transmit an Agent and a message. Therefore,
the Telephony Server sends pair(Ak, hash(seed(S,Ak)) to the Server. If the (implicit)
verification of the received otp for the given Authenticator Ak returns a positive result, the
actions following this list will be executed.
Actionsoutk (opidFγ τ
(?)[F] Fh otp) where O ∈ F . In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an
opid as input, generates an otp that has to be manually copied to the user. The list of ac-
tions starts with the Authenticator (Ak) that implicitly generates an otp that depends on the
opid. As previously mentioned, the opid contains information regarding the Operation
chosen by the User and a UniqueID, associated to the operation and given by the Server.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we assume that if the Authenticator receives an opid as an
input, the generated otp must be somehow related to it. Hence, we model this kind of
otp as the result of an asymmetric encryption, performed with the private key of the Au-
theticator (inv(pK(Ak))), of the opid. It is worth noting that the non-repeatability of the
message is guaranteed by the data inserted in the opid itself. Therefore, the first action
of the list indicates that the Authenticator displays the otp (modeled as as the asymmetric
encryption of the opid) to the User. The otp is then copied by the user on the Endpoint
(second actions). Finally, the Endpoint sends it to the Server for verification. The Server
implicitly decrypts the obtained message with the public key (pK(Ak)) of the Authentica-
tor. If the value of the received otp is as expected by the Server, the actions following this
list will be executed.
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Actionsoutk (opidFγ τ
(?)[F] Fh otp) where O 6∈ F . This case refers to an authenticator, gener-
ating an otp (depending from an opid) to be copied by the user, that does not attest an
Ownership factor. Except for the first action, in which the channel between the Authenti-
cator and the User is not confidential, the set of actions is identical w.r.t. the case in which
O ∈ F .
Actionsoutk (opidFγ τ
(?)[F] Fn otp). In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an opid as input,
generates an otp that is sent to the Server from the Authenticator itself.
The Authenticator (Ak) generates a the otp by encrypting the opid with its private key
(written as crypt(inv(pK(Ak))),opid(Operation,UniqueID))) and sends it to the
Server (S). It is assumed that the communication refers to a previously established session
between the Authenticator and the Server. The Server implicitly decrypts the obtained
message with the public key (pK(Ak)) of the Authenticator. If the value of the received
otp is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will be executed.
Actionsoutk (opidFγ τ
(?)[F] Fi otp) where O ∈ F . In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an
opid as input, generates an otp that is sent to the Endpoint (via IPC) in order to be for-
warded to the Server. This list of actions starts with the Authenticator (Ak) generating a
the otp (crypt( inv( pK(Ak)), opid(Operation,UniqueID))) and sending it to the
Endpoint (E). The Endpoint sends the otp to the Server for verification. The Server im-
plicitly decrypts the obtained message with the public key (pK(Ak)) of the Authenticator.
If the value of the received otp is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list
will be executed.
Actionsoutk (opidFγ τ
(?)[F] Fi otp) where O 6∈ F . This case refers to an authenticator that gen-
erates an otp (depending from an opid), transmits it via IPC or USB interface, and does
not attest an Ownership factor. Except for the first action, in which the channel between
the Authenticator and the Endpoint is not confidential, the set of actions is identical w.r.t.
the case in which O ∈ F .
Actionsoutk (opidFγ τ
(?)[F] Fm otp). In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an opid as input,
generates an otp that is sent to the Server leveraging the mobile network. The first ac-
tion, represents the Authenticator (Ak) generating the otp and sending it to the Telephony
Server. The Telephony Server transmits the received otp to the Server, together with the
identity of the sender (Ak). The Server implicitly decrypts the obtained message with the
public key (pk(Ak)) of the Authenticator. If the value of the received otp (for the spe-
cific authenticator Ak) is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will be
executed.
Actionsoutk (otpFγ τ [F] Fm otp). In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an otp as input, sends
the same otp to the Server leveraging the mobile network. Such behavior is typical of an
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Out-of-band authenticator. In this case, the Authenticator sends the otp to the Telephony
Server. At this point, the Telephony Server transmits the received otp to the Server, to-
gether with the identity of the sender (Ak). If the value of the received otp (for the specific
authenticator Ak) is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will be exe-
cuted.
Actionsoutk (otpFγ τ [F] Fn otp). In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an otp as input, sends
the same otp to the Server via a network connection. As for the previous case, such
behavior is typical of an Out-of-band authenticator. In this case, the Authenticator sends
the otp directly to the Server. If the value of the received otp (for the specific authenticator
Ak) is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will be executed.
Actionsoutk (otpFγ τ
?[F] Fm otp). In this case, an Authenticator, receiving an otp as input and
showing information regarding the ongoing operation to the user, sends an otp to the
Server via the telephony network.
In this case, the Authenticator had previously received an otp and showed Operation to
the user. The first step consists in decrypting the received otp (see Table 3.2 for more
details), signing it with the private key and sending it to the Telephony Server. At this
point, the Telephony Server transmits the received otp to the Server, together with the
identity of the sender (Ak). If the value of the received otp (for the specific authenticator
Ak) is as expected by the Server, the actions following this list will be executed.
Example 5. Let us consider the protocol Nordea1. As presented in Section 3.2, it can be rep-
resented in SLaMP as ¤; opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp (formula (3.2)). Indicating with αN1 the
result of Actions(Nordea1), we calculate it as
αN1 = Actions(¤; opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp)
More specifically, we can write
αN1 = PRE ·Actions1(¤) ·Actions2(opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp)
Now we compute Actions1(¤) as in Table 3.3. In particular, since A1 is a knowledge factor, it is
modeled with the mapping mem. Since it is shared between the Server and the User, and it is the
first authenticator, we write it as mem(S,U,1).
Actions1(¤) =
{
U•→ •E : mem(S,U,1)
E→•S : mem(S,U,1)
Actions2(opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp) requires more attention. As a matter of fact, as defined in
Section 3.3.4.1
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1 U: Msg Operation
2 U →• E: Operation
3 E →• S: Operation
4 U →• E: mem(S,U,1)
5 E →• S: mem(S,U,1)
6 S : Number UniqueID
7 S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
8 E •→ • U: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
9 U •→ • A2: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID)))
10 U •→ • A2: kF(A2)
11 A2 •→ • U: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
12 U →• E: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
13 E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
Listing 3.4: Full structure of αN1 from Example 5.
Actions2(A) = Actionsin2 (A) ·Actionsmid2 (A) ·Actionsout2 (A)
where A =opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp.
In the following, we compute Actionsin2 (A), Actions
mid
2 (A) and Actions
out




S : Number UniqueID
S•→ •E : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
Actionsmid2 (A) = U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2)
Actionsout2 (A) =

A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
U→•E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
The full structure of αN1 is presented in Listing 3.4
3.3.4.2 Agents Function
The function Agents(α), returns the set of agents appearing in α. The agents that can appear in
an SPS specification generated from a n-authenticators SLaMP specification belong to the finite
set Λ = {U,E,S,T,A1, . . . ,An}, where Ak 6∈ {¤}. We denote a generic element of Λ with β,β′.
The Agents function is inductively defined as follows:
46
Agents([ ]) = /0
Agents(β→ β′ : m ·α) = {β,β′}∪Agents(α)
Agents(β : d ·α) = {β}∪Agents(α)
For each action in α, if the action is empty, the empty set is given. If the action is specified as
β→ β′ : m, the two roles β and β′ are united to the set. Finally, if the action is specified as β : d,
where d is a placeholder for the creation of a fresh variable, the role β is united to the set.
Example 6. Let us consider the list of actions αN1 for Nordea1, presented in Listing 3.4. For
brevity, we use αh to denote the sublist obtained from α by removing the first h elements. Let us
calculate Agents(αN1).
Agents(αN1) = Agents(U : Msg Operation ·α1N1) = {U}∪Agents(α1N1) =
= {U}∪Agents(U→•E : Operation ·α2N1) = {U}∪{E}∪Agents(α2N1) =
= {U,E}∪Agents(E→•S : Operation ·α3N1) = {U,E}∪{S}∪Agents(α3N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(U→•E : mem(S,U,1) ·α4N1) = {U,E,S}∪Agents(α4N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(E→•S : mem(S,U,1) ·α5N1) = {U,E,S}∪Agents(α5N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(S : NumberUniqueID ·α6N1) = {U,E,S}∪Agents(α6N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(S•→ •E : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α7N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(α7N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α8N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(α8N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪Agents(U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α9N1) =
= {U,E,S}∪{A2}∪Agents(α9N1) =
= {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2) ·α10N1) = {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(α10N1) =
= {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α11N1) =
= {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(α11N1) =
= {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(U→•E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α12N1) =
= {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(α12N1) =
= {U,E,S,A2}∪Agents(E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))) =
= {U,E,S,A2}
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Table 3.5: Set of mappings that can appear in a generated SPS specification.
Element Type Description
mem Agent,Agent -> Msg
the memorized secret established
between the User and the Server.
lus Agent,Agent,Number -> Number the mapping implementing the Look-up secret
seed Agent,Agent -> Number
the seed that is shared between an Authenticator
and the Server that must be used for generating an otp
which does not depend from opid
pK Agent -> PublicKey models the public key associated to an agent
inv PublicKey -> PrivateKey the private key associated to a given public key
dk Agent, Agent -> SymmetricKey
the symmetric key (shared between the Server
and the Authenticator) for decoding the opid.
fK Agent, Agent -> SymmetricKey
the Knowledge factor that the user
must provide for unlocking the Authenticator.
fI Agent, Agent -> SymmetricKey
the Inherence factor that the user
must provide for unlocking the Authenticator.
Similarly to Section 3.2.4, here we define a utility function
Platform : Λ→{Browser,App,Desktop,Mobile,Hardware,Paper,⊥}
In words, Plat f orm(β) = e means that the agent β is executed inside e. Moreover, we require
Platform(E)∈{Browser,App} , Platform(U)=Plat f orm(S)=Platform(T )=⊥, Platform(Ak)∈
{Desktop,Mobile,Hardware}. For instance, Platform(A) = Mobile means that authenticator A
is a software running on a mobile device.
3.3.4.3 Mappings Function
The function Mappings(α) returns the set of mappings appearing in α. To define Mappings, we
need to introduce some preliminary definitions.
First, we introduce Γ as the (finite) set of names of mappings that can appear in an SPS speci-
fication. In symbols Γ = {mem,lus,seed,pK,inv,dk,fK,fI}. An extended description of each
mapping is given in Table 3.5.
The utility function TypeO f , taking an element of Γ as a parameter, gives its type as result. For
example, TypeO f (mem) would give Number -> Msg as a result.
The Mappings function is inductively defined as follows.
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Mappings([ ]) = /0
Mappings(β→ β′ : m ·α) = Mappings(m)∪Mappings(α)
Mappings(β : d ·α) = Mappings(α)
Slightly abusing the notation, we apply Mappings to a message m as




where v is either a variable or a constant and Γ(•) is a shorthand for the function
λ f .
{
{ f} if f ∈ Γ
/0 otherwise
In words, for each action in α in the form β→ β′ : m, the content of m is matched on the set Γ.
If any part of m corresponds to an element in Γ, the corresponding value is united with the set of
Mappings.
Example 7. Let us consider again αN1 (the list of actions of Nordea1). The result of Mappings(αN1)
can be calculated as follows. As for the previous example, we use αh to denote the sublist ob-
tained from α by removing the first h elements.
Mappings(αN1) = Mappings(U : Msg Operation ·α1N1) = /0∪Mappings(α1N1) =
= Mappings(U→•E : Operation ·α2N1) = Mappings(α2N1) =
= Mappings(E→•S : Operation ·α3N1) = Mappings(α3N1) =
= Mappings(U→•E : mem(S,U,1) ·α4N1) = {mem}∪Mappings(α4N1) =
= {mem}∪Mappings(E→•S : mem(S,U,1) ·α5N1) = {mem}∪Mappings(α5N1) =
= {mem}∪Mappings(S : NumberUniqueID ·α6N1) = {mem}∪Mappings(α6N1) =
= {mem}∪Mappings(S•→ •E : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α7N1) =
= {mem}∪{dK}∪Mappings(α7N1) =
= {mem,dK}∪Mappings(E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α8N1) =
= {mem,dK}∪Mappings(α8N1) =
= {mem,dK}∪Mappings(U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α9N1) =
= {mem,dK}∪Mappings(α9N1) =
= {mem,dK}∪Mappings(U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2) ·α10N1) = {mem,dK}∪{fK}∪Mappings(α10N1) =
= {mem,dK,fK}∪Mappings(A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α11N1) =
= {mem,dK,fK}∪{pK,inv}∪Mappings(α11N1) =
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Table 3.6: Set of formats that can appear in a generated SPS specification.
Element Type Description
opid (Msg, Number)
the format of the opid
which is transmitted by Server to the Authenticator.
pair (Agent, Msg)
the structure containing an otp
which is sent to the Telephony Server
= {mem,dK,fK,pK,inv}∪Mappings(U→•E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·α12N1)=
= {mem,dK,fK,pK,inv}∪Mappings(α12N1) =
= {mem,dK,fK,pK,inv}∪Mappings(E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))) =
= {mem,dK,fK,pK,inv}
3.3.4.4 Formats Function
The function Formats(α) returns the set of formats appearing in α. As for the set of mappings,
we need to introduce some preliminary definitions.
We introduce Φ as the (finite) set of names of formats that can appear in an SPS specification. In
symbols Φ = {opid,pair}. An extended description of each format is given in Table 3.6.
As for the case of Mappings, we define the function TypeO f , taking an element of Φ as a
parameter, gives its type as result. For example, TypeO f (ot p) would give Msg as a result.
The Formats function is inductively defined as follows.
Formats([ ]) = /0
Formats(β→ β′ : m ·α) = Formats(m)∪Formats(α)
Formats(β : d ·α) = Formats(α)
Slightly abusing the notation, we apply Formats to a message m as:




where v is a generic variable or a constant and Φ(•) is a shorthand for the function
λ f .
{
{ f} if f ∈Φ
/0 otherwise
As for Γ in the Mappings function, for each action in α in the form β→ β′ : m, the content of
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m is matched on the set Φ. If any part of m corresponds to an element in Φ, the corresponding
value is united with the set of Formats.
Example 8. As for the Mappings function, let us consider again αN1 (the list of actions of
Nordea1) and calculate the result of Formats(αN1).
Formats(αN1) = Formats(U : Msg Operation ·α1N1) = Formats(α1N1) =
= Formats(U→•E : Operation ·α2N1) = Formats(α2N1) =
= Formats(E→•S : Operation ·α3N1) = Formats(α3N1) =
= Formats(U→•E : mem(S,U,1) ·α4N1) = Formats(α4N1) =
= Formats(E→•S : mem(S,U,1) ·α5N1) = Formats(α5N1) =
= Formats(S : NumberUniqueID ·α6N1) = Formats(α6N1) =
= Formats(S•→ •E : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α7N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(α7N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α8N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(α8N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α9N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(α9N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2) ·α10N1) = {opid}∪Formats(α10N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α11N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(α11N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(U→•E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α12N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(α12N1) =
= {opid}∪Formats(E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))) =
= {opid}
3.3.4.5 Knowledge Function
The Knowledge function gives the list of specifications representing the initial knowledge of
each agent participating to the protocol. In our framework, we assume that an MFA protocol is
executed after the preliminary phases (enrollment and binding procedures) have been correctly
completed. Therefore, we assume that all the secrets and the authentication factors have been
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properly distributed and stored. Therefore, they are part of the initial knowledge of the respective
roles and they are unknown to the intruder.
Similarly to Section 3.3.4.3, we need to introduce some preliminary notions.
For each β ∈ Λ we define Γβ ⊆ Γ as the set of names of mappings that can appear in the knowl-
edge of β. We define them as follows.
ΓU={mem,pK,fK,fI} ΓS ={mem,pK,lus,seed,dK}
ΓE=ΓT = {pK} ΓAk={pK,lus,seed,dK,inv,fK,fI}
In words, besides the other agents she interacts with, the User knows the memorized secrets, any
public key and the knowledge and the inherence factors that are required to unlock multi-factor
authenticators. The Server knows all the memorized and look-up secrets, the public keys, all the
seeds that are used for otp generation and all the decoding keys for transmitting the opid (that
have been previuosly shared with the authenticators). The Endpoint and the Telephony server
know all the public keys. Finally, an Authenticator knows all the public keys, the knowledge
for retrieving a look-up secret, the knowledge and inherence factors that may be needed for
unlocking it and, depending on its functionality, either the decoding key for handling the opid
and its private key (for performing asymmetric encryption of an otp), or the seed for generating
an otp (not related to an opid).
Moreover, we define the knowledge environment κ (being ⊥ the empty environment) that binds
an agent β to its initial knowledge. The initial knowledge is a set that can contain both agents and
instances of mappings. We use κ[β 7→ K] to denote the mapping that binds β to K and behaves as
κ for any other β′. Also, we write [β 7→K] as shorthand for⊥[β 7→K]. Furthermore, we introduce
the operator ⊕ to compose two knowledge environments as (κ⊕κ′)(β) = κ(β)∪κ′(β).
Now, we inductively define the function Knowledgeβ(α), for each agent β ∈ Λ, as
Knowledgeβ([ ]) = Knowledgeβ(β : v) = Knowledgeβ(β′ : v) =⊥
Knowledgeβ(β→ β′ : m ·α) = Knowledgeβ(α)⊕Knowledgeβ(m)⊕ [β 7→ {β′}]
Knowledgeβ(β′→ β : m ·α) = Knowledgeβ(α)⊕Knowledgeβ(m)⊕ [β 7→ {β′}]
Knowledgeβ(β′→ β′′ : m ·α) = Knowledgeβ(α)
Slightly abusing the notation, we apply Knowledgeβ to a message m. In particular, with β ∈
{U,E,S,T} we define Knowledgeβ(m) as





{ f (m1, . . . ,mk)} if f ∈ Γβ
/0 otherwise
Instead, when β ∈ {A1, . . . ,An} ∈ Λ we define Knowledgeβ as
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{ f (m1, . . . ,mk)} if f ∈ Γβ and β appears in some mi
/0 otherwise
Thus, Knowledge(α) is defined as the minimal mapping κ s.t. κ(β) = Knowledgeβ(α).
Example 9. We now calculate Knowledge(αN1), where αN1 is defined as in Example 5. This
requires us to calculate KnowledgeU(αN1), KnowledgeE(αN1), KnowledgeS(αN1) and
KnowledgeA2(αN1) as follows.
KnowledgeU(αN1) = KnowledgeU(U : Msg Operation ·α1N1) = {U}∪KnowledgeU(α1N1) =
= {U}∪KnowledgeU(U→•E : Operation ·α2N1) = {U}∪{E}∪KnowledgeU(α2N1) =
= {U,E}∪KnowledgeU(E→•S : Operation ·α3N1) = {U,E}∪KnowledgeU(α3N1) =
= {U,E}∪KnowledgeU(U→•E : mem(S,U,1) ·α4N1) = {U,E}∪{mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(α4N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(E→•S : mem(S,U,1) ·α5N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(α5N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(S : NumberUniqueID ·α6N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(α6N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(S•→ •E : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·α7N1)=
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(α7N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪KnowledgeU(E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·α8N1)=
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1)}∪{dK(S,A2)}∪KnowledgeU(α8N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2)}
∪KnowledgeU(U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α9N1) =
= {U,E,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2)}∪{A2}∪KnowledgeU(α9N1) =
= {U,E,A2,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2)}∪KnowledgeU(U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2) ·α10N1) =
= {U,E,A2,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2)}∪{fK(U,A2)}∪KnowledgeU(α10N1) =
= {U,E,A2,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2),fK(U,A2)}
∪KnowledgeU(A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) ·α11N1) =
= {U,E,A2,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2),fK(U,A2)}∪KnowledgeU(α11N1) =
= {U,E,A2,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2),fK(U,A2)}




∪KnowledgeU(E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))) =
= {U,E,A2,mem(S,U,1),dK(S,A2),fK(U,A2)}
Similarly to KnowledgeU(αN1), we compute KnowledgeE(αN1) = {U,E,S,pK(A2)} and
KnowledgeS(αN1) = {U,E,S,mem(S,U,1),pK(A2),dK(S,A2)}.
Instead, we compute KnowledgeA2(αN1) as follows.







































































∪KnowledgeA2(E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))) =
= {U,A2,dK(S,A2),fK(U,A2),pk(A2),inv(pk(A2))}






The goal of any authentication protocol is to authenticate the user.
To model this, any SPS specification translated from SLaMP has the following goal
GOAL = S authenticates U on Operation
In words, GOAL amounts to requiring the Server to authenticate the User while agreeing on the
value of Operation.
3.3.4.7 Generation of SPS
The specification in SPS of the specified protocol is obtained through the function Sem. The
definition of Sem is given in Listing 3.5.
In Listing 3.5, we introduce some syntactic sugar. In particular, we use α for Actions(A1; . . . ;An)
(see Section 3.3.4.1) and Mappings(α) : TypeO f (Mappings(α)) (line 5) as a shorthand for
f1:TypeO f ( f1); . . . ; fn:TypeO f ( fn), where Mappings(α) = { f1, . . . , fn}. The same goes for
Formats(α) : TypeO f (Formats(α)) (line 8). Summing up, the result of Sem amounts to the
juxtaposition of the fragments returned by the functions previously defined in this section (and
GOAL).
Example 10. Let us now generate the SPS specification of Nordea1.
We can obtain the final SPS by combining the results of Actions(¤; opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp) =
αN1 (computed in Example 5), Agents(αN1) (obtained in Example 6), Mappings(αN1) (obtained
in Example 7), Formats(αN1) (obtained in Example 8), Knowledge(αN1) (obtained in Example






5 Mappings(α) : TypeO f (Mappings(α));
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7 Formats:

















Listing 3.5: Definition of Sem(A1; . . . ;An).
3.4 Compliance w.r.t. the NIST Classification
In [NIS17] a classification of the authenticators is provided. Such a classification is highly influ-
ential and most manufacturers and service providers comply with it. In this section we show that
our modeling language is expressive enough to include the definitions given there. Each defini-
tion amounts to a constraint over the structure of a generic authenticator as defined in (3.1). The
mapping between the definitions and our modeling language is presented in Table 3.7. Below we
discuss our encoding (with the exception of ¤ and! which are straightforward).
3.4.1 Out-of-Band Devices
According to [NIS17, §5.1.3] out-of-band authenticators are physical devices that are uniquely
addressable and communicate over a distinct, namely secondary, channel (w.r.t. the primary
channel used by the endpoint). Out-of-band devices include both dedicated and general purpose
hardware as far as they satisfy one of the following conditions.
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1 Types:
2 Agents U, E, S, A2;
3
4 Mappings:
5 mem : Agent ,Agent ,Number -> Msg;
6 pK: Agent ,Agent -> PublicKey;
7 inv: PublicKey -> PrivateKey;
8 fK: Agent ,Agent -> SymmetricKey;






15 U: U, E, A2, mem(S,U,1), pk(A2), fK(U,A2);
16 E: E, U, S, pK(A2);
17 S: S, U, E, mem(S,U,1), pK(A2), dK(S,A2);
18 A2: U, E, A2, dK(S,A2), fK(U,A2), pk(A2), inv(pK(A2));
19
20 Actions:
21 U: Msg Operation
22 U →• E: Operation
23 E →• S: Operation
24 U →• E: mem(S,U,1)
25 E →• S: mem(S,U,1)
26 S : Number UniqueID
27 S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
28 E •→ • U: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
29 U •→ • A2: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID)))
30 U •→ • A2: fK(U,A2)
31 A2 •→ • U: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
32 U →• E: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
33 E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
34
35 Goals:
36 S authenticates U over Operation
Listing 3.6: SPS specification of Nordea1.
1. The secondary channel is used to receive a data item for the user.
2. The secondary channel is used to transmit a data item from the user.
3. The secondary channel is used to send and receive a data item on which the user must
agree.
For instance, a common practice is to receive an SMS containing an otp. This case complies
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with the first condition, i.e., it relies on the mobile telephony network as a secondary channel.
Similarly, some MFA protocols require the user to call a secure number from their mobile. This
behavior matches the second condition. Finally, the second protocol presented in Section 1.1 is an
instance of the third case. As a matter of fact, the user receives a notification on her smartphone.
The smartphone connection is a secondary channel w.r.t. the browser connection.
3.4.2 Single and Multi-Factor OTP Device
In [NIS17, §5.1.4 and §5.1.5] these authenticators are defined as devices embedding some seed
number used for the generation of OTPs. This category includes both hardware devices and
software-based OTP generators installed on devices such as mobile phones. They are distin-
guished from the out-of-band authenticators as they do not rely on a secondary channel. More-
over, their output can either directly go to the endpoint through an inter-process connection (i) or
be copied by the user (h).
3.4.3 Single and Multi-Factor Cryptographic Device
A single or multi-factor cryptographic device [NIS17, §5.1.7 and §5.1.9] is a hardware device
that performs some cryptographic operation (e.g., digital signature) on the operation identifier
and directly interacts (I/O) with the user endpoint.
3.4.4 Single and Multi-Factor Cryptographic Software
Basically, these authenticators [NIS17, §5.1.6 and §5.1.8] are the software counterparts of the
previous category.
3.4.5 Observations
It is worth noticing that our definitions admit intersections between the authenticators. For in-
stance, according to Table 3.7, opidFi P[O] Fi otp is both an OTP and a cryptographic device.
This is not actually allowed by the classification of [NIS17]. The reason is that the distinction
between these two authenticators is based on an internal feature, i.e., whether they use cryptog-
raphy or not, that the user cannot observe. As a consequence, our language does not perfecly
comply with the categories of [NIS17]. This is expected as, under our working assumptions, we
are only interested in classifying authenticators that the user can recognize.
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Table 3.7: Mapping NIST definitions to patterns.
Name Constraints Example
Memorized Secret ¤ ¤




τ ∈ { , ?,Æ ,Æ ?}∧δ 6= ε∧ γ ′ = h
τ ∈ { , ?,Æ ,Æ ?}∧δ 6= ε∧ γ ∈ {h,o}
τ ∈ { , ?,Æ ,Æ ?}∧δ 6= ε∧ γ,γ ′ ∈ {n,m}
otpFm ? Fh otp
Single-Factor
OTP Device τ ∈ {P ,P
?, , ?}∧ ā = {O}∧ γ 6∈ {n,m}∧ γ ′ ∈ {h, i} opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
Multi-Factor
OTP Device τ ∈ {P ,P
















τ ∈ { , ?}∧ (O ∈ ā∧|ā|> 1)∧ γ = i∧δ = opid∧ γ ′ = i opidFi ?[O,I] Fi otp
3.5 Language for preliminary phases
Besides specifying a protocol design, we propose a language for describing those phases (namely,
the Enrollment and the Binding phases) that need to be performed for allowing the user to execute
an MFA protocol.
In particular, we focus on the modalities used for verifying the user identity during enrollment,
i.e., identity proofing, and binding phases (the processes for associating the authenticators to
the user identity). In the following sections, we provide further details on how Enrollment and
Binding phases are modeled.
3.5.1 Enrollment
In this phase users are identified and associated to their digital identity. We distinguish between
two possible executions of identity proofing, i.e., in person or remotely. Specifically, we identify
two modalities for user identification, namely  in which users should go to a local office and
be identified in person and  in which users are identified by interacting remotely, e.g., through
a web portal or a call service.
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3.5.2 Binding
Binding is a procedure that users should perform to associate a new authenticator to their digital
identity. As described in Section 2.3.3, we consider it to be consistent of three steps, namely
request, delivery and activation. Each of these steps may involve user identification.
Clearly, identity checks during the binding phase can be carried out in the same way as for
identity proofing (see above). Nevertheless, since the user has been previously enrolled, she
already has a digital identity and, possibly, a previously bound authenticator. This enables one
additional identification modalities, i.e., through an MFA protocol. We denote it with . In terms
of level of assurance for the identification, we claim that is better than  and  is better than
both. Moreover, a number of service providers allows the binding of one or more authenticators
just after the enrollment phase. When this happens, we denote the request of these authenticators
using symbol E.
In our language, the three steps of the binding procedure are be presented as a triple. Each
element of the triple either contains one of the aforementioned symbols, i.e., , ,  , or “–” if
the step requires no action (the first element of the triple – request – can also contain symbol E).
For instance, (,  , ) indicates a binding procedure in which the user requests an authenticator
in person (), receives it through a remote delivery system ( ) and activates it by running an
MFA protocol ( ).
Notice that some services offer alternatives to carry out these steps. When this occurs, we only
consider the operation with lower level of assurance. Also, it may happen that two operations are
needed to be carried out concurrently, e.g., an activation may require both and  . In this case,
we only consider the operation with higher level of assurance as an attacker has to compromise




In this chapter, the framework for analyzing an MFA protocol is presented. The first section
focuses on the evaluation of a protocol in terms of resistance against a set of attacker model.
Therefore, we define the attacker models that we consider for the analysis, their application
conditions and their counterparts in SPS. Then, a second part on the compliance with regulatory
aspects, requirements and best practices is proposed. In particular, we present a set of security
requirements against which protocols can be evaluated, along with a set of best practices. Finally,
a metric for evaluating the ease-of-use of an MFA protocol is presented.
4.1 Security Analysis
The robustness of MFA protocols against attacks is a critical aspect in the evaluation of their se-
curity. In our analysis, we evaluate the security level provided by an MFA protocol by comparing
it against a set of attackers.
We firstly define the set of attacker models in terms of capabilities and application conditions
on the authenticators specified in SLaMP. Then, we describe how the attackers are modeled by
presenting their effects on the SPS specification of a protocol.
4.1.1 Attacker Models
Definition. An attacker is a total function f : {Browser,App}× (A∪{A})→ A∪{A}, where
A denotes the unit element w.r.t. “;” (the sequence operator), i.e., A;P = P;A = P for any
sequence of authenticators P.
Each attacker model is characterized by an application condition, i.e., a set of capabilities in
61
terms of which authenticators an attacker can compromise. Intuitively, fe(A) = Y means that
the capabilities of the attacker allow her to treat the authenticator A (appearing in a protocol with
endpoint e) as if it was Y , i.e., A and Y are equivalent with respect to fe. When fe(A) =A we say
that attacker f neutralized the authenticator A.1 Instead, when fe(A) =Y and A 6=Y 6=A we say
that f partially compromises A.2 Finally, when fe(A) = A we say that f does not affect A. Given
an MFA protocol P = A1;. . .;An, s.t. End point(P) = e, we define fe(P) = fe(A1);. . .; fe(An) and
we say that f neutralizes P whenever fe(P) =A.
The NIST [NIS17] defines several attacker models. Here, we follow the same approach but with
few, minor refinements (see below). Briefly, these refinements are necessary to apply the attacker
models to our definition of MFA protocol.
Note that, under our assumptions, the applicability of an attacker model to an MFA protocol
does not automatically result in an actual threat. In fact, our attacker models represent the set
of resources and capabilities that an adversary should have to interact with the elements of an
MFA protocol. Reasonably, a threat analysis should consider the applicable attacker models to
check whether an attacker can effectively authenticate instead of the user. Such threat analysis is
beyond the scope of this work.
Next, we present the attacker models that we consider in our evaluation process. For each of
them, we provide a brief explanation in natural language as well as a formal definition (right-
hand side). When an authenticator Ak ∈Ω does not appear among the inputs of a function fe, we
intend that fe(Ak) = Ak, i.e., the attacker corresponding to fe does not affect Ak.
4.1.1.1 Device Thief (DT)
Among all possible threats, one of the most considered - in every application scenario - is the
Device Thief, i.e., a malicious agent who has the ability to steal a physical object. As a matter
of fact, almost every online service implementing MFA offers a procedure in the case that “the
device has been stolen”. On the other hand, DT models another frequent situation: the device
loss. Indeed, in both cases, an unknown person gets the possession of an object which can be
used for authentication purposes. In other words, DT targets authenticators relying on ownership
factors by stealing them.
The effects of DT on the authenticators that it can target are reported in Table 4.1.
Lines 1, 2 and 4 of Table 4.1. Intuitively, DT can effectively neutralize any single-factor ownership-
based authenticator. Indeed, DT can interact with the authenticator in place of the user: as long
as it provides the necessary input (as an opid, for instance), DT can obtain the authenticator out-
1Also we require that fe(A) =A for every f and e.
2For the sake of presentation, we write ϕ (with ϕ ∈ {O,K,I}) when an attacker compromises a multi-factor
authenticator by reducing it to the very same authenticator but for the elimination of ϕ.
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put and send it to the server. However, if an authenticator attests multiple AFs, hence requiring
the user to produce a Knowledge or an Inherence factor to unlock the functionality, DT cannot
obtain the output (since it cannot provide the requested factors).
A DTe(A)
1)! A
2) δFγ P(?)[O] Fγ′ δ′ A
3) δFγ P(?)[{O}∪F] Fγ′ δ′  O
4) δFγ (?)[O] Fγ′ δ′ A
5) δFγ (?)[{O}∪F] Fγ′ δ′  O
Table 4.1: Capabilites of
DT.
For instance, this is the case for !: its mere possession would
allow the attacker to provide the server with the requested secret.
Notice that DT also affects out-of-band authenticators. In partic-
ular, DT neutralizes , i.e., a special case of ·F P[O] F ·, and
applies to Æ , which behaves as .
Lines 3 and 5 of Table 4.1. DT affects neither knowledge (K) nor
inherence (I) factors. Indeed, even if DT can steal the authenti-
cator, it cannot provide the requested factors to unlock it. Thus,
authenticator devices and software relying on an ownership factor
(together with some other factors) are affected by DT only par-
tially ( O). For instance, DT(opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp) = opidFh P[K] Fh otp.
4.1.1.2 Authenticator Duplicator (AD)
We define the Authenticator Duplicator as a malicious agent who is able to make a copy of an
authenticator without the user’s knowledge. In our modeling, the duplication can be of different
types. For instance, we consider AD able to attack !, by taking a picture to it. On the other
hand, AD is also able to duplicate private keys and software pieces.
A ADe(A)
1)! A
2) δFγ (?)[O] Fγ′ δ′ A
3) δFγ (?)[{O}∪F] Fγ′ δ′  O
Table 4.2: Capabilites of
AD.
The latter case seems to be of relevant concern, especially on
mobile devices: installing software authenticators on such multi-
purpose devices expose them both to the security weaknesses of
the devices themselves (as for [R.19]) and to possible malicious
actions preformed by other apps running on the same device (as
described in [DDSW10]).
Moreover, private keys and sensitive data are usually kept in spe-
cific software wallets and keystores, but many flaws on such software objects have been found
and exploited during the last years (see [ST16, GPP+16]).
The effects of AD on the authenticators are reported in Table 4.2.
It is worth noting that, in this work, we do not consider the possibility that an attacker can clone
a SIM card. To model such capability, it would be possible to add AD(δFγ (?) Fγ′ δ′) =A to
Table 4.2.
Lines 1 and 2 of Table 4.2. AD can neutralize Look-up Secrets (by taking a picture of them)
and software authenticators only attesting ownership factors (e.g., [O]). Indeed, being able to
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interact with the authenticator in place of the user, AD can provide the required input to the
authenticator (as an opid) and obtain the authenticator output for sending it to the server.
Lines 3 of Table 4.2. AD can partially compromise ownership factor of multi-factor software
authenticators, e.g., ADe(δ Fγ [O,K] Fγ′ δ′) = δ Fγ [K] Fγ′ δ′. This because it can substitute
the User in the communications with Ai, hence getting access to it and having the possibility
to prove its possession (i.e., the Ownership factor). However, as for DT, we assume that AD
cannot compromise knowledge and inherence factors.3 Therefore, it will not e able to produce the
other factors (Knowledge or Inherence ones) that are necessary for unlocking the authenticator
functionality. Notice that the same rules apply to out-of-band software authenticators, i.e., Æ .
It is worth noting that we assume authenticator devices P to be duplication-proof by construc-
tion (as most devices include some secure hardware element). Therefore, they cannot be attacked
by AD.
4.1.1.3 Shoulder Surfer (SS)
A Shoulder Surfer is an attacker that peers over a victim’s shoulder to see what he or she is up
to (as presented in [LM11]). Such an attacker model is widely recognized as a relevant threat,
given the increasing usage of mobile devices (where the user inputs sequences and passwords in
plain sight) and the possibility to perform the malicious actions (i.e., peeking) without technical
knowledge. Many studies (as [MMvZEF17, LB19, ALFD16, JFR17]) tried to evaluate the risks
and possible mitigation of this attacker model, but solutions are not always feasible to perform





3) P[F] Fh otp A
4) δFγ P(?)[K] Fγ′ δ′ A
5) δFγ P(?)[{K}∪F] Fγ′ δ′  K
6) [F] Fh otp A
7) δFγ (?)[K] Fγ′ δ′ A
8) δFγ (?)[{K}∪F] Fγ′ δ′  K
Table 4.3: Capabilities of
SS.
In our analysis, we consider SS able to target any input or datum
that appears on his sight (as presented in [LM11]). This means that
he can successfully attack authenticators relying on a knowledge
factor and authenticator outputs that are manually inserted on the
endpoint.
The effects of SS on the authenticators are reported in Table 4.3.
Lines 1 and 2 of Table 4.3. SS neutralizes ¤ and !, since he
can overlook the user when manually inserting the secrets on the
endpoint.
Lines 3 and 6 of Table 4.3. SS can successfully attack authenti-
cators that (i) generate an otp which is not specifically bound to
an operation (i.e., it has been not generated from an opid) and (ii)
3Note that the NIST [NIS17] assumes that AD can also clone a memorized secret since the user might have
annotated it on paper. Here we neglect this case as it would reduce a memorized secret to a look-up secret.
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require the user to manually copy the otp on the Endpoint.
In these specific cases, indeed, the attacker can compromise the otp that the user inserts on
the endpoint and reuse it for authorizing his malicious operation, therefore compromising the
whole authenticator which generated that otp. It is worth noting that the same attack will not
be effective on those otps that have been generated basing on an opid: since this kind of otp is
bound to a specific operation (requested by user), even if the attacker compromises it, SS would
not be able to use it for his malicious session.
Lines 4 and 7 of Table 4.3. SS can compromise single-factor, knowledge based authenticators,
e.g., δFγ P[K] Fγ′ δ′ and δFγ [K] Fγ′ δ′, and partially compromise multi-factor authenticators
relying on a knowledge factor (by removing it -  K). It is worth noting that this also includes
out-of-band software, i.e., Æ , since they are a specific sub-case. For example, SS(opid Fn
?[O,K] Fh otp) = opidFn ?[O] Fh otp.
Lines 5 and 8 of Table 4.3. SS can oversee the input of the secret code/PIN on the keypad of an
authenticator. Therefore, the Knowledge factor of such authenticators is compromised.
4.1.1.4 Eavesdropping Software (ES)
An Eavesdropping Software is a program that runs on the user endpoint and communicates with
the attacker. In particular, such a software aims at collecting any data passing through the end-




3) P[F] Fh otp A
4) [F] Fm otp A†
5) otpFγ [F] Fm otp A†
6) otpFm P[F] Fγ′ otp A†
7) [F] Fh otp A
8) δFγ (?)[K] Fγ′ δ′ A∗
9) δFγ (?)[{K}∪F] Fγ′ δ′  K ∗
† when e = App
∗ when (e = Browser∧RunsOn(X) = Desktop)
or (e = App∧RunsOn(X) = Mobile)
Table 4.4: Capabilities of ES.
This kind of threat has been widely used during
the last years and features a vast set of different
software to be employed to execute the attack.
The most common examples of such softwares
are spywares hidden in browser extensions (as
shown in [AVZ+18]) and keyloggers (as Hawk-
Eye and Olympic Vision, described in [EU19] and
[Mae16]) - especially targeting mobile devices (as
presented in [MS13, CCK15]).
Therefore, in our modeling, we assume ES can
read, but not modify, data exchanged between the
user and her endpoint. Moreover, ES can eaves-
drop data transmitted via the telephony network
when installed on a smartphone working as End-
point (since a software with enough privileges can
interact with the telephony network APIs, as shown in [DMC15]).
The effects of ES on the authenticators are presented in Table 4.4.
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Lines 1 and 2 of Table 4.4. As for SS, ES neutralizes ¤ and !, since they are manually input
on the endpoint through the keyboard, which is observed by the attacker.
Lines 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Table 4.4. As for SS, ES can neutralize authenticators providing the user
with an otp which has been generated indipendently form an opid and that must be manually
inserted into the endpoint. Additionally, ES can eavesdrop data transmitted over the telephony
network, when e = App.
Lines 8 and 9 of Table 4.4. ES can eavesdrop the knowledge factors (e.g., PIN, secret code)
which are manually inserted for unlocking software authenticators running on the endpoint.
4.1.1.5 Social Engineer (SE)
A Social Engineer is an attacker that “manipulates a person to take an action that may or may not
be in the target’s best interest” [Had10]. To this aim, he may adopt the most diverse techniques,
ranging from various kinds of phishing attacks (as the ones described in [CCR16, HMN15]) to




3) δFγ P[F] Fγ′ δ′ A
4) δFγ [F] Fγ′ δ′ A
Table 4.5: Capabilities
of SE.
Social Engeneering attacks, which started more than 20 years ago, are
still of notable relevance. According to [Kas19], the average share
of spam in global mail traffic, in the first part of 2019, amounted to
57.64%, while 130 million redirects - derived from phishing attempts
- have been detected. Moreover, in 2017, a report deployed by Veri-
zon ([Ver17]) stated that 90% of incidences and breaches included a
phishing element.
In our analysis, we assume that the attacker can induce the user to
perform unwanted actions leveraging all the possible methods that have previously mentioned.
For instance, we assume that the user can be fooled to reveal confidential data to the attacker by
inserting them on a phishing website. Furthermore, we assume that SE can induce the user to
generate and communicate him an otp.
The effects of SE on the authenticators are presented in Table 4.5.
Lines 1 and 2 of Table 4.5. SE neutralizes ¤ and!, since it can collect the secrets by inducing
the user to insert them in a malicious web page.
Lines 3 and 4 of Table 4.5. SE can successfully attack any hardware/software authenticator not
showing information regarding the operation that the user is going to authorize. Indeed, SE can
induce the user to produce any otp, by providing her the proper input. Since the user cannot be
aware of being generating an otp that can be used for another (malicious) operation, the attack
is successful.
However, we assume that SE becomes ineffective when the user is aware of the ongoing opera-
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tion, i.e., when an authenticator is labeled with ?. This because, as mentioned in Section 3.2.4,
we assume that the information displayed on the authenticator is enough to allow the user to
distinguish one operation (e.g., her operation) from another (e.g., one associated to the attacker).
4.1.1.6 Man-in-the-Browser (MB)
The Man in the Browser is a threat that compromises the browser of the user, usually by means
of trojan horses. As reported in [Güh06], MB modifies communications on-the-fly (as they are
formed in browsers), manipulating what the user is shown and modifying the responses to the
server. This kind of software is usually disguised as Browser Helper Objects, browser extensions
or it is injected as javascript code through ajax calls.
This kind of attack is often considered to be a specific case of the Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
attack, acting between the user and her browser. However, as described in [DC12], MB differs
from MitM in many ways, especially in terms of capabilities: while the MitM is only guaranteed
to be able to handle public key encryption, MitB is “immune” to all forms of channel encryption,
by being external to it. Indeed, by infecting the browser, it can handle messages after the have
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It is worth noting that, with respect to what defined in [NIS17], here
we distinguish between MB and MM (see below) as a refinement of
the generic endpoint compromiser. Following this distinction, we as-
sume that MB can only act on browsers installed on desktop comput-
ers. In our analysis, we consider that any piece of data displayed and
typed on the browser can be intercepted and modified by MB.
The effects of MB on the authenticators are reported in Table 4.6.
MB neutralizes ¤, !, δ Fγ P[F] Fγ′ δ′ and δ Fγ [F] Fγ′ δ′ when
the Endpoint from which the protocol is started is a browser. This
because it can interrupt, eavesdrop and modify any message which is
sent or received by the Endpoint. For instance, MB can eavesdrop the memorized secret and
reuse it for a parallel, malicious session. Otherwise, it can induce the user to generate or leak an
otp that could be used for its malicious actions.
As mentioned in [TFT+16, Ayy17], possible countermeasures to such a powerful threat model
include the adoption of dedicated hardware devices or specifically hardened software authentica-
tors, reporting clear information regarding the operation that the user is about to authorize. For
this reason, in our modeling, MB does not affect authenticators that show the ongoing operation
(?), since they allow the user to revise the authenticator input and block the execution of the
MFA protocol when necessary.
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4.1.1.7 Man-in-the-Mobile (MM)
A Man in the Mobile controls the mobile device of the user. This threat model is the counterpart
- for mobile devices - of MB. Therefore, as for MB, MM leverages a malware (or a combination
of them, colluding for targeting different aspects of the mobile platform - as shown in [MA15])
to gain full control of inputs and outputs. In our modeling, we assume MM can leverage specific
malwares (as Riltok [Shi19]), privilege escalation techniques (as presented in [XPW+14]) and
anything that allows for getting the possibility to read and modify the user inputs, the displayed
information and the responses to the server.




3) δFγ P[F] Fγ′ δ′ A∗
4) δFγ (?)[F] Fγ′ δ′ A†
∗Only applies when e = App.
† Only when RunsOn(A) = Mobile
Table 4.7: Capabilities of
MM.
Lines 1-3 of Table 4.7. When an app on a mobile device is the
endpoint of the MFA protocol, MM neutralizes the same authen-
ticators as MB, i.e., ¤,!, δFγ P[F] Fγ′ δ′ and δFγ [F] Fγ′ δ′.
Line 4 of Table 4.7. MM neutralizes software authenticators
that run on a compromised device even when the endpoint is a
Browser computer. Thus, MM neutralizes both δFγ [F] Fγ′ δ′
and δFγ ?[F] Fγ′ δ′ if they run on a mobile device, e.g., a smart-
phone.
Finally, as for MB, the solutions for mitigating the attack include
the usage of external hardware devices informing the user on the
ongoing operations. Therefore, MM is not effective against δFγ
P?[F] Fγ′ δ′.
4.1.1.8 Combination of attackers
In our analysis, we consider both single attacker models and their combination. Specifically,
we combine the attacker models presented above by aggregating the respective capabilities. We
indicate such combination with symbol ◦, e.g., ADe ◦ SSe denotes the combination of Authen-
ticator Duplicator and Shoulder Surfer. To exemplify such attacker models, consider Nordea1,
that can be written as P =¤;opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp. It is neutralized by SSBrowser ◦ DTBrowser.
As a matter of fact, SSBrowser ◦ DTBrowser(P) = DTBrowser(SSBrowser(P)) = DTBrowser(A;opidFh
P[O] Fh otp) =A;A =A.
4.1.1.9 Compliance w.r.t. NIST attackers
In [NIS17] a list of attacker models is provided. Here we put their attackers in correspondence
with the attacker models presented in the previous sections. Table 4.8 reports the list of the
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attackers of [NIS17]. We denote by Ë those that are currently supported by our framework.
Four attackers are not supported (é). This is due to our working assumptions. In particular, our
approach is designed to only rely on the user experience. Thus, the expected input only includes
details about the MFA protocol that a (non expert) user can observe. This entails, for instance,
that we cannot model the internal structure of an authenticator device or software.
The assertion manufacture and modification attack applies to the service infrastructure that han-
dles the authentication process. Such infrastructure is usually totally transparent to the user.
Also, attackers such as offline cracking, side channel and online guessing exploit flaws in the im-
plementation of the authenticators. Under our assumptions, the user is not aware of these internal
and remote implementation details.
Finally, for what concerns the unauthorized binding attack, it applies to the delivery and activa-
tion of a new authenticator. This phase takes place before any execution of the MFA protocol, so
it cannot be evaluated, as the other attacker models presented in this section, on the authentica-
tors. However, a best practice that focuses on the same aspects (BP5) is defined in Section 4.2.2.
Evaluating the compliance with BP5 would give indications on the resistance against this threat
model.
4.1.1.10 Considerations on user mistakes
The attackers presented in the previous sections have been modeled as functions operating var-
ious transformations on SLaMP specifications. The same approach could be used for modeling
other security relevant behaviors, such as human errors.
A ErrApp(A)
δFγ τ
?[F] Fγ′ δ′ δFγ τ[F] Fγ′ δ′†
† when RunsOn(X) = Mobile
Table 4.9: Capabilites of ErrApp.
For instance, imagine that we want to model a user not veri-
fying the information (on the operation) she is displayed on
the mobile phone, confirming all the requests. This could
be modeled as a new operator, ErrApp, that removes the no-
tation ? (when present) from the authenticators running on
her phone (as shown in Table 4.9). Although being of rel-
evance, this kind of transformations are out of the scope of
this work and, thus, account as future work.
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4.1.2 Attackers on SPS
In this section, we present how the attackers presented in Section 4.1.1 intervene on an SPS
specification.
In our framework, attackers are modeled as a modification of the security properties of the com-
munication channels involved in the protocol execution. This means that an attacker affects the
SPS actions of the targeted authenticator by modifying the security properties of one or more
communication channels.
As for the attackers of SLaMP, we define f S : {Browser,App}×SPS → SPS. If Ak =A, its
corresponding SPS actions would allow an intruder to obtain the needed data pieces and bypass
its protection, keeping executing the protocol.
In the following sections, we put forward the attacker definitions. In Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12,
the effects of the attackers on SPS are reported.
4.1.2.1 Device Thief
In our analysis, we model DTSe by altering some security properties of the channels involving
the Authenticator, the User and the Endpoint. Firstly, both the channel between the User and
the Authenticator and the one between the Endpoint and the Authenticator lose the property of
authenticity. Secondly, the channels between the Authenticator and the User and between the
Authenticator and the Endpoint lose the confidentiality property. In terms of SPS specification,
this means that U • → • Ak, E • → • Ak, become U → • Ak and E → • Ak. Moreover, Ak
•→ • U and Ak •→ • E become Ak •→ U and Ak •→ E.
4.1.2.2 Authenticator Duplicator
In our modeling, the copy of an authenticator maps to the fact that a malicious attacker can
interact with it: as for DT, we model ADSe by (i) dropping the property of authenticity of U to
A and E to A and (ii) dropping the property of confidentiality of A to U and A to E. In terms
of SPS specification, this means that U • → • Ak, E • → • Ak, become U → • Ak and E → •
Ak. Moreover, Ak •→ • U and Ak •→ • E become Ak •→ U and Ak •→ E. It is worth noting
that the described transformations apply only if Plat f orm(Ak) 6= Hardware (since AD cannot
replicate Hardware authenticators).
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. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; U →• Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ U: m; . . .
. . .; E →• Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ E: m; . . .
ADSe
. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; U →• Ak: m; . . . †
. . .; Ak •→ U: m; . . . †
. . .; E →• Ak: m; . . . †
. . .; Ak •→ E: m; . . . †
SSSe
. . .; U →• E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; U → E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ U: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ Ak: m; . . . ‡
. . .; Ak •→ U: m; . . .
ESSBrowser
. . .; U →• E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; U → E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ U: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ Ak: m; . . . ∗,‡
. . .; Ak •→ U: m; . . . ∗
ESSApp
. . .; U →• E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; T •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • T: m; . . .
. . .; U → E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ U: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ Ak: m; . . . 
. . .; Ak •→ U: m; . . . 
. . .; T •→ Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ T: m; . . .
† only if Platform(Ak) 6= Hardware, ‡ only if m 6= fI(U,Ak)
∗ only if Platform(Ak) = Desktop,  only if Platform(Ak) = App
4.1.2.3 Shoulder Surfer
SS compromises any datum on its sight. Therefore we model SSSe by removing the confidentiality
property of a) the channels between the User and the Endpoint and b) the channels between the
User and the Authenticator. In terms of SPS specification, this means that the actions including
U →• E, E •→ • U, U •→ • Ak and Ak •→ • U would be with as U → E, E •→ U,
U •→ Ak and Ak •→ U, respectively.
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Table 4.11: Effects of attackers SESe and MB
S
e .




. . .; S •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; E →• S: m; . . .
. . .; S •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • S: m; . . .
. . .; T •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • T: m; . . .
. . .; S →• E: m; . . .
. . .; E → S: m; . . .
. . .; S →• Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ S: m; . . .
. . .; T →• Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ T: m; . . .
MBSBrowser
. . .; U →• E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; E →• S: m; . . .
. . .; S •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; U → E: m; . . .
. . .; E → U: m; . . .
. . .; E → S: m; . . .
. . .; S → E: m; . . .
. . .; E → Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak → E: m; . . .
4.1.2.4 Eavesdropping Software
In our analysis, we model ESSe by removing the confidentiality property of a) the channel between
the User and the Endpoint, b) the channel between the User and the Software Authenticator
installed on the endpoint and c) the channel between the Telephony Server and the Endpoint (only
in the case that the Endpoint is a smartphone). In terms of SPS specification, this means that the
actions including U →• E, E •→ • U, U •→ • Ak and Ak •→ • U would include U →
E, E • → U, U • → Ak and Ak • → U instead. Note that the modifications on the actions
involving Ak only if either e = Browser∧Platform(Ak) = Desktop or e = App∧Platform(Ak) =
Mobile.
4.1.2.5 Social Engineer
In our analysis, SESe is modeled by dropping the confidentiality property of the communication
channel between the Endpoint and the Server and dropping the authentication property of the
channel between the Server and the Endpoint. In SPS, this means that E • → • S becomes E
•→ S and S •→ • E becomes S →• E. Moreover, the same applies for the channels between
the servers (S and T) and the k− th authenticator.
4.1.2.6 Man-in-the-Browser
In our analysis, we consider that any piece of data displayed and typed on the browser can
be intercepted and modified by MB. The user is potentially displayed incorrect information.
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Table 4.12: Effects of MMSe .




. . .; T •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • T: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; S •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • S: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; T → Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak →• T: m; . . .
. . .; E → Ak: m; . . . ∗
. . .; Ak → E: m; . . . ∗
. . .; S → Ak: m; . . . ∗
. . .; Ak →• S: m; . . . ∗
. . .; U → Ak: m; . . . ∗
. . .; Ak → U: m; . . . ∗
MMSApp
. . .; U →• E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; E →• S: m; . . .
. . .; S •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; E •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • E: m; . . .
. . .; T •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • T: m; . . .
. . .; S •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • S: m; . . .
. . .; U •→ • Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak •→ • U: m; . . .
. . .; U → E: m; . . .
. . .; E → U: m; . . .
. . .; E → S: m; . . .
. . .; S → E: m; . . .
. . .; E → Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak → E: m; . . .
. . .; T → Ak: m; . . .
. . .; Ak →• T: m; . . .
. . .; S → Ak: m; . . . ∗
. . .; Ak →• S: m; . . . ∗
. . .; U → Ak: m; . . . ∗
. . .; Ak → U: m; . . . ∗
∗ only if Platform(Ak) = Mobile
In terms of SPS, this means that E would be communicating with other roles leveraging the
following channels: E → S, S → E, U → E, E → U, E → Ak and Ak → E.
4.1.2.7 Man-in-the-Mobile
The Man-in-the-Mobile is the counterpart of MB for the App endpoint. In terms of SPS, this
means that the mobile endpoint E would be communicating with other roles leveraging the fol-
lowing channels: E → S, S → E, U → E, E → U, E → Ak and Ak → E. However, even when
the endpoint is a Desktop computer, MM can still compromise authenticators installed on the
smartphone. In this case, we model this behavior by dropping all the security properties of the
channels between such authenticators and other roles.
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4.1.3 Partial Correctness
In this section we provide a proof of formal correctness of our attackers. In particular, we aim to
prove the following.
Theorem 1. Given P, fe s.t. fe(P) =A then 6` f Se (Sem(P))
Proof. By modus ponens, we assume the premise and we prove the conclusion. Moreover, we
notice that for each protocol P=A1; . . . ;An, holds that fe(P)=A if and only if ∀i∈{1, ...,n}. fe(Ai)=
A. Below, we prove the partial correctness w.r.t. each authenticator, namely if fe(A) =A then
6` f Se (Sem(A)), ∀A ∈Ω.
Memorized Secrets
In this case, fe(¤) =A. According to the tables in Section 4.1.1, this happens for f ∈ {SS, ES,
SE, MB, MM}. Moreover, σ= Sem(¤)= . . . ;PRE ·U→•E : mem(U,S,k)·E→•S : mem(U,S,k);GOAL,
where PRE and GOAL are defined as in Section 3.3.
Thus, we have five sub-cases.
SS By definition of SSSe in Table 4.10, U→•E : mem(U,S,k) becomes U→ E : mem(U,S,k).
Therefore we compute: SSSe(σ)= . . . ;PRE ·U→ E : mem(U,S,k)·E→•S : mem(U,S,k);GOAL.
Since mem(U,S,k) is accessible to the attacker, 6` SSSe(σ).
ES This case is symmetric to the previous one.
SE By definition of SESe in Table 4.10, E→•S : mem(U,S,k) becomes E→ S : mem(U,S,k).
Thus, we compute SESe(σ) = . . . ;PRE ·U→•E : mem(U,S,k)·
E→•S : mem(U,S,k);GOAL. In other words, the attacker is able to collect ¤, comprmos-
ing it. Thus, 6` SESe (σ).
MB This case applies only if e = Browser. In such case, by definition of MBSBrowser in Ta-
ble 4.11, U→•E : mem(U,S,k) becomes U→ E : mem(U,S,k).
Thus, we calculates MBSBrowser(σ)= . . . ;PRE ·U→ E : mem(U,S,k)·. . . ;GOAL. This means
that the attacker can obtain the secret, which suffices to conclude.
MM This case is symmetric to the previous one, but for e = App. Indeed, as shown in Table
4.7, MM does not apply to ¤ if e = Browser.
Look-up Secrets
In this case, fe(!) =A. According to the tables in Section 4.1.1, this implies that f ∈ {DT, AD,
SS, ES, SE, MB, MM}.
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Moreover, σ = Sem(!) = . . . ;PRE ·S : NumberCoords ·S•→ •E : Coords ·E•→ •U : Coords·
U•→ •Ak : Coords· Ak•→ •U : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)· U→•E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)·
E→•S : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords);GOAL.
Thus, we have seven sub-cases.
DT By definition of DTSe in Table 4.10, U•→ •Ak : Coords and Ak•→ •U : exp(lus(S,Ak),
Coords) become U→•Ak : Coords and Ak•→ U : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords), respectively.
Therefore, we compute DT Se (σ) = . . . ;PRE ·S : Number Coords ·S•→ •E : Coords·
E•→ •U : Coords ·U→•Ak : Coords ·Ak•→ U : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)·
U→•E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) ·E→•S : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords);GOAL.
This suffices to hijack a session with Ak, since an intruder can impersonate U in the inter-
action with the authenticator and obtain the needed data.
AD This case is symmetric to the previous one.
SS By definition of SSSe in Table 4.10, U→•E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) becomes
U→ E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)·
Hence, we compute SSSe(σ) = . . . ;PRE· . . . · U→ E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) · . . . ;
GOAL. Since exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) is accessible to attacker, 6` SSSe(σ).
ES By definition of ESSe in Table 4.10, U→•E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) becomes
U→ E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)·
Hence, we compute ESSe(σ) = . . . ;PRE· . . . · U→ E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) · . . . ;
GOAL. Since exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) is accessible to attacker, 6` ESSe(σ).
SE According to the definition of SESe in Table 4.10, S•→ •E : Coords and
E→•S : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) become S→•E : Coords and
E→ S : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords), respectively.
Therefore, we compute SESe (σ) = . . . ;PRE · . . .S→•E : Coords·
E•→ •U : Coords ·U•→ •Ak : Coords·
Ak•→ •U : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) ·U→•E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)·
Ebullet→ S : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords);GOAL.
This allows the attacker to collect the otp, thus 6` SESe (σ).
MB According to the definition of MBSBrowser in Table 4.10, E•→ •U : Coords and
U→•E : Coords become E→ U : Coords and U→ E : Coords.
Thus, we calculate MBSBrowser(σ) = . . . ·PRE · . . . ·E→ U : Coords ·U•→ •Ak : Coords·
Ak•→ •U : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) ·U→ E : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords)·
E→ S : exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords);GOAL.
Since exp(lus(S,Ak),Coords) is accessible to attacker, 6`MBSBrowser(σ).
It is worth noting that, as presented in Section 4.1.1.6, MB does not apply when e = App.
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MM This case is symmetric to the previous one, but for e = App. Indeed, as shown in Table
4.7, MM applies to! only if the endpoint is a mobile application.
Hardware Authenticators
In this case, fe(δFγP(?)[F]Fγ′ δ′) =A.
According to the tables in Section 4.1.1, f ∈ {DT, SS, ES, SE, MB, MM}. Thus, we have six
sub-cases.
DT in this case, we know that F = {O}. Moreover, by focusing on the definition of Actionsink
and Actionsoutk given in Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ = . . . ;PRE · . . . · β•→ •Ak : m ·
. . . ;Ak•→ •β′ : m′ · . . . ;GOAL, where β,β′ ∈ {U,S,E,T}, m ∈ {scrypt(dK(S,Ak),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak)),crypt(pK(Ak),scrypt(dK(S,Ak),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)))} and m′ ∈ {hash(seed(S,Ak)),
crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)}. By definition of DTSe , β•→ •Ak : m
becomes β→•Ak : m and Ak•→ •β′ : m′ becomes Ak•→ β′ : m′, when β,β′ ∈{U,E}. There-
fore, the attacker can successfully provide inputs to Ak and obtain the corresponding out-
put. Thus, 6` DT Se (σ).
SS For this attacker, we have a further distinction, according to Table 4.3.
Case P[F]Fh otp In this case, by definition of Actionsoutk given in Section 3.3.4.1,
σ = Sem(P[F]Fh otp) = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·Ak•→ •U : hash(seed(S,Ak))·
U→•E : hash(seed(S,Ak)) · . . . ;GOAL.
By definition of SSSe , Ak•→ •U : hash(seed(S,Ak)) and U→•E : hash(seed(S,Ak))
become Ak•→ U : hash(seed(S,Ak)) and U→ E : hash(seed(S,Ak)).
Since hash(seed(S,Ak)) has become available to the attacker, 6` SSSe(σ).
Case δFγP(?)[K]Fγ′ δ′ In this case, by definition of Actionsmidk given in Section 3.3.4.1,
σ = Sem(δFγP(?)[K]Fγ′ δ′) = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·U•→ •Ak : fK(U,Ak) · . . . ;GOAL.
By definition of SSSe , U•→ •Ak : fK(U,Ak) becomes U•→ Ak : fK(U,Ak).
Since fK(U,Ak) has become available to the attacker, 6` SSSe(σ).
ES Also in this case, we have a further distinction.
Case P[F]Fh otp This case, for ESSe , is symmetric to the one of SS.
Case [F] Fm otp By definition of Actionsoutk given in Section 3.3.4.1, σ= Sem(δFγ [F]
Fmotp) = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·Ak•→ •T : hash(seed(S,Ak)) · . . . ;GOAL. ESSBrowser cannot
perform any attack. Instead, by definition of ESSApp, Ak•→ •T : hash(seed(S,Ak))
becomes
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Ak•→ T : hash(seed(S,Ak)). The otp has become available to the attacker, hence
6` ESSApp(σ).
Case otpFγ [F] Fm otp As for the previous case, by definition of Actionsoutk given in
Section 3.3.4.1, σ = Sem(δFγ [F] Fm otp) = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·Ak•→ •T :
hash(seed(S,Ak)) · . . . ;GOAL.
By definition of ESSApp, Ak•→ •T : hash(seed(S,Ak)) becomes
Ak•→ T : hash(seed(S,Ak)), i.e., the otp has become available to the attacker. Hence,
6` ESSApp(σ).
Case otpFm [F] Fγ′ otp By definition of Actionsink given in Section 3.3.4.1,
σ = Sem(otpFm P[F] Fγ′ otp) = . . . ;PRE · . . . · T•→ •Ak : hash(seed(S,Ak)) · . . .
;GOAL.
By definition of ESSApp, T•→ •Ak : hash(seed(S,Ak)) becomes
T•→ Ak : hash(seed(S,Ak)). The otp has become available to the attacker, hence
6` ESSApp(σ).
SE We differentiate other 4 sub-cases depending on the input/output of P as follows.
Case P[F] Fh δ′ By definition of Actionsoutk of Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ= . . . ;PRE ·
. . . ·Ak•→ •U : hash(seed(S,Ak)) ·U→•E : hash(seed(S,Ak))
·E→•S : hash(seed(S,Ak));GOAL.
By definition of SESe , E→•S : hash(seed(S,Ak)) becomes E→ S : hash(seed(S,Ak)).
The attacker can hence collect the otp generated by the user, compromising the
authenticator by proving its possession (through the otp) to the server. Therefore
6` SESe (σ).
Case δFhP[F] Fh δ′ where δ 6= ε By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k of Section
3.3.4.1, we know that σ = . . . ;PRE · . . .S•→ •E : m ·E•→ •U : m ·U•→ •Ak : m · . . . ;
Ak•→ •U : m′· U→•E : m′ ·E→•S : m′;GOAL, where m ∈ {scrypt(dK(S,Ak),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))} and m′ ∈ {hash(seed(S,Ak)),
crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)}.
By definition of SESe , S•→ •E : m and E→•S : m′ become S→•E : m and E→ S : m′,
respectively. The attacker can pretend to be the Server, sending an opid relate to a
malicious operation to E. At this point, the user (receiving data from E) is induced
to generate an otp related to malicious opid (since she is not provided information
regarding the operation). Once the otp is given to the Endpoint, the attacker collects
it by acting (again) in place of the Server. Therefore 6` SESe (σ).
Case δFhP[F] Fγ δ′ where δ 6= ε and γ′ 6= h By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k
of Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ= . . . ;PRE ·. . .S•→ •E : m·E•→ •U : m ·U•→ •Ak :
m · . . . ;Ak•→ •β : m′ · . . . ;GOAL, where m ∈ {scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,
UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))}, m′ ∈ {hash(seed(S,Ak)),crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)} and β ∈ {E,T,S}.
77
By definition of SESe , S•→ •E : m and Ak•→ •β : m′ become S→•E : m and Ak•→ β : m′,
respectively. The attacker can pretend to be the Server, sending an opid relate to a
malicious operation to E. At this point, the user (receiving data from E) is induced
to generate an otp related to malicious opid (since she is not provided information
regarding the operation). Once the otp is given to the Endpoint, the attacker collects
it by acting (again) in place of the Server. Therefore, 6` SESe (σ).
Case δFγP[F] Fh δ′ where δ 6= ε and γ 6= h By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k of
Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·β•→ •Ak : m · . . . ·
Ak•→ •U : m′ ·U→•E : m′ ·E→•S : m′;GOAL, where β ∈ {S,E,T} and
m∈{scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))} and m′ ∈
{hash(seed(S,Ak)),crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))}.
By definition of SESe , β•→ •Ak : m and E→•S : m′ become β→•Ak : m and E→ S : m′,
respectively.
The attacker can hence replace β and collect the output. Therefore 6` SESe (σ).
Case δFγP[F] Fγ′ δ′ where δ 6= ε and γ,γ′ 6= h By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k
of Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·β•→ •Ak : m · . . . ;
Ak•→ •β′ : m′ · . . . ;GOAL, where β,β′ ∈ {S,E,T} and
m∈{scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))} and m′ ∈
{hash(seed(S,Ak)),crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))}.
By definition of SESe , β•→ •Ak : m and Ak•→ •β′ : m′ become β→•Ak : m and
Ak•→ β′ : m′, respectively.
The attacker can hence replace β,β′ and hijack the session with Ak, giving it a mali-
cious input and collecting the corresponding otp. Therefore 6` SESe (σ).
MB Also in this case, we differentiate depending on the input/output of P .
Case P[F] Fh δ′ By definition of Actionsoutk of Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ= . . . ;PRE ·
. . . ·Ak•→ •U : hash(seed(S,Ak)) ·U→•E : hash(seed(S,Ak))·
E→•S : hash(seed(S,Ak));GOAL.
By definition of MBSBrowser, U→•E : m′ becomes U→ E : m′, respectively. The at-
tacker can hence obtain the otp. Thus, 6`MBSBrowser(σ).
Case δFhP[F] Fh δ′ where δ 6= ε By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k of Section
3.3.4.1, we know that σ= . . . ;PRE · . . . ·E•→ •U : m ·U•→ •Ak : m · . . . ·Ak•→ •U : m′·
U→•E : m′ ·E→•S : m′;GOAL, where m ∈ {scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,
UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))} and m′ ∈{hash(seed(S,Ak)),crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)}.
By definition of MBSe , E•→ •U : m and U→•E : m′ become E→ U : m and U→ E : m′,
respectively. The attacker can hence impersonate E, inducing the user to generate
an otp from a given input and steal it when the user inserts it on E. Therefore 6`
MBSBrowser(σ).
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Case δFhP[F] Fγ′ δ′ where δ 6= ε and γ′ 6= h By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k
of Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ = . . . ;PRE · . . . · E•→ •U : m · U•→ •Ak : m · . . . ·
Ak•→ •β : m′ · . . . ;GOAL, where m ∈ {scrypt(dK(S,Ak),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))}, β ∈ {S,E,T} and
m′ ∈ {hash(seed(S,Ak)),crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),
opid(Operation,UniqueID)}.
By definition of MBSe , E•→ •U : m and Ak•→ •β : m′ become E→ U : m and Ak→•β : m′,
respectively. The attacker can hence impersonate E, inducing the user to generate an
otp from a given input and collect it by impersonating β. Therefore 6`MBSBrowser(σ).
Case δFγP[F] Fh δ′ where δ 6= ε and γ 6= h By definitions of Actionsink and Actions
out
k of
Section 3.3.4.1, we know that σ = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·β•→ •Ak : m · . . . ·
Ak•→ •U : m′ ·U→•E : m′ ·E→•S : m′;GOAL, where β ∈ {S,E,T} and
m∈{scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))} and m′ ∈
{hash(seed(S,Ak)),
crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)}.
By definition of MBSe , β•→ •Ak : m and U→•E : m′ become β→•Ak : m and U→ E : m′,
respectively. The attacker can hence impersonate β, providing an arbitrary input and
get the output. Therefore 6`MBSBrowser(σ).
Case δFγP[F] Fγ′ δ′ where δ 6= ε and γ,γ′ 6= h This case is symmetric to the one of SE,
but only if e = Browser.
MM This case is symmetric with the previous one, but for e = App
Software Authenticators
In this case, fe(δFγ (?)[F]Fγ′ δ′) =A.
This implies that f ∈ {DT, AD, SS, ES, SE, MB, MM}.
We distinguish the following sub-cases.
DT This case is symmetric to DT in the case of hardware authenticators.
AD This attacker, in the case of Software Authenticators, behaves as DT in the case of hardware
authenticators,
SS This case is symmetric to SS in the case of hardware authenticators.
ES In this case, we have to specify a set of further distinctions, depending on the input/output
of the authenticator.
Case [F]Fh otp In this case, by definition of Actionsoutk given in Section 3.3.4.1,
σ = Sem(P[F]otpFh) = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·Ak•→ •U : hash(seed(S,Ak))·
U→•E : hash(seed(S,Ak)) · . . . ;GOAL.
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By definition of ESSe , U→•E : hash(seed(S,Ak)) become U→ E : hash(seed(S,Ak)).
Since hash(seed(S,Ak)) has become available to the attacker, 6` ESSe(σ).
Case δFγ (?)[K]Fγ′ δ′ where δ 6= ε and Platform( ) = Desktop In this case, by defini-
tion of Actionsmedk given in Section 3.3.4.1,
σ = Sem(δFγP(?)[K]Fγ′ δ′) = . . . ;PRE · . . . ·U•→ •Ak : fK(U,Ak) · . . . ;GOAL.
By definition of ESSBrowser, U•→ •Ak : fK(U,Ak) becomes U•→ Ak : fK(U,Ak) when
Platform( ) = Desktop.
Since fK(U,Ak) has become available to the attacker, 6` ESSBrowser(σ).
Case δFγ (?)[K]Fγ′ δ′ where δ 6= ε and Platform( ) = Mobile This case is symmetric
to the previous, but with e = App.
SE This case is symmetric to SE in the case of hardware authenticators.
MB This case is symmetric to MB in the case of hardware authenticators.
MM By definitions in Section 3.3.4.1, we can write that σ = Sem(δFγ (?)[F]Fγ′ δ′) = . . . ;PRE ·
. . . ·
β•→ •Ak : m · . . . ·Ak•→ •β′ : m′ · . . . ;GOAL, where β,β′ ∈ {U,S,E,T} and
m ∈ {scrypt(dK(S,Ak),opid(Operation,UniqueID)),hash(seed(S,Ak))} and
m′ ∈ {hash(seed(S,Ak)), crypt(inv(pK(Ak)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)}.
By definition of MMSe , β•→ •Ak : m and Ak•→ •β′ : m′ become β→ Ak : m and Ak→ β′ : m′,
respectively, when Platform( ) = Mobile
Thus, 6`MMSe (σ).
Lemma 1. Given P, f 1e , . . . , f ne s.t. f 1e ◦ . . . ◦ f ne (P) =A then ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. 6` f
( j),S
e (Sem( f 1e ◦
. . .◦ f j−1e ◦ f j+1e ◦ . . .◦ f ne (P)))
Proof. By definition, we can reorder f 1e ◦ . . .◦ f ne as f
j
e ◦ f 1e ◦ . . .◦ f
j−1
e ◦ f j+1e ◦ . . .◦ f ne . Then we
define P′ = f 1e ◦ . . .◦ f
j−1
e ◦ f j+1e ◦ . . .◦ f ne (P). Thus, we reduced to the statement of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Given P, f 1e , . . . , f ne s.t. f 1e ◦ . . .◦ f ne (P) =A then 6` f
(1),S
e , . . . , f
(n),S
e (Sem(P))
Proof. We inductively apply Lemma 1 to f 1e , . . . , f
n
e .
As for Section 4.1.1, we now apply the attacker combination SS◦DT on Nordea1. In this case,
however, we use its SPS counterpart, namely SSSe◦DTSe . The following example shows that, as
SS◦DT compromised Nordea1 (SS◦DT(Nordea1)=A), SSSe◦DTSe transforms the SPS specifica-
tion of Nordea1 in a way that the authentication property is violated (6`SSSe◦DTSe(Sem(Nordea1))).
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Example 11. Let us consider Nordea1. As previously explained in Section 4.1.1, SS◦DT(Nordea1)
=A.
We now calculate SSSe◦DTSe(Sem(Nordea1)).To do so, we calculate SSSe◦DTSe(Sem(¤)) and
SSSe◦DTSe(Sem(opidFhP[O,K] Fh otp)) separately.
In the first case, σ = Sem(¤) = . . . ;PRE · U→•E : mem(U,S,1) · E→•S : mem(U,S,1);GOAL.
Due to the capabilities of SSSe◦DTSe , U→•E : mem(U,S,1) becomes U→ E : mem(U,S,1). There-
fore, mem(U,S,1) can be compromised, meaning that 6`SSSe◦DTSe(σ).
In the second case, σ = Sem(¤) = . . . ;PRE ·S : Number UniqueID ·S•→ •E :
scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·
E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·
U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)))·
U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2)·
A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·
U→•E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))·
E→•S : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID));GOAL.
Due to the capabilities of SSSe◦DTSe ,
E•→ •U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)),
U•→ •A2 : scrypt(dK(A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))),
U•→ •A2 : fK(U,A2),
A2•→ •U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) and
U→•E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID))
become
E•→ U : scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID)),
U→ A2 : scrypt(dK(A2),opid(Operation,UniqueID))),
U→ A2 : fK(U,A2),
A2•→ U : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)) and
U→ E : crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation,UniqueID)).
Therefore, the attacker can steal fK(U,A2) and hijack a session with A2, meaning that 6`SSSe◦DTSe(σ).
Thus, 6`SSSe◦DTSe(Sem(Nordea1)).
The SPS obtained after the attack is reported in Listing 4.1. The symbol denotes that a security
property has been dropped due to the effect of SSSe◦DTSe .
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1 Types:
2 Agents U, E, S, A2;
3
4 Mappings:
5 mem : Agent ,Agent ,Number -> Msg;
6 pK: Agent -> PublicKey;
7 inv: PublicKey -> PrivateKey;
8 fK: Agent ,Agent -> SymmetricKey;






15 U: U, E, A2, mem(S,U,1), pk(A2), fK(U,A2);
16 E: E, U, S, pK(A2);
17 S: S, U, E, mem(S,U,1), pK(A2), dK(S,A2);
18 A2: U, E, A2, dK(S,A2), fK(U,A2), pk(A2), inv(pK(A2));
19
20 Actions:
21 U: Msg Operation
22 U → E: Operation
23 E →• S: Operation
24 U → E: mem(S,U,1)
25 E →• S: mem(S,U,1)
26 S : Number UniqueID
27 S •→ • E: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
28 E •→ U: scrypt(dK(S,A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
29 U → A2: scrypt(dK(A2),opid(Operation ,UniqueID)))
30 U → A2: fK(U,A2)
31 A2 •→ U: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
32 U → E: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
33 E →• S: crypt(inv(pK(A2)),opid(Operation ,UniqueID))
34
35 Goals:
36 S authenticates U over Operation




Our framework allows to evaluate an MFA implementation in terms of compliance with a set of
requirements and best practices. The evaluation can be done by focusing either on the MFA pro-
tocol itself or on other features characterizing the MFA implementation, such as the enrollment
and binding phases or the adoption of exemptions. This is possible because the published laws
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and guidelines must not impose the employment of a particular product or technology. There-
fore, in the majority of cases, the presented requirements or definitions do not specify details on
the internal functionality of the entities that are involved in MFA.
The rationale behind this kind of analysis is simple. The first step is to extract the most relevant
aspects of a document (e.g., a directive), that should characterize the design of an MFA protocol
(or implementation) to be evaluated, e.g., “the usage of SMS an phone calls should be avoided”.
Then, for each of the extracted requirements, it is necessary to define a criterion for establishing
if a certain MFA protocol (or implementation) complies with it. Clearly, this criterion should
refer to some feature that can be expressed with our language, e.g., “ 6∈ P”. The analysis will
hence be performed by matching the MFA protocol (or implementation) with the criteria and
evaluating the compliance with each of the defined requirements.
In this research work, we extracted and encoded a set of requirements deriving from EBA regula-
tions ([Eur13a, Eur13b, Eur15, Eur17] and a set of best practices deriving from [NIS17, PCI16a,
Pin09, Gem15, Cen16]. Then, we used it for evaluating the MFA implementations of several
banks around the world (see Section 6.2). However, such requirements and best practices can
reasonably be used for evaluating any MFA implementation.
In the following section, we describe the process of extraction and encoding of both the security
requirements and best practices, together with the criteria for evaluating how an MFA protocol
or an implementation comply with them.
4.2.1 Security Requirements
During our research on the Online Banking use case, a set of official documents, guidelines
and laws concerning the employment of MFA solutions in the online banking context has been
analyzed. From this study, we derived a set of requirements, representing the key features that
have to be included (according to the main authorities in the ebanking context) in order to provide
a proper security level.
The main source of requirements for MFA-based e-payment systems are EU regulations.4 We
group requirements according to their scope:
(i) authenticator requirements refer to specific features that authenticators must comply with; (ii)
digital authentication requirements refer to properties of the MFA protocols employed for digital
authentication; (iii) identity proofing and binding requirements refer to properties of enrollment
4We also considered the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard [PCI16a, PCI16b] (becoming ef-
fective in 2018). As a matter of fact, PCI applies to any service that stores and manages payment card data, which
includes e-banking services. Nevertheless, the requirements specified in the Data Security Standard are either too
generic (e.g., provide documentation to the user for an informed usage of MFA) or too specific for the single imple-
mentation (that we are not able to test). For this reason, these requirements have not been considered in our survey.
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RL1 If a software authenticator or an authentication code is used through a multi-purpose device,
the integrity of the device must be checked
+ + + ○
Digital Authentication
RL2 MFA protocols must be always employed when the user performs risky operations è è ○ ○
RL3 Every MFA protocol must employ at least two different types of AFs ○ ○ ○ ○
RL4 Every MFA protocol must employ at least two independent AFs è è ○ ○
RL5 Every MFA protocol must result in the generation of an authentication code that is unique,
dynamically linked to a specific operation and accepted only once.
+ + è ○
RL6 Every MFA protocol must make the user aware of crucial information on the operation she is
going to authorize
+ + + ○
Enrollment and Binding
RL7 Identity proofing must be performed with a high level of confidence + + + ○
RL8 The binding procedure for every authenticator must be executed in a secure manner ○ ○ è ○
RL9 Every remotely delivered authenticator must be activated before its usage + + + ○
and binding phases, respectively. Below we discuss those requirements, which are summarized
in Table 4.13.
4.2.1.1 Authenticator requirements
RTS [Eur17] requires that authenticators are tamper-proof. This, however, is a hard requirement
to meet, in case of software authenticators that run on multi-purpose, e.g., mobile devices (this
will be detailed in the following sections). As highlighted in [HM18], software authenticators are
relatively easy to compromise if the platform running them is compromised. Therefore, accord-
ing to [Eur17], when a software authenticator or an authentication code is used through a multi-
purpose device, such a device must be checked against alterations (RL1). The aim of this require-
ment is hence to limit the aforementioned weakness as much as possible, by imposing banks to
equip their software authenticators and applications with mechanisms for ensuring the integrity
of mobile devices and potentially blocking the execution of payments from an insecure endpoint.
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4.2.1.2 Digital Authentication requirements
The specifications concerning digital authentication based on MFA have evolved over time.
While some initial requirements on MFA were given in RSIP [Eur13a], more precise and strin-
gent requirements were defined in later regulations and directives. For instance, PSD2 [Eur15]
introduces the concept of authentication code and dynamic linking (further refined in RTS [Eur17]).
EBA defines specific situations in which MFA must be adopted (RL2). In particular, PSD2 and
RTS require the adoption of MFA when (i) accessing a personal account for the first time in 90
days, (ii) initiating a payment transaction and (iii) executing any operation that may imply a risk
of fraud or other abuses. Hereafter, we refer to such operations as risky operations. Intuitively,
a risky operation is an operation that may lead to a leakage of sensitive data or to an economical
damage. The operations to be considered as risky were identified by EBA after public consulta-
tions with several stakeholders within the online banking context. Specifically, the identification
process took into account the outcome of empirical research and risk analysis procedures that are
normally adopted in the field.
EBA also explicitly lists a number of situations in which MFA may not be employed. These
exemptions for the MFA employment are regulated in [Eur17]. In particular, operations such
as (i) checking the account balance, (ii) paying a trusted beneficiary, (iii) executing a recurring
transaction and (iv) executing a bank transfer between user’s own accounts may not require
MFA. This requirement has an impact on both the security and usability of MFA protocols. In
particular, RL2 helps in identifying the situations in which the security level provided by an MFA
protocol should be reasonably high. The exemptions, instead, helps identifying those situations
in which the user can be relieved from MFA, increasing the usability and perceived ease of use.
Further requirements are provided for the design of the MFA protocol itself. A first design
requirement, defined already in [Eur13a], concerns the variety of AFs employed in a MFA pro-
tocol. In particular, EBA requires that AFs are distinct, i.e., at least two distinct types of AFs
(e.g., one knowledge and one ownership factor) should be employed in the verification process
(RL3). This requirement is crucial for MFA protocols, since the variety of AFs can strongly
increase their security. The differentiation of AFs, indeed, forces a potential malicious agent to
adopt different techniques in order to compromise an identity proof, hence making it difficult for
the attacker to execute an MFA protocol on behalf of the user.
Another fundamental design requirement for MFA protocols is the independence of the employed
AFs. Specifically, after compromising one AF, an attacker must have no advantage for compro-
mising the others. This concept is formalized in [Eur13a, Eur15, Eur17], where it is stated that
AFs adopted by an MFA protocol must be independent (RL4). Reasonably, to compromise an
AF, the attackers must control the authenticator that attests it. Therefore, an attacker has to con-
trol at least two different authenticators to compromise two AFs. Furthermore, EBA requires
that an MFA protocol “shall result in the generation of an authentication code” [Eur17]. EBA
also states that the authentication code is the information used to authorize a specific payment
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transaction. For this reason, an authentication code should be OTP-generated (through a device
or other cryptographic facility) and must be uniquely linked to a specific transaction (RL5). This
requirement aims to improve the security level of MFA by strictly linking an authentication code
to its context of use; accordingly, even if intercepted by a malicious agent, it can only be used
for an operation that has been previously confirmed.
Finally, EBA requires in [Eur17] that the user is made aware of (the crucial information about) the
ongoing transaction (RL6). The information provided to the user should include (i) the amount
of the transaction, (ii) the payee and (iii) the generated codes. Intuitively, this requirement aims
to reduce the risk for the user to be induced to perform unwanted actions.
4.2.1.3 Enrollment and Binding requirements
Regulations and directives also define requirements on both the enrollment and binding proce-
dures. For the former, EBA requires that users are identified with a high level of assurance
(RL7). This is because issues in this phase can affect the reliability of the entire MFA process.
In particular, EBA requires that user identification is carried out by a trained person [Eur17].
Additional constraints are imposed by eIDAS regulations [Eur14], which require user identifi-
cation to be based on highly reliable identification proofs. For the binding process instead, two
main requirements are defined by the EBA. The first addresses the delivery of authenticators
[Eur13a, Eur13b]. In particular, each authenticator must be delivered exactly to the intended
user and in a secure manner (RL8). Accordingly, authenticators should be delivered to users
personally after an in-person (de visu) identification. In case of “remote binding”, authenticators
should be delivered only after the user has been identified through MFA (by means of previously
bounded authenticators).
An additional (and more specific) requirement concerning the binding phase requires an acti-
vation procedure for those authenticators that have been remotely delivered (RL9). Leveraging
an activation procedure, indeed, a service provider can provide users with a unique code to be
inserted in the delivered authenticator in order to uniquely bind it to their identity.
The aforementioned requirements (RL7, RL8 and RL9) are clearly intended to limit the possible
risks in the operations that are preliminary for the MFA usage. The security guarantees offered by
an MFA protocol do indeed depend on the aforementioned operations: if an attacker manages to
obtain an authenticator, the overall security of any MFA protocol depending on that authenticator
is compromised.
4.2.1.4 Evaluation Criteria for Security Requirements
The criteria for evaluating the considered banks in terms of the security requirements are defined
as follows.
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Table 4.14: Summary of the evaluation criteria for requirements.
ID    Criteria
RL1 Every Some No banking application (including software authenticators) provides a device integrity check
RL2 No n.a. Some risky operation is performed without MFA
RL3 Every Some No MFA protocol relies on at least two AF
RL4 Every Some No MFA protocol relies on at least two authenticators
RL5 Every Some No MFA protocol contains opidF · F otp or otpF · F otp
RL6 Every Some No MFA protocol uses at least one of P?[. . .] and ?[. . .]
RL7   n.a. used for the enrollment
RL8 Every Some No binding includes  or
RL9 Every Some No binding is (·, , ·), (·, ·, ) or (·, ·, )
It is worth noting that some requirements are defined at the level of banking application, authen-
ticator and MFA protocol (e.g., RL1, RL3 to RL6, RL8 and RL9) and others at the level of
bank. In our analysis, we evaluate the former group of requirements also at the level of bank.
In this case, we consider three possible levels of fulfillment defined through the quantification
over the banking application, authenticator and MFA protocols adopted by a bank: fulfilled ()
denotes that all adopted target elements (banking applications, authenticators or MFA protocols)
satisfy the requirement; partially/possibly5 violated () denotes that some (but not all) adopted
target elements satisfy the requirement; and violated () denotes that none of the target elements
satisfies the requirement. The criteria for assessing the compliance with requirements and best
practices are summarized in Table 4.14 and Table 4.16, respectively.
RL1. To determine whether a bank meets this requirement, we verify its software authenticators
and mobile banking applications.6 In particular, we inspect the code, looking for the use of root
detection mechanisms. Thus, we state that RL1 is fulfilled when the code of every application
includes these checks, partially violated when only some applications include these checks, and
violated otherwise.
RL2. This requirement focuses on the protection of risky operations (see Section 4.2.1) with
MFA. Trivially, RL2 is satisfied by a bank if the bank does not allow the execution of risky
operations without MFA. Otherwise, RL2 is violated.
RL3. This requirement is fulfilled by a bank if and only if all employed MFA protocols involve
at least two AFs of different type. For instance, a protocol in which ¤ is combined with P[O]
complies with RL3 (since ¤ subsumes a knowledge factor), while a protocol using authentica-
tors! and P[O] does not (as both authenticators assert an ownership factor). If only a subset of
the MFA protocols offered by a bank meets this criterion, the requirement is considered partially
violated by the bank. Finally, if none of the offered MFA protocols involve at least two AFs of
5The compliance of a bank with some requirements (e.g., RL7) depends on the specific implementation adopted
by the bank. In this cases,  indicates that the implementation adopted by a bank can potentially violate the
requirement.
6We only considered the Android version of banking applications.
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different type, RL3 is violated.
RL4. As stated in the previous section, we assume that two AFs are independent when an
adversary has to control at least two authenticators to compromise both. For instance, this is
the case for ¤;!. Conversely, two AFs are not independent when they are attested by a single,
multi-factor authenticator, e.g., P[O,K]. Under this interpretation, RL4 requires that every MFA
protocol adopted by a bank employs at least two distinct authenticators. Hence, a bank partially
violates RL4 if some of the MFA protocols it offers do not use more than one authenticator; if
none of its MFA protocols uses more than one authenticator, we consider RL4 violated.
RL5. This requirement is satisfied by a bank if and only if all employed MFA protocols result
in an authenticator output that is uniquely associated to the ongoing operation. In symbols, we
require that an MFA protocol includes at least one authenticator with the form opid F · F otp7
or otpF · F otp. For example, an MFA protocol relying on opidFi [O,K] Fi otp does link
the output to the ongoing operation, while one only relying on P[O,K] Fh otp does not. If only
some of the protocols satisfy it, RL5 is considered partially violated and, if none of the protocols
returns the desired authenticator output, RL5 is violated.
RL6. This requirement is satisfied by a bank if and only if all employed MFA protocols employ
at least one authenticator labeled with ?, i.e., in the case of P?[. . .] and ?[. . .]. In contrast, if
such an authenticator is only used in some of the MFA protocols, RL6 is partially violated; if
none of the provided MFA protocols uses it, RL6 is violated.
RL7. The required level of assurance is clearly achieved when enrollment is carried out in
person (). Otherwise, i.e., when enrollment is performed remotely ( ), we claim that RL7 is
possibly violated.
RL8. As for RL7, the binding procedure for an authenticator provides the required level of
assurance only if one step is done at the bank () or through an MFA protocol ( ). Note that an
MFA protocol executed in a binding step should comply at least with RL3 and RL4 and the au-
thenticators it employs should have been bound in compliance with RL8 and RL9. If the request
step includes E, it is necessary to consider the modality in which the enrollment is executed (for
that bank). Thus, a bank satisfies RL8 if the binding procedure for all its authenticators provide
the required level of assurance. Instead, the requirement is partially violated when only some
binding procedures rely on in-person identification or MFA. Finally, if no binding procedure
requires in-person identification or MFA, RL8 is violated.
RL9. This requirement is satisfied under two circumstances: either the delivery phase consists
of  or there is a secure activation step (i.e.,  or ). On the other hand, we consider RL9
possibly violated if these conditions are met by a bank only for some authenticators. In all other
cases, the bank violates RL9.
7We assume that if an opid is received as an input, it is actually used to generate the output, which is therefore
assumed unique. Unfortunately, we cannot verify if the output is accepted only once by the server.
88























































BP1 A software authenticator should be integrated in the mobile banking application (if any) + + + + ○
Digital Authentication
BP2 MFA protocols should rely on standard solutions + è ○ ○ +
BP3 Step-up authentication should be adopted + è ○ ○ ○
BP4 MFA protocols should limit SMS reception as much as possible ○ ○ + + ○
Enrollment and Binding
BP5 Identity proofing should be executed with high level of confidence ○ è + + +
BP6 The binding procedure should be executed in a secure manner ○ ○ + ○ ○
BP7 Two authenticators attesting ownership factors should be bound after the enrollment ○ + + + +
BP8 The user should be offered with multiple authenticators of different types ○ + ○ è ○
4.2.2 Best Practices
By gathering the guidelines released by NIST [NIS17] and PCI-SSC (MFA Guidelines, [PCI17])
as well as by three independent vendors of digital identity security systems, i.e., Gemalto [Gem15],
PingIdentity [Pin09] and Centrify [Cen16], we have categorized a set of best practices. We cat-
egorize best practices following the same criteria used for the requirements.
4.2.2.1 Authenticator best practices
Best practices on authenticators put a major emphasis on mobile devices, e.g., smartphones and
tablets. For instance, Ping Identity [Pin09] states that, if a service requiring MFA employs a ded-
icated mobile application, the capabilities of the authenticator should be integrated in it (BP1).
That is, the service provider should not use a separate authentication application. This best prac-
tice aims to improve the usability of MFA protocols by reducing the amount of applications that a
user has to interact with. BP1 can somehow be related to RL1: joining two software applications
into one might help in the security measures effectiveness, since security functionalities do not
have to be implemented twice.
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4.2.2.2 Digital authentication best practices
These best practices deal with the digital authentication process with a particular emphasis on
MFA protocols and their features. For example, Centrify [Cen16] and Gemalto [Gem15] recom-
mend to implement MFA protocols using standard solutions (BP2). This because, unlike pro-
prietary algorithms, standardized algorithms go through public scrutiny by industry and security
experts, which reduces the chance of any inherent weakness or vulnerability. This best practice
adds some constraints to the design requirements related to MFA protocols (i.e., RL3 to RL6)
by encouraging the employment of solutions that comply with the aforementioned requirements
and by limiting the adoption of ad-hoc solutions that may introduce security issues.
Moreover, best practices in [Cen16, Gem15, Pin09] provide recommendation on the situations
in which MFA should be adopted. In particular, they recommend to implement adaptive or
“step-up” authentication procedures. This means that MFA should be avoided when not strictly
necessary (BP3). A way to implement this is to require an increasing number of authenticators
depending on the actions to be performed by the user. This best practice aims to improve the
perceived ease-of-use during the access to remote data. Step-up authentication relieves users
from the burden to achieve an unnecessary high security level by requiring MFA only in situations
where it is needed. It is worth noting that this best practice exemplifies the exemptions introduced
in RL2 by suggesting practical solutions to be adopted in low-risk scenarios.
Another best practice targets the adoption of SMS services, therefore adding constraints to MFA
protocol requirements. In particular, both NIST and PCI-CSS (in [NIS17] and [PCI17], respec-
tively) deprecate the usage of out-of-band authentication via SMS (BP4). This is because the re-
liability of this kind of authenticator has been recently questioned: a large amount of malware has
specifically targeted this authentication method to obtain sensitive data for MFA [Vir14, Kas13].
Moreover, the advantage of using alternative channels (compared to classic HTTPS connection)
may be nullified if an SMS is received on the same phone from which a payment operation is
started [PCI17]. According to [Hag07], the adoption of SMS can lead to situations in which the
mobile phone of the user constitutes a single point of failure whose exploitation can compromise
the security of all communication channels.
4.2.2.3 Enrollment and binding best practices
NIST provides a detailed explanation in [NIS17] on how enrollment and, in particular, identity
proofing should be performed. In our context, it can be summarized by asserting that identity
proofing should be performed with high level of confidence (BP5). This can be performed by
an in-person identification and/or based on documents and certifications issued by a so-called
qualified entity (e.g., a national authority). Regarding the binding process, the best practices
released by many public and private authorities [NIS17, PCI17, Gem15, Pin09] require service
providers to bind authenticators to the user’s identity in a secure manner (BP6). This because
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Table 4.16: Summary of the evaluation criteria for best practices.
ID    Criteria
BP1 Every n.a. No and/or Æ is integrated in MP endpoint
BP2 Every Some No relevant (cfr. Table 4.17) API is used by dedicated mobile applications
BP3 Ëor ËË n.a. é exemptions are adopted by the online service
BP4 No Some Every MFA protocol relies on
BP5 – – – same as RL7
BP6 – – – same as RL8
BP7 2+ 1 0 among P[{O}∪F], [{O}∪F] and! have binding procedure of the form (E,·,·)
BP8 2+ n.a. 1 type of authenticator is provided
“an authentication mechanism is only as strong as the binding process that issued the creden-
tials” [Pin09]. It is worth noting that BP5 and BP6 are strongly related to requirements RL7
and RL8, respectively. This underlines the paramount importance of the identity proofing and
binding procedures in the security of MFA systems.
According to [NIS17], at least two physical authenticators should be bound to the user’s iden-
tity immediately after enrollment (BP7). This best practice is related to RL9 and permits users
to be immediately able to provide ownership factors for digital authentication or for future re-
mote bindings. Moreover, a number of authorities [NIS17, Cen16, Pin09] recommend service
providers to support flexible authentication procedures (BP8). This reduces to allowing the user
to select among multiple, alternative authenticators of different types. Customizing the MFA
experience could, indeed, increase the perceived usability of an MFA implementation. Binding
multiple authenticators also makes it possible to recover from the loss or theft of other authenti-
cators that a user might posses.
The best practices above have been extracted from guidelines and white papers concerning MFA
applied in a generic context. Nevertheless, they can be easily mapped to one or more require-
ments defined in EBA documents. Differently from what one may expect, the best practices re-
lated to the security aspects of MFA are rarely more strict than the related requirements (except
for the one concerning the SMS usage). On the other hand, it is noticeable how their adoption
can increase the ease-of-use of MFA protocols.
4.2.2.4 Evaluation Criteria of Best Practices
The criteria for evaluating an online service in terms of the presented best practices are defined
as follows.
BP1. This best practice is fulfilled whenever an online service offering software authenticators
integrates their functionality in the dedicated mobile application. Otherwise, the best practice is
violated. In the case an online service does not provide users with any software authenticator (
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Table 4.17: Relationship between MFA protocol elements and relevant Android APIs.
Element Relevant API Used for
always com.google.android.gms.safetynet.* Integrity
I android.hardware.fingerprint.* Fingerprint
O android.security.keystore.* Secure storage
K android.widget.EditText ("textPassword" mode) Password field
android.telephony.TelephonyManager Telephony network
Æ firebase.messaging.* Push notification
Fi android.content.Intent (permission protected) Android IPC
Fo gms.vision.barcode.* or firebase.ml.vision.* Optical code
Fn javax.net.ssl.* HTTPS & SSL
and Æ ), BP1 is considered to be fulfilled.
BP2. In general, checking the adoption of standard technologies requires disassembling and
inspecting the target object. Since we cannot do this for remote services and authenticator de-
vices, here we only focus on software authenticators (used both for IP and MP) and dedicated
mobile applications. In particular, we decompiled the Android applications (both software au-
thenticators and dedicated applications) offered by each an online service and inspected the code
looking for standard APIs (according to [Anda, Andb, Andc]). Table 4.17 defines the relation-
ship between the (elements of the) MFA protocols and the standard APIs that it should use,
namely the relevant APIs. Thus, we claim that an online service satisfies BP2 when all its
Android applications use the standard APIs that are relevant for the MFA protocols they are
involved in. For instance, for the MFA protocol opid Fn Æ[O] Fn otp we expect to find the
APIs com.google.android.gms.safetynet.* (always), javax.net.ssl.* (due to opidFn
and Fn otp), firebase.messaging.* (due to Æ ) and android.security.keystore.* (due to
[O]). If only some applications use those API, we say that BP2 is possibly violated and, when
no application uses them, we say that the best practice is violated. Note that this evaluation cri-
terion adheres as much as possible to BP2. Nonetheless, we stress that the usage of commercial
APIs – different from the ones listed above – does not necessarily mean that a less secure digital
authentication is provided. However, a security analysis of APIs is out of the scope of this work;
the implications of this criterion on our analysis are discussed in Section 6.3.
BP3. This best practice is fulfilled when an online service adopts a step-up authentication
driven by the risk level of the operation to be performed. In this context, the fact that an online
service defines multiple risk levels is indicated by the exemptions it adopts. Thus, we state that
an online service satisfies BP3 if it adopts some exemption, i.e., either ËË or Ë. We consider
BP3 violated by online services that do not use exemptions, i.e., é.
BP4. This best practices concerns the usage of SMS messages (received through ) in MFA
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protocols. Clearly, if none of the MFA protocols employed by an online service uses , the
online service satisfies BP4. Otherwise, if some (but not all) of its MFA protocols leverage ,
the online service partially violates BP4; if all MFA protocols make use of , the online service
violates BP4.
BP5. This best practice requires users to exhibit an official identification document to a clerk.
The best practice is hence subsumed by RL7. Therefore, we evaluate BF5 using the same crite-
rion defined for RL7.
BP6. This best practice is subsumed by RL8. Accordingly, its satisfaction is assessed using the
criterion defined for RL8.
BP7. This best practice states that the user should receive at least two authenticators devices
(or one authenticator device and a look-up secret) immediately after the enrollment phase. Thus,
an online service satisfies BP7 if the binding procedure for at least two authenticator devices (or
look-up secrets) is performed during enrollment (E), i.e., the procedure has the form (E,·,·). The
best practice is possibly violated if this happens for only one authenticator. Otherwise, BP7 is
violated.
BP8. This best practice is fulfilled by an online service whenever it provides its users with at
least two different types of authenticators, e.g., ! and P . Otherwise, if at most one type is
provided, BP8 is violated.
4.3 Complexity
A key aspect for the adoption of MFA protocols is their ease-to-use [CDFN13, WDRJ10, Alt16].
Indeed, the users might be discouraged to execute a cumbersome or complex protocol. Moreover,
if a protocol is too complex and hard to follow, a user might incur in errors either spontaneous
or, even worse, induced by an attacker.
A standard approach [ISO18] for evaluating the usability of a system is to measure its effec-
tiveness (i.e., the accuracy and completeness with which users achieve specified goals), effi-
ciency (i.e., the resources used in relation to the results achieved) and satisfaction (i.e., how the
system meets the user expectations) related to reaching of a given goal. A number of studies
[WDRJ10, Alt16, WDCJ09] have applied those measures to analyze MFA protocols and, in gen-
eral, solutions for digital authentication. For instance, Weir et al. [WDCJ09] applied them for
the analysis of two-factor authentication protocols where effectiveness was assessed by checking
task completion records and usage of help, efficiency by counting the time needed to complete
the authentication process and satisfaction by questioning users immediately after they authenti-
cated. The same usability metrics were used in [Alt16], where a broader scope of MFA protocols
was investigated. Other studies [CDFN13, KPCS15] focus on user satisfaction and, in general,
perceived usability of MFA protocols for online banking. These studies apply the System Us-
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ability Scale (SUS) [Bro96], which relies on a predefined questionnaire to provide a subjective
measure of the usability perceived by users about a target system.
In our study, we focus on the efficiency and, in particular, on the complexity of MFA protocols
as several studies [CDFN13, KPCS15, WDRJ10] recognized the complexity of MFA protocols
as a critical aspect in the adoption of those protocols. In particular, we define a metric to evaluate
the complexity of an MFA protocol (i.e., how much a protocol is difficult to use) that measures
the amount of “resources” necessary to execute an MFA protocol (e.g., remembering a pass-
word, bringing a device). We consider three main types of resources for our evaluation, namely
memory, (manual) operations and (extra) devices. The first type is used to determine the num-
ber of knowledge factors used in a MFA protocol (i.e., ¤ and [K]), the second the number of
input/output operations that have to be carried out by the user (Fh) and the third the number of
(non general-purpose) devices that have to be carried by the user (i.e.,! and P ). For example,
consider the MFA protocol ¤ ; opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp. Its memory, operations and devices
values are 2, 2 and 1, respectively. The overall complexity value (hereafter called complexity




The framework presented in the previous chapter has been implemented in a working prototype.
Such prototype is called Multi-Factor Authentication Specification and Analysis tool (MuFASA).
This tool allows to describe an MFA protocol design leveraging a user-friendly interface, generate
the corresponding specification in SLaMP and analyze it.
MuFASA is based on the modeling and analysis process schematically depicted in Figure 5.1.
Our working assumption is to obtain a description of the MFA protocol from the experience of
common users, acquired by running the MFA protocol (usage phase). Therefore, the user knowl-
edge has to be translated into a model of the MFA protocol behavior (translation phase). We rely
on a questionnaire to support the modeling process for users with no technical skills. The users
fill the questionnaire and provide a description of the MFA protocols they use. The compiled
questionnaire is then automatically processed (modeling phase), obtaining the corresponding
model of the MFA protocol, specified in SLaMP.
The model then passes through an analysis phase, in which it is a) validated against a set of built-
in adversaries, b) validated against a list of specifications and c) evaluated in terms of usability.
The adversaries consist in the threat models presented in Section 4.1.1. Instead, the specifications
consist of a collection of requirements and best practices, presented in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2,
respectively released. Finally, the ease-of-use of the protocol is measured in terms of complexity
(described in Section 4.3).
The final result of the process is a report, i.e., the output of the reporting phase. The report
contains the results of the security analysis as well as other metrics of interest. In particular, we
provide (i) a risk profile (in terms of the adversaries that might compromise the protocol), (ii)
a compliance checklist (i.e., what are the requirements and guidelines that the protocol meets)
and (iii) a complexity score (i.e., how many operations must be correctly executed by the user to
authenticate).
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Figure 5.1: Flow of the proposed approach.
5.1 Goals
The primary goal of our tool is to allow, even non-expert users, for obtaining a security and
usability assessment of a specified MFA protocol. In particular, it could help security experts to
evaluate an MFA protocol at the very preliminary stages of the design process. Indeed, MuFASA
could help to understand the consequences of certain design choices in terms of resistance against
a set of attacker models.
On the other hand, MuFASA is built to help normal users to understand weaknesses and strengths
of a protocol design and to raise their awareness of the risks they might be exposed to.
5.2 Implementation details
MuFASA has been developed as a Java application, based on the abstract architecture depicted in
Figure 5.2. It consists of four main modules: the Questionnaire module, the Translator module,
the Analysis module and the Aggregator module. Below we discuss them in detail.
5.2.1 Questionnaire
This module implements the user interface of MuFASA. After a first question regarding the
Endpoint from which the protocol is started, the user is prompted with high-level questions
about her experience with the MFA protocol she wants to model. Each round of questions aims
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of MuFASA.
at precisely identify an authenticator. The rounds are iterated until the user describes all the
authenticators in the protocol.
The actual questions presented at each round are determined by the previous answers. For in-
stance, the first question is
“What is your nth operation?” (where n is the round counter)
The user can pick one of five answers, i.e., “I insert some secret credentials”, “I read a value
from a list”, “I use a device”, “I use a software” and “I send/receive something on my mobile
phone (e.g., an SMS)”. Some questions can be also accompanied by some pictures. The pictures
show several elements and the user has to select the one that more resembles her experience. An
example questionnaire is reported in the Appendix of this thesis.
5.2.2 Translator
The Translator module reads the answers to the questionnaire and converts them to a model of the
MFA protocol, specified in SLaMP. The module follows an interpretation tree that exhaustively
represents all the possible answers to a round of the questionnaire. Each leaf of the tree is labeled
with the model of an authenticator. The list of all the possible sequences of forms is reported in
the Appendix.
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By combining all the authenticators in a sequence, the Translator obtains the protocol model.
Eventually, the model is submitted to the analysis module.
5.2.3 Analysis
This module consists of a collection of sub-modules. Each sub-module implements a common
interface: the Analysis interface. In this way, the set of analysis carried out by MuFASA can be
extended by adding new sub-modules. For the time being, the three built-in analyses implement
the operations described below.
5.2.3.1 Attackers
As anticipated in Section 4.1.1, each attacker corresponds to a function. Attackers’ functions
remove the authenticators and AFs from the target protocol until, eventually, it is entirely com-
promised. When an attacker cannot compromise a protocol, its function behaves as the identity.
Moreover, applying the same attacker, i.e., the same function, twice on the same protocol has no
effect. Thus, the module iterates until a fixed point is reached, i.e., the protocol is entirely com-
promised or all the attacks reduce to the identity. Eventually, the list of the attacks is returned.
The list contains all the groups of attackers together with their effect on the protocol. Moreover,
a list of unsuccessfully attackers is also provided.
5.2.3.2 Criteria
The security and best practices criteria evaluation amounts to a pattern matching between the
protocol and the rules encoding each criterion. Each comparison results in a boolean value
indicating whether the protocol matches the rule. The final result is a list of the criteria that the
protocol matches.
5.2.3.3 Complexity
This module evaluates the complexity score of the specified MFA protocol. The complexity score
is computed as the sum of three scores, i.e., memory, operations and devices (see Section 4.3).
5.2.4 Aggregator
The Aggregator module retrieves the output of each analysis module and combines them into a
unified report. The report is then returned to the user in the form of a PDF document.
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of the first question proposed by MuFASA: the Endpoint choice.
5.3 Tool demo
MuFASA has been employed to perform part of a latitudinary study on MFA protocols adopted
by 30 international banks. The results of the analysis, leveraging the data obtained with Mu-
FASA, are presented in Section 6.2.
The tool is currently available (as an executable JAR) at https://sites.google.com/fbk.
eu/mufasa. In the following, we present a demo, using Nordea1 as the protocol under analysis.
Demo. Let us try to specify and analyze Nordea1 with MuFASA. Firstly, we run the jar and we
select the wizard for protocol specification. A first question is asked, regarding the Endpoint from
which the protocol will be executed (see Figure 5.3). We select the first option, since Nordea1
is supposed to be executed from a desktop computer. At this point, the wizard shows the page
for specifying the authenticators composing the protocol (Figure 5.4). The upper part of the
window shows the authenticators specified so far (none, for now). The lower part, instead,
include the first part of the questionnaire for specifying various details of an authenticator. In
our case, as our answer to the question “Which is your next operation?” we select the first
option, i.e., “I insert some secret credentials” (modeling ¤ in Nordea1). When pressing next,
MuFASA will memorize the specified authenticator (no other questions are needed, for specifying
the authenticator) and show again the page for specifiyng another authenticator (Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot of the wizard prompting for the specification of an authenticator.
This time, however, the page shows ¤ in its upper part, among the authenticators that we have
specified already.
The next authenticator to be specified is opidFh P[O,K] Fhotp. After selecting the option “I
use a device”, new questions are shown. We have to indicate if it is a personal device (yes), if it is
connected to something as an Endpoint (no), if it receives a sort of input code (yes, I personally
digit it), if it shows information on the ongoing operation (no) and, finally, if the output has to be
manually copied somewhere (yes). When the last answer is given, MuFASA saves the specified
authenticator and redirects us again on the wizard page for specifying another authenticator
(Figure 5.6).
At this point, since the authenticator shown in the upper part of the page coincide with those of
Nordea1, we can select the option “None, I’m authenticated” and proceed with the analysis.
Before starting the analysis, another wizard page is shown (see Figure 5.7). In this page, besides
selecting the directory of the report file and its name, it is possible to define the set of attacker
models to be considered in the analysis. By default, all the attacker models presented in Section
4.1.1 are considered. However, in the case that a user is interested in evaluating the protocol
against a subset of them, she can easily include/exclude an attacker model by using the corre-
sponding flag. Moreover, a user can select the maximum size of attacker combinations. In the
case that a user wants to perform an analysis only on attacker models attacking singularly, this
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Figure 5.5: Screenshot of the wizard prompting for the specification of an authenticator, after
specifying ¤.
could be done by selecting the maximum size as 1. Finally, MuFASA allows to select the type
of security analysis and report to be given as output. In particular, it offers the possibility to
analyze a protocol and retrieve the minimum set of attackers compromising it (Minimum option).
Alternatively, MuFASA can extensively analyze the resistance of a protocol against all the pos-
sible combination of attackers (Extensive) or considering all the attackers that compromise the
protocol that are composed by sub-combination that do not (Selective).
It is worth noting that the evaluation of the protocol in terms of compliance with requirements
(and best practices) cannot be customized. The same applies for the evaluation in terms of
complexity.
As a final result, a PDF containing the outcomes of the three evaluations is reported.
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Figure 5.6: Screenshot of the wizard prompting for the specification of an authenticator, after
specifying ¤ and opid Fh P[O,K] Fh otp.
Figure 5.7: Screenshot of the wizard for customizing the security analysis and the output.
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Chapter 6
Use Cases and Experimental Results
In this chapter we present two use cases on which our framework has been applied. In the
eHealth use case, we applied the framework for designing an MFA solution for the eHealth
services offered by Azienda Provinciale per i Servizi Sanitari (APSS), the local service provider
for the Trentino province. The framework has been employed to support the protocol design
phase, in order to evaluate the trade-off between complexity and security of the protocol.
In the online banking use case, we performed a latitudinary study on real MFA implementations
adopted by 30 banks around the world. In this context, several aspects of each MFA implemen-
tation have been investigated, including the preliminary phases, the security level provided by
the employed MFA protocols, their complexity, the compliance with security requirements and
best practices.
6.1 eHealth Use Case
The eHealth online services manage Personal Health Records, medical data and, in general, very
sensitive information that must be protected in a proper way. Indeed, a leakage or a theft of such
data can cause serious damage to a user, with potentially deadly consequences.
This means that both security and privacy are of paramount importance in this scenario, which
relevance is notably growing year by year (as reported in [Com18]).
However, along with the security and the privacy aspects, usability may take a relevant role in
specific cases of eHealth services. Several medical conditions require constant monitoring, in-
volving periodic transmission of (sensitive) data concerning one or more pathological conditions
(e.g., glycemia levels for a person with diabetes). In such cases, the transmitted data have to
be properly protected, while the employed security protocols must not discourage the user by
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lacking in usability.
To sum up, eHealth services are a harsh application scenario for MFA, that must balance three
different aspects in order to effectively protect users while not being felt as a burden in every day
tasks.
The main eHealth services, at least in the European zone, are provided by government. During
last years, the employment of MFA in eHealth services seemed to be an obvious yet necessary
choice to guarantee a proper security level to protect even extremely sensitive set of data. Never-
theless, as reported in [CAM11], the majority of the European states are adopting ad-hoc security
solutions, even leveraging different mechanisms, to protect citizen medical data.
In order to establish minimum security levels for handling and accessing medical data, the ma-
jority of national laws refer to the eIDAS directive [Eur14]. However, no detailed guidelines and
design patterns are presented in such directive. Therefore, the currently adopted MFA solutions
in the European eHealth context are quite various, providing different user experience and, most
importantly, different security levels.
The chosen use case refers to a specific application of MFA in the eHealth services offered by
Azienda Provinciale per i Servizi Sanitari (APSS), the local service provider for the Trentino
province (in Italy). In particular, APSS needed to design a new MFA protocol for letting their
user to access their Personal Health Records and telemedicine programs from their mobile de-
vices (i.e., using an App as the Endpoint). The users would access their data via native smart-
phone apps, which can interact with other apps of the same developer. Moreover, users who
adhere to telemedicine programs may require to access the applications four-six times a day.
Therefore, the designed MFA protocol must not be difficult to execute. For the same reason,
manual inputs for passing data between software authenticators and apps should be limited, and
the users should not be forced to bring additional devices with them for the purposes of the au-
thentication. Obviously, all the necessary preliminary phases for enrolling the users to the service
and bind the authenticators to their identities have to be designed as well.
Besides realizing a new MFA protocol with limited availability of guidelines and design princi-
ples, other challenges have to be faced. Firstly, the stakeholders required the MFA protocol to
employ - besides Memorized Secrets - only software authenticators, that could be easily installed
on the smartphone from which a user may want to access her data. Secondly, the MFA protocol
has to comply with security requirements and best practices in the MFA context. Finally, the
MFA protocol must be easy to execute, since many users require to access their PHR multiple
times a day for monitoring/inserting health values.
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6.1.1 Framework application
Our methodology has been applied for the design of a new MFA protocol for accessing personal
health records held by APSS (Azienda Proviciale dei Servizi Sanitari). Both the MFA protocol
and the preliminary phases have been designed.
6.1.1.1 Design of the MFA Protocol
The designed MFA protocol had to guarantee both a low complexity and a good security level.
Moreover, it had only to employ software authenticators. At the time, APSS had already devel-
oped a software authenticator, attesting both ownerhip and knowledge factors, for another MFA
protocol. Therefore, such authenticator has been employed and adopted to the new MFA protocol
(that had to be executed from the App).
The final design can be specified as: ¤; [O,K] Fi otp.
The security evaluation of such protocol highlighted the resistance against DT, AD, SS, ES (act-
ing singularly). However, both SE and MM are successful.
For what concerns the compliance with security requirements, the protocol complies with RL3
and RL4. Instead, it does not comply with RL5 and RL6, since the generated otp is not bounded
to a single operation and the user is not informed about the operation she is going to authorize.
Moreover, the protocol complies with BP2 (since the Android application has been developed
using standard APIs) and BP4, since no SMS is used.
Finally, the complexity of the protocol is low: 2 (derived from the memorization of ¤ and the
PIN for unlocking the authenticator).
6.1.1.2 Design of the Preliminary Phases
The enrollment procedure for registering to the service has been designed to respect RL7 and
BP5. Therefore, given the availability of multiple offices and branches available on the territory,
we decided to perform the identity proofing in person. This would indeed guarantee a high
assurance level (as required by the eIDAS directive [Eur14]).
On the other hand, also the binding phase had to be defined. If possible, such phase should have
respected BP6,BP7,BP8. To this aim, we decided that, at the time of the enrollment, the new
user would receive a password (to be changed at her first access) and a “temporary access code”,
along with a part of an activation code to be inserted on the software authenticator (the other half
will be sent via SMS on a phone number declared during the enrollment).
The designed Enrollment can hence be specified as . Furthermore, the two biding procedure
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for the Memorized Secret and the Software authenticator can be specified as (E,–, ), (E, , ).
In the first case, the user requires the secret during the Enrollment, it does not require activation,
and it is established by the user after inserting the temporary code. In the second case, the user
requires the authenticator during its Enrollment, downloads the app and activates it providing the
password and a composition of two activation codes (that will expire as soon as they have been
successfully inserted in the authenticator).
In this case, the MFA implementation complies with RL7, RL8 and RL9. Instead, for what
concerns the best practices, it only complies with BP5 and BP6, while does not respect BP7 and
BP8 (since only the software authenticator is given).
6.1.1.3 Conclusions
The evaluation of the designed MFA implementation has been completed with the execution
of a risk assessment procedure (following the OWASP Risk Management Framework 1). The
obtained results have been discussed with the stakeholders, that approved the proposed design.
The described MFA implementation is currently employed for the APSS services.
6.2 Analysis of online banking services
Online Banking services are another scenario in which MFA has been widely adopted. These
services allow customers to remotely access their bank accounts and financial data as well as
to perform online payments and other financial transactions. These services are becoming in-
creasingly popular among customers: according to Eurostat [Eur18], the number of European
citizens using online banking services has doubled since 2007 and currently more than half of
the European population use an online banking service daily.
The Online Banking services are one of the first scenarios in which MFA has been applied. In-
deed, the European Banking Authority started to discuss about minimum security requirements
and on the adoption of multi-factor authentication in 2011. In this scenario, the resources as the
balance of an account, the possibility of transferring money or execute payment transactions,
constitute sensitive data that must be properly protected against theft and other attacks. There-
fore, during the years, MFA has been progressively adopted by the majority of banks. At the
current time, an impressive number of MFA implementations are currently offered to customers
of banks all around the globe.
However, the landscape of MFA implementations in Online Banking services is absolutely var-
ious. Indeed, the majority of banks offer to their customers a set of various MFA protocols,
1https://owasp.org/www-project-risk-assessment-framework/
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differing in terms of resistance against threat models and user experience, but allowing the users
to access the same sensitive data. On top of that, a relevant number of banks implement ad-hoc
MFA protocols, which security level is uncertain and that may hide unknown vulnerabilities.
Important institutions and international authorities, as the European Banking Association, pub-
lished some directives and regulations (as [Eur13a, Eur13b, Eur15, Eur17] to limit the variety
of the available implementation and require a minimum level of security. Nevertheless, their
influence on existing MFA implementations remains unclear.
Therefore, we decided to perform an analysis on the existing MFA solution adopted by banks op-
erating in different countries, evaluating different aspects of the MFA implementations following
different criteria and verifying the existence of possible correlations between them.
6.2.1 The Dataset
Therefore, we performed a latitudinal study on the adoption of MFA and the design choices
made by 30 important international banks based in 10 different countries (3 banks per country).
In particular, a first group includes 21 banks chosen among those based in the first seven countries
in the European Union for gross domestic product2, i.e., Germany, United Kingdom 3, France,
Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Sweden. For each country, we selected the three largest banks
(offering online banking services to individuals) in terms of assets (according to the Standard &
Poor’s 2017 classification4). solutions adopted by 30 important international banks based in 10
different countries (3 banks per country).
The second group of banks is taken from relevant countries (for the banking sector) that are not
subject to the EU legal framework, i.e., China, USA and Switzerland. Again, for these countries
we considered the three largest banks in terms of assets. The geographic distribution of the
selected banks is shown in Figure 6.1. This allows us to enlarge our perspective on the banking
sector by investigating how non-EU banks behave with respect to MFA adoption.
For each of the considered banks, we considered the MFA protocols offered to the customers, dis-
tinguishing from those for executing payments from a Desktop computer (Internet Payments, IPs
from now on) and those from smartphone (Mobile Payments, MPs from now on). Obviously, we
considered every aspect concerning the implemented MFA protocols. Besides the MFA protocol
themselves, for each bank we considered the process of identity proofing, all the authenticators
that are offered to the customers and their binding phases. Furthermore, the adoption of the
so-called exemptions (i.e., the possibility to avoid the execution of an MFA protocol in low risk
situations) has been investigated.
2https://goo.gl/ZctkLc
3The data collection started before Brexit.
4https://goo.gl/HR3HDQ
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Figure 6.1: Geographic distribution of the analyzed banks. EU countries (filled with a blue
pattern) are Spain, France, UK, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Sweden. Non-EU countries
(filled with a red pattern) are USA, Switzerland and China.
6.2.2 Evaluation Criteria
The selected banks have been evaluated according different aspects.
Firstly, banks have been evaluated in terms of compliance with security requirements (see Sec-
tion 4.2.1) and best practices (see Section 4.2.2), following the specific criteria presented in the
respective sections.
Then, the considered banks are evaluated in terms of resistance against threats (see Section 4.1.1)
and complexity (see Section 4.3). To this aim, each MFA protocol employed by the considered
banks is evaluated in terms of resistance against the set of attackers presented in Section 4.1.1.
Instead, to evaluate a bank in terms of complexity, we compute the average complexity scores of
all MFA protocols that the bank offers to its customers.
6.2.3 Results of analysis
In this section, we present the results of our investigation. In particular, we firstly present our
findings in terms of demographic aspects of the considered dataset (see Section 6.2.1). Then, we










































































































































































































































































Figure 6.2: Number of authenticators provided by banks.
verify whether some correlations between the obtained results exist.
6.2.3.1 Demographics
To characterize the landscape of how MFA has been adopted in the online banking sector, we
consider several perspectives. Below we present some statistics on authenticators, MFA proto-
cols, exemptions, and enrollment and binding procedures.
6.2.3.1.1 Authenticators. Figure 6.2 shows the number of authenticators that each bank of-
fers to its customers. Vertical bars indicate the number of distinct authenticators per bank; hori-
zontal lines indicate the average per nation (blue dashed line) and per group (red solid line). All
banks employ a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 9 authenticators. At national level, values ap-
pear homogeneous. As a matter of fact, the maximum variation in the number of authenticators
per nation is 2 and the average variation per nation is 1.7. This may indicate that some national
trends exist. These trends may be the result of national laws, market strategies or adoption of
national identity systems (e.g., BankID [Ban] for Swedish banks).
Although the number of employed authenticators provides an indication on the variability of
the authenticators commonly offered by banks, we are also interested in their type (see Sec-
tion 6.2.1). Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of authenticators per type, i.e., devices, software,
look-up secrets and memorized secrets, adopted by EU and non-EU banks. White bars indicate
the percentage of banks that employ at least one authenticator of the given type. Moreover, for de-
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vice and software authenticators, the figure shows the percentages with respect to sub-categories,
i.e., single-factor, multi-factor and out-of-band. Note that, in order to differentiate the employ-
ment of credentials (username and password) and additional memorized secrets, we represent
them in two separate columns, namely “credentials” and “2nd memorized secret”, respectively.
We observe some facts. All considered banks provide their users with credentials. Secondly,
almost all of them (except one) offer at least one device authenticator. Moreover, EU banks
offer 1.4 device authenticators on average, while the average number of device authenticators
for non-EU banks is 1.9. Among device authenticators, out-of-band authenticators (i.e., SIM
cards) are more common (48% for EU and 78% for non-EU banks). We can also observe that
EU banks employ multi-factor device authenticators more frequently than single-factor device
authenticators (38% and 29% of the banks, respectively), whereas non-EU banks do the opposite
(with 67% and 33% of non-EU banks employing single and multi-factor device authenticators,
respectively).
The adoption of other types of authenticators differs between the two bank groups. For EU
banks, the second most frequent type of employed authenticators is software. As a matter of fact,
86% of EU banks adopt at least one authenticator of this type.5 Among these banks, the average
number of software authenticators is 3.1. Multi-factor ones are dominant (62%), although a
significant number of out-of-band software authenticators are also employed (57%). Single-
factor authenticators are less common (43%). Look-up secrets and extra memorized secrets
follow in the order, being employed by 29% and 14% of EU banks, respectively.
On the other hand, non-EU banks present a different trend. After device authenticators, look-
up secret is the second most adopted type of authenticator (44%). Software authenticators are
employed by 33% of the banks. All banks adopting software authenticators provide at least one
that is multi-factor. Only one non-EU bank provides also a single-factor software authenticator.
Finally, only 11% of the banks in this group adopt additional memorized secrets.
6.2.3.1.2 MFA protocols. Our analysis reveals that banks usually provide their clients with
a variety of MFA protocols. For each bank, we distinguish MFA protocols for IP and for MP.
These two kinds of payment methods differ for the endpoint on which they are executed. This
distinction is necessary to evaluate the compliance with requirements and best practices as well
as to analyze the security and complexity of MFA protocols (see following sections). Figure 6.4
shows the number of MFA protocols adopted by each bank. The figure also reports the average
number of MFA protocols for IP (red lines) and MP (blue lines), for each nation (dashed lines)
and for bank group (solid line). Overall, we counted 32 distinct MFA protocols employed by
banks for IP and 29 protocols for MP.
We observe a few facts. Except for two banks, the number of MFA protocols for IP is equal



























































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.4: Number of MFA protocols supported by banks.
or greater than the one for MP. In particular, four banks do not support MFA protocols for MP
at all.6 As expected, we observe a correspondence between the number of authenticators (Fig-
ure 6.2) and the number of MFA protocols per bank. As a matter of fact, most authenticators are
associated to a limited number of MFA protocols (often only one). Moreover, most of the MFA
protocols (around 80%) rely on two authenticators.
6Note that the absence of MFA protocols does not imply that MP is not supported. In fact, Barclays, Credit




















































Figure 6.5: Combinations of AFs used in MFA protocols.
To better understand the differences between the adopted MFA protocols, we investigated how
many (and which kind of) AFs are used by them. Figure 6.5 shows the result of this analysis,
displaying the combinations of AFs that the analyzed MFA protocols employ. Each combination
can be composed by Knowledge, Ownership and Inherence factors. If more than one factor of
the same type is used, the number of factors is reported as a subscript for the corresponding type.
For example, if an MFA protocol leverages a memorized secret and a multi-factor authenticator
device attesting both ownership and knowledge factors, such an MFA protocol is annotated with
combination K2O.
Figure 6.5 shows that a large number of MFA protocols leverage more than two AFs (the mini-
mum for an MFA protocol) for authenticating the user. This fact is particularly noticeable for EU
banks, where 52% of the employed MFA protocols for IP and 59% of those for MP leverage at
least three AFs. A slightly different situation can be observed for non-EU banks. In this group,
only 37% of the MFA protocols for IP rely on more than two AFs. In the case of MP, however,
the trend is opposite, with 62% of the MFA protocols employing at least three AFs.
We also observe that, both for IP and MP, combinations involving knowledge and ownership
factors are the most frequent. The employment of inherence factors is more frequent in MFA
protocols for MP employed by EU banks. In particular, 38% of these protocols employ at least
one inherence factor and around 15% of them leverage only inherence and ownership factors.
Interestingly, this type of AF is usually not employed by non-EU banks, where only 6% of the
MFA protocols adopted by those banks leverage an inherence factor. Finally, no combinations
constituted only by knowledge and inherence factors have been observed.
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ng Request                              
Delivery                              
Activation *  *  *  *       *         *
6.2.3.1.3 Exemptions The adoption of exemptions can influence both the security level and
perceived ease-of-use of MFA protocols. To this end, we investigated the type of exemptions
allowed by each bank. The consequent evaluation in terms of ease-of-use (BP3) will be discussed
in the following sections.
The type of exemption for every bank is reported in Table 6.1. We can observe from the table
that exemptions are widely adopted. As a matter of fact, 27 of the considered banks adopt some
form of exemption. The adopted level of exemptions seems to be homogeneous for each country.
The only three banks that do not support exemptions are located in two countries, i.e., Sweden
and Switzerland.
6.2.3.1.4 Enrollment The enrollment phase plays a critical role in MFA. The analysis of the
offered modalities allows to understand at which level of security the verification of user identity
is performed. This information will be used in the next section to assess the compliance of banks
with RL7, RL8 and RL9.
The enrollment modalities offered by banks are reported in Table 6.1. We observed that every
bank allows enrollment at the bank. In the table, symbol  indicates the possibility for the
user to choose between remote or de visu enrollment, whereas symbol  indicates that only the
second option is available for a given bank. We can observe that remote enrollment is fairly
common. Indeed, out of 30 banks, 18 allow remote enrollment. Also in this case, values appear
homogeneous at a national level.
6.2.3.1.5 Binding The binding of an authenticator to a user’s identity can influence the secu-
rity of MFA protocols leveraging that authenticator. Here, we analyze the modalities offered by
banks for binding, which will allow us to evaluate the compliance of banks with requirements
RL8 and RL9.
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Table 6.1 presents the worst case (in terms of security) of the binding procedures offered by every
bank. Further details on the enrollment and binding procedures adopted by all banks are given
in the supplementary material. Intuitively, the analysis of the worst case provides an indicator
of the compliance of banks with RL8 and RL9 and, in particular, the resistance of a procedure
to attacks: if even in the worst case an attacker is not able to compromise an authenticator, the
others will be reasonably secure.
From the table, we observe that the remote request of authenticators is massively supported.
A similar trend can also be observed for the delivery of authenticators. The only exception is
represented by Chinese banks in which all binding operations – request, delivery and activation
– have to be performed at the bank. The majority of banks also allow a remote activation of
authenticators, but using a weak procedure. Only 12 banks (among the 30 considered) ensure an
adequate level of security for the activation of authenticators (either requiring clients to activate
them at the bank or though MFA leveraging previously activated authenticators). Six of these
banks would actually offer an activation step leveraging an MFA protocol, but the employed
authenticators have not been bound with a sufficient security level. In Table 6.1, this is marked
with *. An example is the binding procedures offered by Commerzbank and BNP Paribas:
those banks offer the possibility to activate a software authenticator through an MFA protocol
based on the reception of an SMS on an out-of-band device. However, the binding of the out-
of-band device can be performed remotely, hence not complying with RL8 and lowering the
security level of the binding procedures relying on it.
6.2.3.2 Compliance with requirements and best practices
In this section we discuss the compliance of banks with the requirements and best practices
presented in Section 6.2.2. A complete view of the analysis is reported in the supplementary
material.
6.2.3.2.1 Requirements Figure 6.6 shows, for each bank, the number of fulfilled (solid bar)
and partially fulfilled (dashed bar) requirements. The average number of fulfilled requirements
is represented by a solid (red) line and the average number of fulfilled and partially fulfilled
requirements by dashed (blue) line.
We observe that none of the considered banks does meet all nine identified requirements. For EU
banks, the average number of requirements fulfilled by banks is 5.1. If we combine both fulfilled
and partially fulfilled requirements, the average increases to 7.6. The number of fulfilled require-
ments appears to be homogeneous among the banks of the same country (average variation is 2).
The maximum variation is more than 2 only for Dutch and German banks (5 and 3, respectively).
However, we observed some differences in the level of compliance for different countries. Three

















































































































































































































































































Figure 6.6: Fully and partial fulfilled requirements per bank.
contrary, Italian banks adhere to regulations and directives more than others, with an average of
6.3 fulfilled requirements.
For non-EU banks, the average number of fulfilled requirements is 4.2. This is not surprising,
since our survey focused on requirements derived from EU regulations and directives. However,
a deep look at the data shows that this value is strongly influenced by the low number of require-
ments met by US banks, which fulfill only two requirements. On the contrary, all Chinese banks
comply with six requirements, which is higher than the average number of requirements met by
EU banks. This means that, even if they are not subject to the same regulations and directives as
EU banks, Chinese banks are aligned to EU security requirements. Similar observations apply
to Swiss banks. Even if the average number of requirements met by these banks is not as high as
the one met by Chinese banks, it matches the average number (5.1) met by EU banks.
We now analyze the compliance of banks with single requirements. Figure 6.7 shows the per-
centage of banks that fulfill each requirement. For each requirement, the gray bar indicates the
percentage of banks that fulfill the requirement and the dashed bar the percentage of banks that
partially fulfill it.
RL1, which concerns integrity checks on multi-purpose devices, is met by 71% of EU banks.
In particular, none of the Swedish banks meet this requirement, along with two Dutch and one
French bank. However, it is worth noting that this requirement will enter into force in the first half
of 2019 [Eur13a] and, thus, EU banks do not to have to comply with it yet. For what concerns
































































Figure 6.7: Percentage of banks that fully and partially comply with the requirements.
requirement.
RL2, which requires the employment of MFA for risky operations, is fulfilled by all EU banks.
This meets our expectations, since a first definition of this requirement [Eur13a] was introduced
in 2014. This requirements is also met by all Chinese and Swiss banks, but by none of the US
banks.
RL3 and RL4 concern the usage of distinct and independent authentication factors in MFA
protocols, respectively. While the first one is fulfilled by all EU banks, the second is only met
by the 76% of them. The remaining 24% of EU banks, however, partially fulfill RL4, since
they offer at least one MFA protocol employing two authenticators. This is due to the fact that
some EU banks employ MFA protocols that only leverage a mobile application attesting both
inherence and ownership factors (hence not leveraging independent AFs). Similarly to RL1, both
these requirements were introduced in [Eur13a], which will enter into force in 2019. However,
the high level of compliance with RL3 and RL4 might indicate that EU banks have already taken
actions to adhere to this regulation. The percentage of non-EU banks that comply with RL3 and
RL4 is 67% and 56%, respectively.
RL5, which requires the generation of a unique authentication code in every MFA execution, is
fulfilled by 52% of EU banks and partially fulfilled by 38% of them. This can be explained by
the fact that half of the banks offer a large range of heterogeneous MFA protocols where at least
one does not employ an otp generated using an opid. It is worth mentioning that the fulfillment
of this requirement will become mandatory only in 2019. For non-EU banks, instead, we have
44% of them complying with RL5, while the others (56%) partially fulfill it.
The level of compliance with RL6 is the lowest, when compared to those of the other require-
ments. Indeed, this requirements is met by 19% of EU banks and partially fulfilled by 62% of
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them. In words, this means that the majority of the banks (81%) employ at least one MFA proto-
col that does not inform the user about what operation she is authorizing. Similarly to RL5, the
compliance with this requirement will become mandatory in 2019. It is worth noting that none
of the non-EU banks comply with RL6, while 67% of them partially fulfill it.
The fulfillment of RL7, which concerns user enrollment, strongly reflects the results presented in
Section 6.2.3.1. Being influenced by enrollment modalities, RL7 is fulfilled by those banks only
providing enrollment in their branches (43% and 33% of EU and non-EU banks, respectively).
The other banks fulfill RL7 only partially.
Finally, we analyze requirements RL8 and RL9. Recall from Section 6.2.2 that RL8 concerns
the level of security of the binding phases, whereas RL9 concerns the activation of remotely
delivered authenticators. These requirements exhibit the same level of compliance: 24% of EU
banks fulfill these requirements. In several cases, banks employ authentication protocols leverag-
ing multiple factors for activating an authenticator; however, the binding of these authenticators
is performed without a proper security level, causing the requirements not to be fulfilled. Simi-
larly to other requirements, RL8 and RL9 will enter into force in 2019. Among non-EU banks,
44% of them comply with both RL8 and RL9, whereas 22% partially fulfill them.
To summarize, EU banks comply, on average, with half of the considered requirements. This
may be due to the fact that five of them are specified on directives (and regulatory standards)
entering into force only in 2019. Indeed, the percentage of EU banks complying with RL1,
RL5, RL8, RL9 and especially with RL6 is low. However, a large number of EU banks offers
at least one MFA protocol that meets all criteria defined in Table 4.14, thus partially fulfilling
these requirements. Therefore, the majority of the banks can easily become compliant with these
requirements just by offering a subset of the MFA protocols they currently support. When con-
sidering both the fulfillment and partial fulfillment of RL5 and RL6, more than two-third of
EU-banks comply with these requirements. If we assume that all requirements that are currently
partially fulfilled will be fully met by 2019, EU banks will comply, on average, with more than
7 requirements out of 9.
6.2.3.2.2 Best practices We also analyzed the compliance of banks with best practices. Fig-
ure 6.8 shows the result of our analysis. For each bank, the number of fulfilled best practices
is represented by a solid bar and the number of partially fulfilled best practices by a dashed bar.
In the figure, we also report the average number of fulfilled best practices (solid line) and the
average number of fulfilled and partially fulfilled best practices (dashed line).
As for the requirements, no bank fulfills all eight identified best practices. The average number
of best practices fulfilled by a bank is 3.5 and 2.5 for EU and non-EU banks, respectively. If we














































































































































































































































































Figure 6.8: Fully and partial fulfilled best practices per bank.
Among EU banks, Spain is the country in which banks meet less best practices, with an average
of two best practices. On the other hand, Italian banks lead also in terms of fulfilled best practices,
with an average of 6 best practices. Among non-EU countries, the results for best practices are
similar to the ones concerning requirements. US banks fulfill an average of one best practice,
whereas Chinese banks an average of 4.3 best practices. The position of Swiss banks is quite
heterogeneous with a variation in the number of fulfilled best practices equal to 3 (the average
number of fulfilled best practices is 2.3).
To gain more insights, we analyzed the compliance of banks per best practice. Figure 6.9 shows
the percentages of banks that fulfill and partially fulfill each best practice. From the figure, we
observe that the percentage of banks that met the best practices is lower than the one of banks that
met the requirements (45% compared to 51% for EU banks and 32% compared to 43% for non-
EU banks). However, if we consider both the fulfillment and partial fulfillment of requirements
and best practices, the percentage of banks are aligned (85% vs. 83% and 77% vs. 81%, for EU
and non-EU banks, respectively).
We now discuss the compliance with each best practice against the fulfillment criteria in Sec-
tion 6.2.2.7 BP1, which concerns the integration of software authenticators in mobile banking
applications, is fulfilled by 56% of EU banks. On the other hand, 67% of non-EU banks fulfill
this best practice because they do not offer any software authenticator. The software authenti-
7Recall that BP5 and BP6 are subsumed by RL7 and RL8. In the following, the same observations apply to both




























































Figure 6.9: Percentage of banks that fully and partially comply with the best practices.
cators offered by the remaining 33% (i.e., the Swiss banks) are instead not integrated with the
respective mobile banking applications, thus violating BP1.
BP2 concerns the usage of commonly used libraries to execute security-relevant operations. The
fulfillment of this best practice is 5% for EU and 22% for non-EU banks. It is worth noting
that all Chinese banks do not comply with this best practice. This may be due to the fact that the
majority of services on which Android applications rely on (e.g., Google Play Services, Firebase)
are blocked by the Chinese firewall [CNB, Goo17]. The least used APIs are those concerning the
integrity checks and keystore, while those related to SSL are always implemented. Moreover,
we observed that several software authenticators use commercial solutions instead of those we
considered in Section 6.2.2. We will discuss this aspect in Section 6.3.
BP3, which concerns the adoption of step-up authentication mechanisms, is fulfilled by 90% and
89% of EU and non-EU banks. Our analysis revealed that almost all banks employ some form
of exemption (see Table 6.1), thus supporting step-up authentication.
BP4 concerns the usage of SMS messages in MFA protocols. 52% of EU banks do not employ
any MFA protocol leveraging SMS messages, whereas 15% of the same group of banks employs
only MFA protocols relying on them. For what concerns non-EU banks, only 22% of them em-
ploy MFA protocols that do not use SMS messages while 33% of them (specifically, US banks)
employ only MFA protocols relying on SMS.
BP7 concerns the binding of two physical authenticators immediately after the enrollment. This
best practice is fulfilled by 14% of EU banks and never fulfilled by non-EU banks. However,
48% and 67% of EU and non-EU banks (respectively) partially fulfill BP7. It is also worth
noting that 33% of both EU and non-EU bank violates the best practice, not offering the user any
physical authenticator immediately after her enrollment. Finally, BP8 concerns the availability
119
of multiple types of authenticators. This best practice is fulfilled by 76% of EU banks and 67%
of non-EU banks. It is worth noting that all non-EU banks that violate this best practice are US
banks.
Globally, we observe that the considered best practices are fulfilled, on average, by more than
a half of the EU banks. For non-EU banks the level of compliance is lower. The most violated
best practices are BP2 and BP7. The first one is rarely fulfilled because almost every applica-
tion released by banks relies on proprietary or commercial solutions, rather than the APIs we
identified in Table 4.17. In the case of BP7, the lack of fulfillment is due to the fact that, if two
physical authenticators are offered, one of the two is usually given upon request and payment of
a little sum of money. On the other hand, the most fulfilled best practices are those related to
the perceived ease-of-use of the digital authentication, namely BP3 and BP8. Indeed, as seen
in Section 6.2.3.1, the majority of the banks employs both exemptions and a high variety of
authenticators.
6.2.3.3 Resistance to attacker models
In this section, we discuss how the MFA protocols adopted by banks behave with respect to
the attacker models described in Section 4.1.1. Here, we provide an overview of the results
and only report when an MFA protocol can be successfully compromised by one of the attacker
models individually or only by their combination. We refer to the supplementary material for a
detailed evaluation of MFA protocols (e.g., which and how many attackers that can compromise
a protocol by acting individually).
Figure 6.10 shows, for each bank, the percentage of MFA protocols for IP that can be compro-
mised by single attacker models and their combinations (composed either by two or three attacker
models), whereas Figure 6.11 shows the results for MFA protocols for MP. The percentage of
MFA protocols that are vulnerable to attacker models acting individually is represented by solid
gray boxes, whereas the percentage of MFA protocols that are only vulnerable to combinations
of attacker models is represented by white (two attacker models) or light blue (three attacker
models) pattern-filled boxes with dashed lines. Trivially, MFA protocols that are vulnerable to
single attackers, are also vulnerable to their combination with other attacker models. We refer to
Section 6.2.3.1 for the number of MFA protocols for IP and MP offered by each bank.
We observe that 46% (on average) of the MFA protocols for IP adopted by each EU bank are
vulnerable to single attacker models. In particular, at least half of the MFA protocols offered by
10 EU banks are vulnerable to single attacker models. All MFA protocols offered by 5 banks (all
English, one Spanish and one French) can be compromised by single attacker models. Non-EU
banks offer an average of 62% of the MFA protocols for IP that can be compromised by single
attacker models. It is worth noting that the MFA protocols offered by all US banks and by one

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.11: Percentages of MFA protocols for MP vulnerable to single or combined attackers.
In the context of MP, the percentage of vulnerable protocols is higher. 85% (on average) of
the MFA protocols offered by each EU bank are vulnerable to single attacker models. Only























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.12: Percentage of MFA protocols for IP that are vulnerable to given attackers.
models, but only by their combination. It is worth noting that the missing box for Barclays and
Credit Agricole is due to the fact that these banks do not provide any MFA protocol for MP (see
Figure 6.4). On the other hand, 83% (on average) of the MFA protocols offered by each non-EU
bank are vulnerable to single attacker models. US banks do not provide any MFA protocol for
MP, and only the Chinese banks offer at least one MFA protocol that cannot be compromised by
single attacker models.
Interestingly, our analysis revealed that 97% of all MFA protocols (both for IP and MP) can
be compromised by at least one combination of two attacker models. The other 3% (2 MFA
protocols for MP offered by Rabobank and ABN Amro) require a combination of at least three
attacker models to be compromised.
We now present an analysis of the effectiveness of different attacker models over the employed
MFA protocols (see Section 4.1.1 for the details on each attacker model). Figure 6.12 and 6.13
show the percentage of MFA protocols (for IP and MP, respectively) that can be compromised
by single attacker models or by combinations of two of them. The effectiveness of single and
composed attacker models is represented by a gray box.
From the figures, we observe that the most effective attacker models against MFA protocols for
IP are Man in the Browser (MB) and Social Engineer (SE). When taken individually, these at-
tacker models can compromise 48% and 67% of the MFA protocols for IP employed by EU and
non-EU banks, respectively. On the contrary, Man in the Mobile (MM), Device Thief (DT) and
Authenticator Duplicator (AD) alone are never able to compromise any MFA protocol for IP.
If we consider combinations of attacker models, the most effective combination of two attacker
models on the MFA protocols for IP employed by EU banks is constituted by DT and Shoulder
Surfer (SS), being able to compromise 84% of these protocols. In the case of non-EU banks, the
combined attacker model can potentially compromise all adopted MFA protocols for IP.
For what concerns MFA protocols for MP, Man in the Mobile (MM) is the most effective at-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.13: Percentage of MFA protocols for MP that are vulnerable to given attackers.
MP offered by EU and non-EU banks, respectively. The most effective combination of two at-
tacker models is “DT◦MM”, managing to compromise 83% and 100% of the protocols offered
by EU and non-EU banks, respectively. Also in the context of MP, DT and AD are not effective
against any MFA protocol when acting by themselves. In particular, these attacker models com-
promise the ownership factors asserted by an authenticator, but they are not able to compromise
knowledge factors, which are used in all analyzed MFA protocols.
We stress that there is no combination of two attacker models that is able to compromise all MFA
protocols (either for IP or MP) offered by EU banks. The minimum number of attacker models
required to achieve this result is 3. In particular, only a combination of DT, SS and MM, is able
to compromise all MFA protocols (either for IP or MP) offered by EU banks.
We now analyze the effectiveness of combinations of attacker models. In particular, we assess the
effectiveness “gain” that combinations of attacker models have with respect to the effectiveness
of the attacker models that they include. The gain (represented with a box filled with gray pattern)
is the percentage of protocols that can be compromised only by exploiting the capabilities of
all attacker models in the combination. Moreover, the figures show the “inherited” percentage
of effectiveness, i.e., the percentage of protocols compromised by the attacker models in the
combination when acting individually (represented with a white box with dashed line). In the
case an MFA protocol can be compromised by more than one attacker model, it is considered
only once in the computation of the inherited value.
Consider, for instance, combination “DT◦SS◦SE”. According to Figure 6.15a, this combination
has 78% of inherited effectiveness and 14% of gained effectiveness. The inherited effectiveness
is obtained by considering the protocols that can be compromised by DT, SS or SE individually
or by all combinations including two of these attacker models. If an MFA protocol is com-
promised by more than one of these (composite) attacker models, it is counted only once for
assessing the inherited effectiveness. As shown in Figure 6.13a, “DT◦SS” has 57% of effec-
























































































































































































































































































Figure 6.14: Percentage of MFA protocols for IP that are vulnerable to given attackers.
protocols compromised by “SS◦SE” and the majority of those compromised by “DT◦SS”, man-
aging to compromise only 23% additional MFA protocols in respect with “DT◦SS”. Therefore,
the inherited effectiveness is 78%. The gained effectiveness, instead, derives from the number of
MFA protocols that can only be compromised by DT, SS and SE acting together (i.e., that cannot
be compromised by any of the two combinations). In this case, “DT◦SS◦SE” (acting together)
can compromise 13% of the MFA protocols in addition to the 78% compromised by “DT◦SS”
and “DT◦SE”, obtaining a total effectiveness of 91%.
Figures 6.14 and 6.15 present the results of our analysis. Note that combinations not having any
gain with respect to the effectiveness of the attacker models that they include are not shown in the
figures. We observe that the most effective combination (i.e., with higher gain) is “DT◦SS”. In
general, these two plots show that the most effective combinations are those combining attacker
models having different targets (in terms of authenticators, authenticator outputs and authenti-
cation factors). The “DT◦SS” combination, for example, includes DT – that targets ownership
factors – and SS – targeting knowledge factors and manually copied otps). This result is not
surprising, since MFA protocols should be designed in such a way that a potential attacker is re-
quired to execute multiple (and different) malicious actions in order to compromise the protocol.
To conclude, we observe that the least secure MFA protocols, both for IP ad MP, are those
employing authenticators generating an otp without receiving an opid as an input. Indeed, as
shown in the supplementary material, these protocols are the most vulnerable ones in terms of






































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.15: Percentage of MFA protocols for MP that are vulnerable to given attackers.
6.2.3.4 Complexity of MFA Protocols
In this section, we analyze the complexity of the MFA protocols adopted by banks against the
criteria defined in Section 4.3. We first compute the complexity score8 of the MFA protocols
adopted by each bank and then investigate to what extent the various types of resources affect
the overall complexity of MFA protocols. A detailed analysis of the complexity of the MFA
protocols is given in the supplementary material.
Figure 6.16 shows the complexity score of the MFA protocols for IP and MP (represented by
gray and pattern-filled boxes, respectively) employed by each bank. In the plots, we represent
the average complexity score of the MFA protocols for IP and MP employed by each bank
using a black and red line respectively, where the average is computed over the number of MFA
protocols employed by each bank as reported in Section 6.2.3.1. From the figure, we observe
that the average complexity for each bank is homogeneous between banks of the same country,
with the exception of the Netherlands. In particular, the difference in the complexity of MFA
protocols adopted by banks in the same country never exceeds 1.6 (except for the Netherlands,
where this difference is 2.67 and 4 for IP and MP, respectively). The difference observed in the
Netherlands is mainly due to a single bank, i.e., ING, which offers its customers a set of MFA
protocols that notably differ from those offered by the other banks in the country. Given the
small number of banks considered for each country, we cannot determine to what extent this
result represents a national trend (see further discussion on this point in Section 6.3).
Moreover, we observe that MFA protocols for IP are, in general, more complex than those for
MP. This fact is particularly noticeable for the MFA protocols employed by EU banks where the
average complexity of MFA protocols for IP is 2.8 and the average complexity of MFA protocols
8Recall from Section 4.3 that the complexity score of a MFA protocol is computed by summing up the amount
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(b) Non-EU banks
Figure 6.17: Average complexity of MFA protocols.
for MP 2.1. On the other hand, this difference is lower for non-EU banks (3.5 against 3).
Figure 6.17 shows the impact of the different types of resources – memory, manual operations
and extra devices – on the overall complexity of MFA protocols both for IP and MP. We observe
that memory efforts have typically a higher impact on the overall complexity of MFA protocols
compared to the other two complexity aspects (around 50% of the complexity score). This is be-
cause the majority of the MFA protocols offered by banks rely on at least one knowledge factor
and more than 30% of MFA protocols leverage two of them (see Section 6.2.3.1). On the other


















































Figure 6.18: Relationship between exemptions and complexity (IP).
other two complexity aspects.
An in-depth analysis reveals that MFA protocols with the lowest complexity are the ones for MP
that only leverage combinations of inherence (i.e., fingerprints) and ownership factors and that do
not require users to bring any extra device, any memory effort or manual input. On the contrary,
the most complex MFA protocols are the ones involving at least one knowledge factor and a
multi-factor hardware authenticator that requires users to manually insert opid and manually
copy the obtained otp into the endpoint.
6.2.3.5 Correlations
In our analysis, we also investigated on possible correlations between the obtained results. In
particular, we scrutinize on possible correlations between compliance (with requirements and
best practices), robustness against security threats and complexity of the MFA protocols adopted
by banks.
6.2.3.5.1 Correlations between exemptions and complexity As a first investigation, we hy-
pothesized that there exists a correlation between the adoption of exemptions and the complexity
of MFA protocols employed by banks.
The results of our analysis is presented in Figures 6.18 and 6.19, which show the number of
banks employing exemptions and the minimum complexity of the adopted MFA protocols for IP
and MP, respectively. From three of these figures, we observe the lack of correlation between
these two aspects. Figure 6.19b, instead, seem to show an inverse correlation. This is confirmed
by the Pearsons’s correlation coefficients. For EU banks, we obtained coefficient of 0.37 and




















































Figure 6.19: Relationship between exemptions and complexity (MP).
and -0.64 for MP.
To assess if our results are statistically significant, we used the Fisher’s exact test. The obtained
p-values for EU banks are 0.073 and 0.066 for IP and MP respectively, whereas for non-EU
banks they are 0.64 and 0.40 for IP and MP, respectively. Since the p-values are higher than the
significance level of 5%, we cannot reject the null hypotheses.
Therefore, our first hypothesis is not supported by the results. We conclude that the adoption of
exemptions (hence the compliance with BP3) – even if very frequent – might not be related to
the employment of complex MFA protocols.
6.2.3.5.2 Correlation between compliance to security requirements (and best practices)
and resistance. The second hypothesis aims to assess the effectiveness of security require-
ments and best practices on the robustness of MFA protocols against attacker models. To this
end, we verify whether there exists a correlation between the compliance of an MFA protocol
with requirements and best practices (related to security aspects) and its resistance against the
attacker models presented in Section 4.1.1.
Figure 6.20 presents the results of the analysis by indicating the number of MFA protocols (both
for IP and MP) that comply with requirements and best practices and are vulnerable to single
attacker models. The level of compliance with the aforementioned security requirements and
best practices is computed as the number of requirements and best practices met by the protocol.
It is interesting to observe that all MFA protocols comply with at least 3 security requirements and
best practices. Furthermore, we observe that the more security requirements and best practices
are met by an MFA protocol, the more robust the protocol is against attacker models. This
is especially evident in the case of MFA protocols for IP: 16 MFA protocols comply with all


























































(b) MFA Protocols for MP
Figure 6.20: Relationship between compliance with security requirements (and best practices)
and resistance to attacker models.
attacker models. On the other hand, almost all MFA protocols complying with less than four
security requirements and best practices are vulnerable to at least two single attacker models.
A similar trend can also be observed in the case of MFA protocols for MP. The Pearsons’s
coefficient confirms our intuition. Specifically, the Pearsons’s coefficient is -0.93 and -0.84 for
MFA protocols for IP and MP, respectively. These values show the presence of a very strong
inverse correlation between the two variables.
To investigate the most relevant security requirements in the correlation, we calculate the corre-
lation between the resistance of MFA protocols against attacks (i.e., the number of singletons)
and every security requirement and best practice in the set. We notice that RL6 and RL5 are
the requirements that mainly influence the robustness of MFA protocols against attacker mod-
els. In particular, the correlation between RL6 and the number of attackers compromising an
MFA protocol is 0.90 and 0.82 (for IP and MP, respectively), while between RL5 and the num-
ber of attackers is 0.86 and 0.73 (for IP and MP, respectively). These results show that the use
of operation-dependent otp and keeping the user aware of the operation she is going to autho-
rize are the more effective solutions against the identified attacker models. We performed the
Fisher’s exact test to verify the statistical significance of our findings. The obtained p-values are
5.93e−10 and 6.08e−7 (for IP and MP, respectively), which are lower than the fixed significance
level of 5%. Therefore, the null hypotheses can be rejected and our results can be considered to
be statistically significant.
We can conclude that this hypothesis holds, indicating that the compliance with security require-


































































(b) MFA Protocols for MP
Figure 6.21: Relationship between complexity and resistance to attacker models.
6.2.3.5.3 Correlation between complexity and resistance to attackers. The third hypothe-
sis aims to assess the independence between the complexity of an MFA protocol and its resistance
against individual attacker models.
Figure 6.21 shows the results of the analysis for MFA protocols both for IP and MP. We note
that there is not a clear correlation between the complexity of an MFA protocol and its resistance
against attacks in both IP and MP context. An example of this can be observed for MFA protocols
with complexity equal to 3. We can find both MFA protocols resistant against every individual
attacker model and MFA protocols vulnerable to 4 of them.
We compute the Fisher’s exact test to assess the independence between the complexity score of
an MFA protocol and its resistance to attacker models. The obtained p-values for the IP and MP
cases are 0.83 and 0.44, respectively. Both the values are higher than the significance level of
5%. Hence, we can confirm that the two variables are independent.
Therefore, we can conclude that a complex MFA protocol is not necessary more resistant against
attacker models.
6.3 Threats to Validity and Generality
In this section we list the limitations of our study and discuss their potential impact on the validity
of our work. We distinguish between four types of threats, namely internal, external, construct




Internal threats to validity are mostly related to our bank and, thus, MFA protocol dataset. We
obtained all information relevant and necessary for the analysis from the documentation, tuto-
rial and demos made available by banks. In fact, banks tend to publish as much documentation
as possible to help their customers in the use of their services. However, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 6.2.1, we had no direct interaction with banks and we only accessed public information and
documentation. Therefore, we did not have access to information concerning the server side of
the MFA implementation or technical features of the employed authenticators. These technical
features could have effects that can be only partially captured by our analysis.
Moreover, we did not consider the release time and evolution of MFA protocols in our dataset.
Reasonably, an MFA protocol should be evaluated against the regulations and directives that
were in force when it was released. The changes in the legal framework (see Section 4.2.1)
might have resulted in security patches and updates of older MFA protocols and older protocols
might be supported for backward compatibility. In this case, banks might require new customers
to only use the newer MFA protocols and even force old customers to use them.
6.3.2 External threats
The main external threat to the validity of our study is related to the size and composition of
our dataset. Since we only consider three banks per country, we cannot fully support statements
on national trends. Moreover, we selected banks according to their dimension. Arguably, large
banks have more resources to invest on the security of their services. Thus, extending our analysis
to smaller banks would result in a more precise characterization of the online banking landscape.
While MFA has been adopted in several types of online services, our analysis only focuses on
MFA implementations adopted for online banking. Different types of online services can have
very different business models and requirements. These differences can have a significant impact
also on the employed MFA implementations. In this respect, our findings cannot be generalized
to other types of online services. Below (generality), we discuss to what extent our methodology
can be used for the analysis of MFA implementations adopted in other application domains.
6.3.3 Construct threats
A potential construct threat is our interpretation of regulations, directives and best practices. As
a matter of fact, some definitions and descriptions contained in the documentation are informal
or vague. This is probably done on purpose to make the rules generic and widely applicable.
From our perspective, we had to cast these concepts to more rigorous and precise definitions. A
concrete example is the interpretation of BP2, where we provided a list of standard solutions.
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Although based on standards defined by manufacturers, such a list might be too restrictive. For
instance, some commercial solutions are commonly adopted and they represent the de facto
standard.
Another construct threat is related to our representation of MFA protocols. In this work, we
reconstructed MFA protocols by observing the client side of the authentication process. Since
we have no information concerning the sequence of operations performed on the server side, we
assume that such operations are executed properly and the communications between server and
client work as intended. Moreover, we abstracted some details regarding the sequence of mes-
sages exchanged during protocol execution. This lack of information has also an impact on our
representation of authenticators. Although authenticators are, by definition, used on client side,
their behavior might depend on some procedure executed remotely, e.g., the generation of au-
thentication tokens. For instance, we did not consider the possible impairment of keys and seeds
for the otp generation on the server side. Overall, the analysis of a low-level implementation
might be subject to additional security risks and considerations.
6.3.4 Conclusion threats
In the analysis of the correlation between different criteria, the validity of our conclusions were
evaluated in terms of the statistical significance of the obtained results. In some cases, e.g., for
hypothesis H1, the null hypotheses cannot be discarded and, thus, our conclusions cannot be
considered statistically significant.
6.3.5 Generality
In this work, we focused on the MFA implementations used by some online banking services.
Nevertheless, our approach for analyzing the robustness and complexity of MFA protocols is
independent from the specific application domain. Therefore, our approach can be applied to
analyze MFA protocols in general. On the other hand, assessing the compliance with laws and
regulations is context-dependent. For instance, the European laws for digital identity (e.g., eI-
DAS [Eur14]) do not require “dynamic linking”, which is a critical factor for the online banking
sector [Eur15, Eur17]. Therefore, a shift in the application domain would require rethinking the




In this chapter, we firstly present the related work concerning the analysis of MFA protocols.
Then, we compare our research in the field of online banking with other surveys.
7.1 Analysis of MFA protocols
Several publications on the analysis of security protocols have been released in the last decades.
Among them, formal methods have a central role and they have been used to discover several
flaws in a number of protocols (e.g., [Low96, APS14, BV11, BM11, CGDW09])). As a conse-
quence, many formal verification frameworks have been put forward [Vig06, MSCB13, Bla14,
ACC09]. Nevertheless, only some frameworks targeting MFA protocols have been proposed.
Some authors applied formal methods also for the analysis of MFA protocols. In [JK18], the
authors propose an analysis framework for evaluating MFA protocols against a set of adversaries,
including both the Dolev-Yao and new adversaries based on common human errors. In particular,
each protocol is modeled as an agent of the pi-calculus. The pi-calculus specification is then
refined by considering certain factors such as common human errors. Finally, the specification
is given as input to the PROVERIF [Bla14] tool for the analysis. Some of the threat models
of [JK18] are in common with our work (e.g., the Eavesdropping Software), but they do not
consider others (e.g., Device Thief) that we consider here. Moreover, there are several other
differences. First of all, [JK18] does not support the concept of authenticator. Instead, their
modeling technique requires specific internal information about the protocol. In many real cases,
this is unlikely to happen. On the other hand, [JK18] model common human errors that we do
not consider in this thesis.
In [SCRV18, SCRV], the authors present the design of a multi-factor authentication solution for
native mobile apps, along with a formal specification and analysis of the presented protocol. In
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particular, the authors propose a novel design of protocol for performing MFA with a Single
Sign-On capability on a mobile device. The design is then formally specified using ASLAN++
[vOM12], a high-level, role-based formal language supporting the specification of different vari-
ants of authentication and confidentiality properties. Such a formal model is then analyzed with
the SATMC [ACC16] model checker, one of the model checkers of the AVANTSSAR platform
[AAA+12]. The security analysis is performed against a Dolev-Yao attacker model, to which
are progressively added capabilities by removing different kind of security assumptions char-
acterizing various protocol aspects. Although they also consider an attacker model inspired to
[NIS17], [SCRV18] has a different focus. In particular, they focus on the fine-grained, formal
verification of a single protocol, while in this work we prioritize the number of protocols. More-
over, our technique requires less information for the MFA protocol specification, thus making
our methodology applicable in more contexts.
In [PRW17], the authors perform a security analysis on the FIDO U2F, leveraging pi-calculus for
modeling the protocol. The evaluation is performed against an attacker that has control over the
network and it can either attack by itself or relying on a dishonest Server or Client. The analysis
highlighted how the verification of the appID parameter is key for the security. In our work, we
perform a different kind of analysis, assuming the Server and the Client are acting honestly and
all the checks on values are performed.
In [ACZ13], the authors performed a formal analysis on two Secure Call Authorization proto-
cols. These protocols feature use two-factor and two-channel authentication The authors found
a vulnerability on the protocols by evaluating them against Dolev-Yao attacker and Social En-
gineer. Again, the methodology proposed in [ACZ13] requires details about the protocol that
are not necessary for our technique. Many other authors followed simiral approaches, e.g.,
[DeF11, Hag07, JCL+17, JJIL16]. In many cases, these authors could spot out actual vulner-
abilities in some specific MFA protocols. Yet, all of them rely on protocol internals as discussed
above.
In [Gar16], the author applies static vulnerability analysis on four MFA protocols, employing
passwords and smart cards or secure storage. These protocols are evaluated in terms of resistance
against the clogging attack, a form of denial of service. The analysis of [Gar16] is performed on
cryptographic operations and primitives, as modular exponentiation. Various vulnerabilities on
the analyzed protocols have been found and countermeasures have been proposed. This kind of
analysis is out of the scope of our work, since we assume perfect cryptography and we do not
model the internal operations of the authenticators employed in a protocol.
In [OBM+18], the authors provide a survey on MFA in terms of the available sensors and factors
that can be employed in an MFA implementation. The authors present a plethora of different
types of sensors, comparing them according to different criteria. Moreover, the authors pre-
senting the open challenges in terms of security, technological perspective and user experience.
Finally, the authors propose a framework for utilizing MFA in cases where some of the factors are
missing, guaranteeing a proper level of security and usability. This work gives multiple insights
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Number of Banks 60 80 4 10 – 30
Geographical Distribution
UK,CA,IN,IRL
US,RSA,AU World DE UK SA,UK
DE,UK,FR,IT,ES,
NL,SW,CN,US,CH
Number of MFA Protocols – 80* 6 9 3 61 (153)
Endpoints IP IP, MP† MP IP IP IP, MP
Temporal evolution – Ë – – – –
Authentication factors/authenticators Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë
Enrollment and Binding – – – – – Ë
Compliance Regulations – – – – – ËBest Practices – – – – – Ë
Security
Security of TLS/SSL implementation – Ë Ë – – –
Perceived security – – – Ë Ë –
Resistance of MFA protocols against attacker models – – Ë – – Ë
Usability Perceived usability – – – Ë Ë –Complexity – – – – – Ë
Correlations
Exemptions and Complexity – – – – – Ë
Compliance with security requirements and resistance to attackers – – – – – Ë
Complexity and resistance to attackers – – – – – Ë
* No reference to unique MFA protocols.
† Only classification of authenticator factors.
of the various aspects of MFA. Nevertheless, since the authors do not put forward a methodology
for the analysis of existing protocols, their proposal covers a different aspect w.r.t our work.
7.2 Surveys on MFA in Online Banking
Comparison and surveys has initially been published only by companies proposing new MFA
solutions or generic security products (as [Cen16] [Gem15] [Pin09]). In the following years,
new surveys on MFA protocols have been published. However, the majority of such publications
is focused on the specific application scenario.
For what concerns the banking sector, for instance, new designs of several MFA protocols for
online banking have been summarized in a few surveys. These surveys usually provide a clas-
sification and a comparison of MFA protocols and implementations. Choubey et al. [CC13]
analyze the authentication mechanisms for IP employed by banks of 7 countries. In particular,
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the authors provide a classification of the adopted authenticators and emphasize the lack of a
standardization in the design of MFA protocols. Kiljan et al. [S. 16] review the authentication
and communications protocols for online banking adopted by 80 banks worldwide. This study
provides an analysis of the temporal evolution of MFA protocols adopted by banks, together with
a classification of the used authentication factors and MFA protocols for both IP and MP. The
security of MFA protocols for IP is evaluated by analyzing the implementation of the underlying
TLS/SSL mechanisms whereas the security of MFA protocols for MPs is not analyzed. However,
no evaluation regarding the resistance to attacker models and compliance with regulations (and
best practices) is provided. Dmitrienko et al. [DLRS14] analyze the security of 6 commonly used
MFA protocols for MP. In particular, they identify the main weaknesses of these MFA protocols
in terms of potential implementation errors and resistance to attacker models. No data regarding
usability and MFA implementations adopted by banks is presented. Krol et al. [KPCS15] analyze
the usability and perceived security of the authentication mechanisms employed by 10 UK banks
(for a total of 9 MFA protocols) through user studies. Similarly, Althobaiti [Alt16] evaluates the
security and usability of MFA protocols based on questionnaires and field tests.
The aforementioned studies differ from each other for the analyzed features and scope. Table 7.1
summarizes the main differences between those studies and our work. A primary difference is in
the analyzed dataset and, in particular, in the number of banks and MFA protocols considered.
All surveys provide an analysis of MFA protocols along with the used authenticators, with the
exception of the work in [CC13], which only provides a classification of authenticators without
analyzing the protocols in which they are used. However, most surveys only analyze MFA proto-
cols specific to one endpoint, with the majority considering protocols for IP. Our survey considers
protocols for both IP and MP, since they might provide different security levels and user expe-
rience. Existing surveys also do not consider user enrollment and the binding of authenticators.
Nevertheless, these phases can affect the overall security of an MFA protocol. Moreover, none
of the previous works assesses the compliance of MFA solutions with laws and best practices.
We claim that this aspect is also relevant, since often laws and best practices define a baseline for
the security guarantees that an MFA protocol must provide. Security aspects of MFA protocols
are considered by most surveys, but at a different level compared to our work. For instance,
some surveys [S. 16, DLRS14] analyze weaknesses in MFA implementations, whereas others
[KPCS15, Alt16] focus on the security of MFA protocols perceived by users. In contrast to these
studies, our work evaluates the security of MFA protocols by assessing their robustness against
some attacker models. This analysis aims to compare MFA protocols in terms of resistance to
well defined attack scenarios. At the best of our knowledge, the only other proposal considering
an attacker model for MFA protocols is [DLRS14]. However, their attacker model only considers
the MP context. Moreover, only a few surveys [KPCS15, Alt16] evaluate the usability of MFA
protocols. However, differently from those surveys that evaluate perceived usability and user
satisfaction of MFA protocols through user studies, we focus on the efficiency of MFA proto-
cols and propose an “objective” measurement of the complexity of MFA protocols, which can
be computed from the dataset at hand. Finally, our survey is the only one that aim to discover
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correlations between compliance with laws and best practices, security and usability aspects.
Leveraging this investigation, we are able to verify how the different features of MFA protocols




In this thesis, we proposed a framework to analyze MFA protocols relying on neither implemen-
tation details nor behavioral specifications. To this aim, we defined a specification language for
modeling MFA protocols even having a limited amount of details. In practice, it is possible to
model a protocol in terms of the operations that a user is required to perform during an authen-
tication session. In particular, the presented language focuses on the concept of authenticator as
the basic building block of any MFA protocol. The semantics of the proposed language is given
in Security Protocol Specification (SPS) language [AMV15].
For what concerns the security analysis, MFA protocols are evaluated in terms of resistance
against a set of attacker models. These attackers have been tailored for the specific case of MFA
protocols, being modeled following dedicated literature (as [JFR17, Ayy17, LM11]) and NIST
definitions [NIS17]. For what concerns the regulatory aspects and best practices, MFA protocols
are evaluated in terms of compliance with a customizable set of requirements and best practices.
In this work, we extracted and encoded a set of requirements (deriving from EBA regulations)
and a set of best practices (derived from [NIS17, PCI16a] and others) and use them for evaluating
a protocol. Furthermore, a new metric, called complexity, is employed for evaluating a protocol
in terms of efforts that a user is required to perform during its execution.
The framework has been then implemented in a working tool, MuFASA. By showing an user-
friendly interface, MuFASA allows (even non-expert users) to model an MFA protocol and to
automatically analyze it, giving a report presenting the performed evaluations and the obtained
results.
Finally, the presented framework has been applied on some selected use cases. First, it has
been employed in the early stages of a new MFA protocol design. Then, it has been used for
performing a latitudinary study on online banking services, allowing us to model and analyze
more than 150 MFA protocols employed by banks all over the world.
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Appendix
Example of questionnaire proposed by MuFASA
Here we provide an example of how the user fills the questionnaire to obtain Nordea1 proto-
col (3.2). Notice that the sequence of the reported questions only represent a specific path in the
interpretation tree.
Table 1: Questionnaire proposed by MuFASA for modeling Nordea1.
1. From which Endpoint do you start the protocol?
Ì From a desktop computer
+ From a smartphone
2. What is your 1st operation?
Ì I insert some secret credentials (e.g., a password on a website)
+ I read a value from a list
+ I use a device (e.g., a card reader)
+ I use a software (e.g., an app on my smartphone)
+ I send/receive something on my mobile phone (e.g., an SMS)
+ None, I am authenticated
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3. What is your 2nd operation?
+ I insert some secret credentials (e.g., a password on a website)
+ I read a value from a list
Ì I use a device (e.g., a card reader)
+ I use a software (e.g., an app on my smartphone)
+ I send/receive something on my mobile phone (e.g., an SMS)
+ None, I am authenticated
3a. Is your device connected to the endpoint?
Ì No, it is isolated
+ Yes (e.g., through a USB cable)
3b. Does it read some sort of input code?
+ No
+ Yes, it scans an optic code (e.g., barcode or QR code)
+ Yes, it automatically sent by the endpoint
Ì Yes, I personally digit it (e.g., a code displayed on a website)
3c. Among the followings, what do you need to use the device?
+ Nothing
Ì I must insert a secret code/pin
+ I must scan a part of my body (e.g., my fingerprint)
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3d. Does it recap the ongoing operation and ask for your confirmation?
Ì No
+ Yes (e.g., “Your are paying x$ to y. Confirm?”)
3e. Does it return some code that you have to copy somewhere?
+ No
Ì Yes
4. What is your 3rd operation?
+ I insert some secret credentials (e.g., a password on a website)
+ I read a value from a list
+ I use a device (e.g., a card reader)
+ I use a software (e.g., an app on my smartphone)
+ I send/receive something on my mobile phone (e.g., an SMS)
Ì None, I am authenticated
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MuFASA Forms
In this section, we report all the outcomes of the possible form sequences in MuFASA.
Table 2: Table of possible sequences of forms after selecting “Device” option; †since the device
is not connected to the endpoint, there are no other possibilities than manual copy; since the
authenticator is not on the same platform of the endpoint, it cannot receive a “direct input”;
















Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (Nog) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) P[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo P?[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo P[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo P?[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 
3 (Direct) – – – not possible
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh P?[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) not possible†
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Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh P?[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) not possible†
Any A3 (Device) 1 (No) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh P?[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) P[O] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) P[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) P[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) P[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo P[O] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFo P?[O] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo P[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo P?[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo P?[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo P[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo P[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo P?[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 2 (Scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo P?[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi P[O] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFi P?[O] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi P?[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi P[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi P?[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi P?[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi P[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi P[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi P?[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 3 (Direct) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi P?[O,I] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh P[O] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh P[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFh P?[O] Fi otp
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Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh P?[O] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh P[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh P?[O,K] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh P?[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh P[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh P?[O,I] Fi otp
Any A3 (Device) 2 (Yes) 4 (Manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh P?[O,I] Fh otp
Table 3: Table of possible sequences of forms after selecting “Software” option; since the
authenticator is not on the same platform of the endpoint, it cannot receive a “direct input”;















Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo [O] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo ?[O] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo [O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo ?[O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo [O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo ?[O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi [O] Fi otp
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Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi ?[O] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi [O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi ?[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi [O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi [O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi ?[O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi ?[O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFh ?[O] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh ?[O,K] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh ?[O,I] Fi otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) Æ[O] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) Æ[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) Æ[O,I] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo Æ[O] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFo Æ?[O] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo Æ[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo Æ[O,I] Fn otp
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Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 
3 (direct) – – – not possible
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh Æ[O] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFh Æ?[O] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh Æ[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh Æ[O,I] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
Brows. A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) Æ[O] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) Æ[O,K] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) Æ[O,I] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo Æ[O] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo Æ?[O] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo Æ[O,K] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo Æ[O,I] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 3 (direct) – – – not possible
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh Æ[O] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFh Æ?[O] Fn otp
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App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh Æ[O,K] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh Æ[O,I] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
App A4 (Softw.) 1 (Desktop) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O,I] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) [O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 1 (No) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo [O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFo ?[O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo [O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo ?[O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFo [O,I] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFo [O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFo ?[O,I] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 2 (scan) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFo ?[O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi [O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (Yes) opidFi [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFi ?[O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi ?[O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi [O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi ?[O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFi [O,I] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFi [O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFi ?[O,I] Fi otp
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App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 3 (direct) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFi ?[O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (No) opidFh ?[O] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh ?[O,K] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,K] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O,I] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFh [O,I] Fh otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh ?[O,I] Fi otp
App A4 (Softw.) 2 (Smartph.) 4 (manual) 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFh ?[O,I] Fh otp
Table 4: Table of possible sequences of forms after selecting “Out-of-band” option; ♣ we do not
consider phone locking mechanisms as additional factors; ∇the output cannot be different than
the code transmitted to the telephony server; ∗since the authenticator does not receive an input,















Deskt. A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) otpFm [O] Fm otp
Deskt. A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) otpFm [O] Fh otp
Deskt. A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFm ?[O] Fm otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFm ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 2 (PIN) – – not possible♣
Brows. A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 
3 (Biom.) – – not possible♣
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O] Fm otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) not possible∇
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) – – not possible♣
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 
3 (Biom.) – – not possible♣
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O] Fm otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) not possible∇
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh ?[O] Fm otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) not possible∇
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 2 (PIN) – – not possible♣
Brows. A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 
3 (Biom.) – – not possible♣
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFnÆ[O] Fn otp
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Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ[O] Fh otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFnÆ?[O] Fn otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ?[O] Fh otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFnÆ[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFnÆ?[O,K] Fn otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ?[O,K] Fh otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFnÆ[O,I] Fn otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ[O,I] Fh otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFnÆ?[O,I] Fn otp
Brows. A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ?[O,I] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) otpFm [O] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) otpFm [O] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFm ?[O] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFm ?[O] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 2 (PIN) – – not possible
App A5 (OOB) 1 (SMS) – 
3 (Biom.) – – not possible
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) [O] Fm otp
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) not possible∇
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) – not possible∗
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 2 (PIN) – – not possible♣
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 1 (No) 
3 (Biom.) – – not possible♣
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFh [O] Fm otp
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) not possible∇
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFh ?[O] Fm otp
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) not possible∇
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 2 (PIN) – – not possible♣
App A5 (OOB) 2 (Call) 2 (Yes) 
3 (Biom.) – – not possible♣
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFnÆ[O] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ[O] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFnÆ?[O] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 1 (No) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ?[O] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFnÆ[O,K] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ[O,K] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFnÆ?[O,K] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 2 (PIN) 2 (Yes) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ?[O,K] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 1 (No) opidFnÆ[O,I] Fi otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 1 (No) 2 (Yes) opidFnÆ[O,I] Fh otp
App A5 (OOB) 3 (Notif.) – 3 (Biom.) 2 (Yes) 1 (No) opidFnÆ?[O,I] Fi otp




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MFA implementations per bank
In this section, we detail the MFA implementations adopted by the considered banks. Table 5
introduces the notation. The MFA protocols employed by the banks are presented in Table 6.
An overview on the MFA implementations adopted by each bank is given in Tables 7 and 8,
reporting the enrollment procedure, the employed authenticators and the respective binding pro-
cedures, the employed MFA protocols (both for Internet and Mobile Payments) and the adoption
of exemptions.
Table 5: Notation for authenticators, data I/O, exemptions, enrollment & binding.
AUTHENTICATORS
Authenticator type Data items Data channels
¤ Memorized secret opid Operation identifier Fh Manual copy
! Look-up secret otp One-time password Fi Inter-process communication
P Device authenticator Fo Optical code scan
Software authenticator Fm Mobile telephony network
Out-of-band device auth. Fn Network packet
Æ Out-of-band software auth.
EXEMPTIONS
é No exemptions Ë Personal data visualization ËË Low risk payments
ENROLLMENT AND BINDING
 The user goes to a local branch  The user establishes a remote session
† The user runs a MFA protocol E† The user operates during the enrollment
(†binding only)
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DE UK FR IT ES NL SW CN US CH
ID MFA protocol Internet Payments
IP-1 ¤;P[O]Fh otp XXX X
IP-2 ¤;P[O,K]Fh otp XX X X
IP-3 ¤;opidFiP?[O]Fi otp XX X
IP-4 ¤;¤;opidFiP?[O]Fi otp X
IP-5 ¤;opidFiP?[O,K]Fi otp XXXX
IP-6 ¤;opidFoP?[O]Fh otp XXX X
IP-7 ¤;opidFoP?[O,K]Fh otp X
IP-8 ¤;opidFhP[O,K]Fh otp XXX X
IP-9 ¤;¤;opidFhP[O,K]Fh otp X
IP-10 ¤;opidFhP?[O,K]Fh otp XX
IP-11 ¤;! X X X XX X XX X
IP-12 ¤;¤;! X
IP-13 ¤;opidFi ?[O,K]Fi otp XX
IP-14 ¤;otpFm Fh otp XXX XXX XX
IP-15 ¤;otpFm ? Fh otp XXX X X XX
IP-16 ¤;¤;otpFm Fh otp X
IP-17 ¤;¤;otpFh Fm otp X
IP-18 ¤; [O]Fh otp X
IP-19 ¤; [O,K]Fh otp XX
IP-20 ¤; [O,I]Fh otp XX
IP-21 ¤;opidFo ?[O]Fh otp X X
IP-22 ¤;opidFo [O,K]Fh otp XX
IP-23 ¤;opidFo ?[O,K]Fh otp X
IP-24 ¤;opidFh ?[O,K]Fh otp X
IP-25 ¤;opidFh ?[O,I]Fh otp X
IP-26 ¤;opidFnÆ?[O]Fo otp X
IP-27 ¤;opidFnÆ?[O,K]Fn otp X X XX X XXX
IP-28 ¤;opidFnÆ?[O,I]Fn otp X XXX
IP-29 ¤;¤;opidFnÆ[O,K]Fn otp X
IP-30 ¤;¤;opidFnÆ[O,I]Fn otp X
IP-31 ¤;opidFnÆ?[O,K]Fh otp X
IP-32 ¤;opidFnÆ?[O,I]Fh otp X
ID MFA protocol Mobile Payments
MP-1 ¤;P[O]Fh otp XX
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DE UK FR IT ES NL SW CN US CH
MP-2 ¤;P[O,K]Fh otp X
MP-3 ¤;opidFhP[O,K]Fh otp XXX X
MP-4 ¤;¤;opidFhP[O,K]Fh otp X
MP-5 ¤;opidFhP?[O,K]Fh otp X
MP-6 ¤;opidFiP?[O]Fi otp XX
MP-7 ¤;¤;opidFiP?[O]Fi otp X
MP-8 ¤;opidFoP?[O]Fh otp XX
MP-9 ¤;opidFoP?[O,K]Fh otp X
MP-10 ¤;! X X XX
MP-11 ¤;¤;! X
MP-12 ¤;otpFm Fi otp X X
MP-13 ¤;otpFm ? Fi otp X X
MP-14 ¤;¤;otpFm Fi otp X
MP-15 ¤; [O,K]Fi otp X
MP-16 ¤; [O,I]Fi otp X
MP-17 ¤;opidFi [O]Fi otp X
MP-18 ¤;opidFi [O,K]Fi otp X
MP-19 ¤;opidFi ?[O]Fi otp X X XX
MP-20 ¤;opidFi ?[O,K]Fi otp X X XXXX XXX X X
MP-21 ¤;opidFi ?[O,I]Fi otp X XX XXX
MP-22 [I];opidFoP?[O]Fh otp XX
MP-23 [I];opidFhP?[O,K]Fh otp X
MP-24 [I];opidFoP?[O,K]Fh otp X
MP-25 [I];! X
MP-26 [I];opidFi [O]Fi otp X
MP-27 [I];opidFi ?[O]Fi otp X X X
MP-28 [I];opidFi ?[O,K]Fi otp X X
MP-29 [I];opidFi ?[O,I]Fi otp X
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Table 7: MFA protocols adopted by EU banks.
Bank C Enr. Authenticators Binding IP MP Ex
Deutsche Bank DE 
[I]
opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
!
?










VR Bank DE 
[I]
opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
otpFm ? Fh otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O,I] Fi otp
opidFn Æ?[O,I] Fn otp















opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
!
otpFm ? Fh otp
opidFo ?[O] Fh otp
opidFi ?[O] Fi otp




 , , ( )























E,  , 
 , ,
 ,  ,
 ,  ,
IP-2, IP-19,
IP-20 ËË
LLoyds Bank UK 
¤
otpFh Fm otp
opidFn Æ[O,K] Fn otp
opidFn Æ[O,I] Fn otp
[I]








IP-30 MP-17, MP-26 ËË
BNP Paribas FR 
otpFm Fh otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
otpFi [O] Fi otp
E, ,
 , , ( )
 , , ( )
IP-14, IP-27 MP-12,MP-20 ËË
Credit Agricole FR  otpFm Fh otp E, , IP-14 ËË
Societe Generale FR 
otpFm Fh otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
E, ,
 , , ( )
 , , ( )
IP-14, IP-27 MP-20 Ë
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Table 7: MFA protocols adopted by EU banks.




opidFh ?[O,K] Fh otp
opidFh ?[O,I] Fh otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
E, , 






IP-24, IP-25 MP-20, MP-21 ËË
Banca Intesa IT 
P[O] Fh otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
opidFn Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFi ?[O,I] Fi otp
E, , 
 ,  ,
 ,  ,
 ,  ,









opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
E, , 





IP-18, IP-27 MP-1, MP-20 Ë




E, , IP-16 MP-14 ËË
BBVA ES  otpFm ? Fh otp E, , IP-15 MP-13 Ë
La Caixa ES 
!
opidFn Æ?[O] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O] Fi otp
E,,
 ,  ,
 ,  ,
IP-11, IP-26 MP-19 ËË
ING Bank NL 
!
otpFm ? Fh otp
opidFnÆ?[O,K] Fn otp
[I]
opidFi ?[O] Fi otp
E, ,
E, ,
 , , ( )
 ,  , –
 , , ( )
IP-11, IP-15,
IP-27 MP-19, MP-27 Ë
Rabobank NL 
opidFo P?[O,K] Fh otp




 ,  , –
IP-7, IP-10 MP-9, MP-24 ËË
ABN AMRO NL 
opidFi P?[O,K] Fi otp









opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
opidFi P?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
opidFn Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp














Table 7: MFA protocols adopted by EU banks.




opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
opidFi P?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
opidFn Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp















opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
opidFi P?[O,K] Fi otp
opidFn Æ?[O,K] Fn otp
opidFn Æ?[O,I] Fn otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp











Table 8: MFA protocols adopted by non-EU banks.
Bank C Enr. Authenticator Binding IP MP Ex
ICBC CN 
P[O,K] Fh otp
opidFi P?[O] Fi otp
!










opidFh P?[O,K] Fh otp
!









opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp











Chase USA  otpFm Fh otp E,  ,  IP-14 ËË
Bank of America USA  otpFm Fh otp E,  ,  IP-14 ËË
Wells Fargo USA  otpFm Fh otp E,  ,  IP-14 ËË
UBS CH 
opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
opidFh P[O,K] Fh otp
opidFi P?[O] Fi otp
[I]
opidFo ?[O,K] Fh otp












Table 8: MFA protocols adopted by non-EU banks.
Bank C Enr. Authenticator Binding IP MP Ex
Credit Suisse CH 
P[O] Fh otp
otpFm Fh otp
opidFo [O,K] Fh otp
opidFi [O,K] Fi otp
E,,
E,  , 
 ,  , 





opidFo P?[O] Fh otp
otpFm Fh otp
opidFo ?[O,K] Fh otp
opidFi ?[O,K] Fi otp
E,  , 
 ,  ,




IP-14, IP-23 MP-12,MP-20 é
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Evaluation of resilience of MFA protocols against attacker mod-
els
In this section, we evaluate the observed MFA protocols in terms of complexity (with the three
values related to memory, manual operations and extra devices) and resistance to the attacker
models (namely Device Thief, Authenticator Duplicator, Shoulder Surfer, Eavesdropping Soft-
ware, Social Engineer, Man in the Browser and Man in the Mobile) and their combinations. The
results are presented in Tables 9 and 10 (for Internet and Mobile Payments, respectively).






































































































































































































































































































IP-1 1 1 1  O – A A A A –  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-2 2 1 1  O – A A A A –  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-3 1 0 1  O –  K  K  K  K –  O A A A A  O  K  K  K  K –  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K
IP-4 2 0 1  O – K2K2K2K2 –  O A A A A  O K2 K2 K2 K2 – K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2 Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2
IP-5 2 0 1  O – K2  K  K  K –  O A  K O  K O K O  O K2  K  K  K – K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë  K O  K O K O  O Ë Ë Ë Ë K O K O  K O  K O K O K O K2 K2 K2 K2  K  K  K  K  K  K K2K2K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K
IP-6 1 1 1  O –  K  K  K  K –  O A A A A  O  K  K  K  K –  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K
IP-7 2 1 1  O – K2  K  K  K –  O A  K O  K O K O  O K2  K  K  K – K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë  K O  K O K O  O Ë Ë Ë Ë K O K O  K O  K O K O K O K2 K2 K2 K2  K  K  K  K  K  K K2K2K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K
IP-8 2 2 1  O – K2  K A A –  O A  K O Ë Ë  O K2  K Ë Ë – K2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-9 3 2 1  O – K3K2A A –  O A K2 O Ë Ë  O K3 K2 Ë Ë – K3 Ë ËK3 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 O Ë Ë Ë K3 Ë Ë K3 Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK3 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-10 2 2 1  O – K2  K  K  K –  O A  K O  K O K O  O K2  K  K  K – K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë  K O  K O K O  O Ë Ë Ë Ë K O K O  K O  K O K O K O K2 K2 K2 K2  K  K  K  K  K  K K2K2K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K
IP-11 1 1 1  O OA A A A –  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-12 2 1 1  O OA A A A –  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-13 2 0 0  O OK2K2  K  K –  O A A  K O K O  O A A  K O K O  O K2K2K2K2K2K2K2  K  K  K Ë Ë  K O K O  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O K O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K O K O K OK2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2  K
IP-14 1 1 1  O –  K  K A A  O  O A A Ë Ë  O  K  K Ë Ë  O  K Ë Ë A Ë Ë A Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-15 1 1 1  O –  K  K  K  K  O  O A A A A  O  K  K  K  K  O  K  K  K A  K  K A  K A A Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K  K Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
IP-16 2 1 1  O – K2K2A A  O  O A A Ë Ë  O K2 K2 Ë Ë  O K2 Ë Ë A Ë Ë A Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-17 2 1 1  O – K2K2A A  O  O A A Ë Ë  O K2 K2 Ë Ë  O K2 Ë Ë A Ë Ë A Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-18 1 1 0  O OA A A A  O  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-19 2 1 0  O OA A A A K O O Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-20 1 1 0  O OA A A A  OI  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  OI Ë Ë Ë Ë  OI Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  OI Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-21 1 1 0  O O  K  K  K  K  O  O A A A A  O A A A A  O  K  K  K A  K  K A  K A A Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
IP-22 2 1 0  O OK2K2A A K O O A A Ë Ë  K O A A Ë Ë  K OK2 Ë Ë A Ë Ë A Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-23 2 1 0  O OK2K2  K  K  K O O A A  K O K O K O A A  K O K O K OK2K2K2AK2K2A  K A A Ë Ë  K O K O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K O Ë Ë K2K2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë
IP-24 2 2 0  O OK2K2  K  K  K O O A A  K O K O K O A A  K O K O K OK2K2K2AK2K2A  K A A Ë Ë  K O K O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K O Ë Ë K2K2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë
IP-25 1 2 0  O O  K  K  K  K  OI  O  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K  K  K A  K  K A  K A A  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K O  K O K OË K O K O Ë  K O Ë Ë  K O  K O K O Ë K O K O Ë K O Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
IP-26 1 0 0  O O  K  K  K  K  O  O A A A A  O A A A A  O  K  K  K A  K  K A  K A A Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
IP-27 2 0 0  O OK2K2  K  K  K O O A A  K O K O K O A A  K O K O K OK2K2K2AK2K2A  K A A Ë Ë  K O K O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K O Ë Ë K2K2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë
IP-28 1 0 0  O O  K  K  K  K  OI  O  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K  K  K A  K  K A  K A A  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K O  K O K OË K O K O Ë  K O Ë Ë  K O  K O K O Ë K O K O Ë K O Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
IP-29 3 0 0  O OK3K3A A K O O A A Ë Ë  K O A A Ë Ë  K OK3 Ë Ë A Ë Ë A Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-30 2 0 0  O OK2K2A A  OI  OK2 OK2 O Ë Ë  OI K2 OK2 O Ë Ë  OI K2 Ë Ë A Ë Ë A Ë Ë ËK2 OK2 O Ë Ë  OI K2 O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
IP-31 2 1 0  O OK2K2  K  K  K O O A A  K O K O K O A A  K O K O K OK2K2K2AK2K2A  K A A Ë Ë  K O K O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K O Ë Ë K2K2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë
IP-32 1 1 0  O O  K  K  K  K  OI  O  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K  K  K A  K  K A  K A A  K O  K O  K O K O  OI  K O  K O K OË K O K O Ë  K O Ë Ë  K O  K O K O Ë K O K O Ë K O Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
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MP-1 1 1 1  O – A A A – A O Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-2 2 1 1  O – A A A – A O Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-3 2 2 1  O – K2  K A – A O A  K O Ë  O Ë K2  K Ë – ËK2 ËK2 Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 Ë K2 Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-4 3 2 1  O – K3K2A – A O A K2 O Ë  O Ë K3 K2 Ë – ËK3 ËK3 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 O Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 O Ë Ë Ë Ë K3 Ë K3 Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK3 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-5 2 2 1  O – K2  K  K –  K  O A  K O  K O O K O K2  K  K –  K K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë  K O  K O O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë K O  K O  K O K O K O K O K2 K2 K2 K2  K  K  K  K  K  K K2K2K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K
MP-6 1 0 1  O –  K  K  K –  K  O A A A  O A  K  K  K –  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K
MP-7 2 0 1  O – K2K2K2 – K2  O A A A  O A K2 K2 K2 – K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2 Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2 K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2K2
MP-8 1 1 1  O –  K  K  K –  K  O A A A  O A  K  K  K –  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K  K
MP-9 2 1 1  O – K2  K  K –  K  O A  K O  K O O K O K2  K  K –  K K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K  K  K Ë  K O  K O O K O Ë Ë Ë Ë K O  K O  K O K O K O K O K2 K2 K2 K2  K  K  K  K  K  K K2K2K2K2K2K2  K  K  K  K
MP-10 1 1 1  O OA A A – A O Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-11 2 1 1  O OA A A – A O Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-12 1 0 1  O –  K  K A – A O A A Ë  O Ë  K  K Ë – Ë  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-13 1 0 1  O –  K  K  K – A O A A A  O Ë  K  K  K – Ë  K  K  K Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K  K Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
MP-14 2 0 1  O – K2K2A – A O A A Ë  O Ë K2 K2 Ë – ËK2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K2 Ë K2 Ë Ë K2 Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-15 2 0 0  O OK2K2A – A O A A Ë  O Ë A A Ë  O ËK2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-16 1 0 0  O O  K  K A – A O K O  K O Ë  O Ë  K O K O Ë  O Ë  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë K O  K O Ë  O Ë  K O Ë  K OË Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë  K O Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-17 1 0 0  O O  K  K A – A O A A Ë  O Ë A A Ë  O Ë  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-18 2 0 0  O OK2K2A – A O A A Ë  O Ë A A Ë  O ËK2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-19 1 0 0  O O  K  K  K – A O A A A  O Ë A A A  O Ë  K  K  K Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
MP-20 2 0 0  O OK2K2  K – A O A A  K O O Ë A A  K O O ËK2K2K2 ËK2K2 Ë  K Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  K O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë K O Ë ËK2K2 ËK2 Ë ËK2 Ë Ë Ë
MP-21 1 0 0  O O  K  K  K – A O K O  K O  K O O Ë  K O K O K O O Ë  K  K  K Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë K O  K O  K O O Ë  K O K O K OË K O  K O Ë  K O Ë Ë  K O K O K O Ë K O K O Ë K O Ë Ë  K  K Ë  K Ë Ë  K Ë Ë Ë
MP-22 0 1 1  O – – – I – I  O  O  O A  O A – – I – I – I – I I – I I I I  O  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë – I – I I – I I I I I – I I I I I I I I
MP-23 1 2 1  O –  K – I – I  O K O  O  OI  O  OI  K – I – I  K  KI  K  KI I – I I I I  K O  O  OI  O  OI  K O A  K OA  OI  O  OI  OI  OI  OI  K  KI  K  KI I – I I I I  KI  K  KI  KI  KI  KI I I I I
MP-24 1 1 1  O –  K – I – I  O K O  O  OI  O  OI  K – I – I  K  KI  K  KI I – I I I I  K O  O  OI  O  OI  K O A  K OA  OI  O  OI  OI  OI  OI  K  KI  K  KI I – I I I I  KI  K  KI  KI  KI  KI I I I I
MP-25 0 1 1  O O  O  O A – A O  O  O Ë  O Ë  O  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-26 0 0 0  O O – – A – A O  O  O Ë  O Ë  O  O Ë  O Ë – Ë – Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë Ë  O  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë – Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
MP-27 0 0 0  O O – – I – A O  O  O A  O Ë  O  O A  O Ë – I – Ë I – Ë I Ë Ë  O  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë  O Ë  O Ë Ë  O Ë Ë Ë Ë I – Ë I Ë Ë I Ë Ë Ë
MP-28 1 0 0  O O  K  K I – A O K O  K O  OI  O Ë  K O K O  OI  O Ë  K  KI  K Ë KI  K Ë I Ë Ë K O  K O  OI  O Ë  K O A  K OË A  K O Ë  OI Ë Ë  K O A  K O Ë A  K O Ë  OI Ë Ë KI  K Ë KI Ë Ë KI Ë Ë Ë
MP-29 0 0 0  O O – – I – A O  O  O  OI  O Ë  O  O  OI  O Ë – I – Ë I – Ë I Ë Ë  O  O  OI  O Ë  O  OI  O Ë  OI  O Ë  OI Ë Ë  O  OI  O Ë  OI  O Ë  OI Ë Ë I – Ë I Ë Ë I Ë Ë Ë
Compliance with requirements and best practices
In this section, we present the compliance of EU and non-EU banks with the requirements ex-
tracted from the European regulations [Eur15, Eur17] and the best practices extracted from sev-
eral guidelines [Cen16, PCI17, Gem15, NIS17, Pin09]. The results concerning EU banks are
shown in Table 11, whereas those related to non-EU banks are shown in Table 12.
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Table 11: Compliance with Requirements and Best Practices (EU banks).
Bank name C RL1 RL2 RL3 RL4 RL5 RL6 RL7 RL8 RL9 BP1 BP2 BP3 BP4 BP5 BP6 BP7 BP8
Deutsche Bank DE                 
VR Bank DE                 
Commerzbank DE                 
HSBC UK                 
Barclays UK                 
LLoyds UK                 
BNP Paribas FR                 
Credit Agricole FR          –       
Sociètè Generale FR                 
Unicredit IT                 
Banca Intesa IT                 
Banco BPM IT                 
Banco Santander ES          –       
BBVA ES          –       
La Caixa ES                 
ING Bank NL                 
Rabobank NL          –       
ABN AMRO NL          –       
Nordea SW                 
Svenska Handelsb. SW                 
SEB SW                 
Legend: Requirements/best practices can be fulfilled, partially violated or violated.
Table 12: Compliance with Requirements and Best Practices (non-EU banks).
Bank name C RL1 RL2 RL3 RL4 RL5 RL6 RL7 RL8 RL9 BP1 BP2 BP3 BP4 BP5 BP6 BP7 BP8
ICBC CN          –       
CCB CN          –       
ABC CN          –       
Chase US          –       
Bank Of America US          –       
Wells Fargo US          –       
UBS CH                 
Credit Suisse CH                 
Raiffeisen CH                 
Legend: Requirements/best practices can be fulfilled, partially violated or violated.
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